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MARKET FAILURE AND NON-STANDARD
CONTRACTING: HOW THE GHOST OF PERFECT
COMPETITION STILL HAUNTS ANTITRUST
Alan . Meese*
ABSTRACT
Modem antitrust policy has a 'love hate' relationship with non-standard contracts
that can overcome market failure. On the one hand, courts have abandoned
various per se rules that once condemned such agreements outright, concluding
that many non-standard contracts may produce benefits that are cognizable
under the antitrust laws. 1 The prospect of such benefits, it is said, compels courts
to analyze these agreements under the Rule of Reason, under which the tribunal
determines whether a given restraint enhances or destroys competition.2 At the
same time, courts, scholars, and the enforcement agencies have embraced
methods of rule of reason analysis that are unduly hostile to such agreements.3 In
particular, courts and others are too quick to view such agreements and the
market outcomes they produce as manifestations of market power. This article
seeks to explain why these agreements are still the object of undue hostility.
The article finds an explanation in the continued influence of the perfect
competition model on antitrust thinking. The article begins by offering a revised
explanation for the so-called 'inhospitality era' of antitrust, an explanation that
helps shed light on the current state of affairs. During this period, which
stretched from the 1930s until 1978, scholars, courts and the enforcement
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See State Oil v Khan, 522 US 3 (US Supreme Court 1997) (abandoning per se ban on maximum
resale price maintenance); Continental T V v. GTE Sylvania, 433 US 36 (US Supreme Court
1977) (abandoning per se ban on vertically-imposed exclusive territories).
2 See Continental TV v GTE Sylvania, 433 US 36 (US Supreme Court 1977) 49-59; see also
Chicago Board of Trade v United States, 246 US 231, 238 (US Supreme Court 1918) (describing
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3 See Alan J. Meese, 'Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason', 2003 Illinois Law
Review 77 (2003).
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agencies condemned most non-standard contracts as unlawfulperse or nearly so.
Beginning in the 1960s, the advent of transaction cost economics (TCE) caused
many scholars to recognize that non-standard contracts can produce significant
efficiencies by reducing transaction costs, and this recognition has resulted in
the relaxation of most, but not all, per se rules in the courts. Practitioners of TCE
traced the inhospitality tradition to neoclassical price theory, its paradigmatic
technological conception of the firm and the resulting hostility toward partial
integration, which by its nature cannot produce technical efficiencies. In other
words, these scholars saw the problem as arising 'from the inside-out': because
economists of the era misunderstood why firms exist, they could not understand
less complete forms of integration, either. TCE, it is said, offered a new
explanation for the firm, an explanation that also helped explain partial
integration in the form of non-standard contracts.
Still, lingering manifestations of the inhospitality tradition in the form of
unjustified per se rules and an unduly hostile Rule of Reason suggest that the TCE
revolution has not been entirely successful where antitrust doctrine is concerned.
As a result, it seems likely that there is some shortcoming in TCE's account of the
inhospitality tradition, a shortcoming that has undermined the efforts of TCE's
proponents to convince courts and agencies to reform antitrust doctrine. This
article argues that the conventional explanation simply begs the question why
inhospitality-era scholars did not recognize that non-standard agreements could
produce non-technical efficiencies by overcoming market failure. The article also
offers an explanation for this latter oversight, an explanation rooted in the period's
paradigmatic approach to analyzing questions of market failure.4 This approach,
it is shown, rested upon a methodological habit common to this pre-Coasean era
of assuming that 'perfect competition' and 'market failure' co-existed. By
imagining perfect competition, and framing market failure as a phenomenon that
thwarted an optimal allocation of resources, which perfect competition would
otherwise produce, the methodology of the era effectively blocked the recognition
of certain market failures of particular relevance to antitrust policy. More
importantly, this methodology blocked the recognition that private contracts
could overcome market failure, because such contracts necessarily entailed one or
more departures from the very perfect competition that was the foundation for the
analysis. In the absence of a benign explanation for non-standard contracts,
scholars and others naturally viewed non-standard contracts as manifestations of
market power and thus proper objects of regulation designed to optimize the
allocation of resources.
Of course, the Coase theorem has taught us that perfect competition cannot
coexist with market failure.5 Moreover, practitioners of TCE have shown that
many non-standard agreements are in fact methods of reducing the cost
of transactions, that is, relying upon an unbridled market to conduct
4 See Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press
1970).
5 See Ronald H. Coase, 'The Problem of Social Cost', 3 JLE 1 (1960).
Market Failure and Non-Standard Contracting 23
economic activity.6 Such agreements are beneficial, it is said, precisely because
unbridled markets sometimes fail to produce an optimal allocation of
resources. 7 At the same time, however, courts, scholars, and enforcement
officials still lack a complete understanding of the market failure concept and
its relation to antitrust analysis of non-standard contracts. In particular, courts
and others do not seem to recognize that such agreements entail contractual
internalization of externalities that alter 'competitive' patterns of trade and
produce prices and the output different from what would be obtained in an
unbridled market. The paper ends by suggesting that perfect competition-the
normative and interpretive bedrock of modern antitrust-still blocks the
recognition that certain non-standard contracts produce benefits by over-
coming market failure and thus altering the terms or patterns of trade.
Antitrust regulation is, after all, designed to thwart a particular form of market
failure-the misallocation of resources resulting from the exercise of market
power. As shown below, inhospitality-era economists used perfect competition as
a methodological starting point for their analysis of market failure. In the same
way, modern antitrust scholars embrace a peculiar version of perfect
competition-modified to exclude externality by assumption-as a normative
ideal and starting point for the interpretation of business behavior in their effort to
identify and quash market failure qua market power. The perfect competition
framework is sufficiently elastic to accommodate claims that mergers reduce
production costs, or non-standard agreements 'reduce transaction costs.'
Modem scholars recognize that such practices are often beneficial, even as they
result in departures from perfect competition. At the same time, scholars who
embrace perfect competition as a starting point thereby assume that any
departure from this antiseptic model--even if beneficial-reflects some exercise
of market power. It is thus no surprise that many scholars treat non-standard
contracts that exclude competition or collectively alter price and output as
manifestations of market power. Thus, modern antitrust's embrace of perfect
competition and its core vision of atomistic rivalry apparently blocks the
recognition that non-standard contracts altering collective prices and outputs or
thwarting rivals' access to markets can in fact internalize externalities, change a
firm's cost structure, and thus alter price or output without creating or exercising
market power. As a result, modern scholars still treat agreements that expressly or
effectively alter prices or exclude rivals as manifestations of market power, the
antithesis of the unbridled rivalry and the resulting prices implied by the perfect
competition model and its more realistic variants. So long as scholars cling to
perfect competition as a normative and descriptive ideal, antitrust policy will
likely misinterpret some contracts that overcome market failure.
Part I examines certain aspects of current law that reflect an incoherent
approach to contracts that overcome market failure. Part II examines the
6 See nn 119-27, below and accompanying text.
7 See nn 123-27, below and accompanying text.
24 Journal of Competition Law and Economics 1(1)
standard account of the so-called inhospitality tradition and offers a critique of
that account. Part III offers an alternative account of the inhospitality tradition, an
account grounded in the claim that the period's paradigm for addressing
questions of market failure depended upon the methodological habit of assuming
that perfect competition coexisted with such failures. Part IV examines the
treatment of perfect competition and market failure by representative modern
antitrust scholars and suggests that the perfect competition model still blocks
antitrust scholars from recognizing the exact manner in which non-standard
contracts overcome market failure. It is thus no surprise that courts and
enforcement officials are still unduly hostile to many such contracts.
I. THE INCOHERENCE OF CURRENT LAW
Courts, scholars and enforcement agencies were uniformly hostile to non-
standard contracts for more than four decades.8 During this 'inhospitality era'
agencies challenged and judges condemned most such restraints as unlawful
per se or nearly so under Section 1 of the Sherman Act or Section 3 of the
Clayton Act. 9 At the same time, courts and the agencies condemned outright
many non-standard contracts as 'exclusionary' practices that offended Section
2 of the Sherman Act if adopted by a monopolist. 10 According to scholars,
8 Of course, 'the firm' is simply a particular type of non-standard contract, with the result that
references to 'non-standard contracts' could encompass both complete and partial integration.
See Steven N. S. Cheung, 'The Contractual Nature of the Firm', 26 JLE 1 (1983); Ronald
H. Coase, 'Nature of the Firm', 4 Economica (n.s.) 386 (1937). See also Benjamin Klein, Robert
Crawford and Armen Alchian, 'Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents and the Competitive
Contracting Process', 21 JLE 297 (1978), 326. However, this paper follows Professor
Williamson's example and uses the term 'non-standard contract' to refer only to partial
contractual integration. See Oliver E. Williamson, Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York:
Free Press; London: Collier Macmillan 1985) 13, 23-25, 371. Examples include tying, exclusive
dealing, minimum resale price maintenance, and various horizontal restraints ancillary to
otherwise valid joint ventures. Ibid, at 13.
It should be noted that Williamson's definition, and thus the one employed in this paper, is
very expansive, including within its ambit any contract that does more than simply mediate the
passage of title at a uniform price. Ibid, at 23 (distinguishing between nonstandard contracts and
'classical market exchange,' whereby 'product is sold at a uniform price to all comers without
restriction'. As such, this formulation would include various garden variety agreements such as
warranties or return provisions. Thus, any assertion that scholars were once hostile to all or most
'nonstandard contracts' defined in this way probably sweeps too broadly. This paper therefore
employs the term 'nonstandard contract' somewhat loosely, to refer simply to those agreements
that were the object of antitrust concern and condemnation during the inhospitality era. I am
grateful to Edmund Kitch for pressing me on the meaning of 'non-standard' in this context.
9 Alan J. Meese, 'Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason', 2003 Illinois Law Review
77 (2003), 124-34 (recounting this hostility); Frank H. Easterbrook, 'Is There A Ratchet In
Antitrust Law?', 60 Texas Law Review 705-715 (1982).
10 See Alan J. Meese, 'Monopolization, Exclusion, and the Theory of the Firm', 89 Minnesota
Law Review 743, 793-808 (2005). See also United States v Grinnell Corp., 384 US 563, 578 (US
Supreme Court 1966) (banning exclusive dealing clause without regard to benefits).
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courts, and the agencies, these non-standard agreements involved the exercise
of market power in one of two ways. First, a firm could use such power to
impose these contracts on unwilling buyers, thus excluding rivals and
protecting or enhancing the firm's existing power." Second, several firms
could employ such contracts to create and exercise market power that none
would possess individually. 12
More recently, courts, scholars and agencies have taken a significantly more
charitable view of such restraints, abandoning or softening numerous per se
rules. 13 This new attitude followed what might be called a revolution in
Industrial Organization in the form of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE). 14
According to TCE, most non-standard contracts, including those that are
'horizontal,' are methods of reducing the cost of transactions, that is, the cost
of relying upon an unbridled market to conduct economic activity.15 Put
another way, such contracts can overcome various 'market failures' that would
prevent an optimal allocation of resources. 16
Thus, while it may appear that manufacturers 'force' or 'impose' some
non-standard agreements on unwilling purchasers, agreements that reduce
11 See Former Enterprises v United States Steel Corp., 394 US 495 (US Supreme Court 1969)
(tying); Perma Life Mufflers v International Parts Corp., 392 US 134 (US Supreme Court 1968)
(holding that exclusive dealing and tying contracts were the result of coercion).
12 See United States v TOPCO, 405 US 596 (US Supreme Court 1972) (exclusive territories
ancillary to valid joint venture); Kior's, Inc. v Broadway Hale Stores, 359 US 207 (US Supreme
Court 1957) (group boycott by rival suppliers).
13 See State Oil v Khan, 522 US 3 (US Supreme Court 1997) passim; BMI v CBS, 441 US 1 (US
Supreme Court 1979) (finding that horizontal price fixing ancillary to blanket license agreement
was subject to rule of reason analysis); Continental TV v GTE Sylvania, 433 US 36 (US
Supreme Court 1977) passim. See also Alan J. Meese, 'Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule
of Reason', 2003 Illinois Law Review 77 (2003), 141-44 (describing judicial retreat from some
per se rules).
14 See Alan J. Meese, 'Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason', 2003 Illinois Law
Review 77 (2003), 141-44 (describing influence of TCE on modem antitrust doctrine); Oliver
E. Williamson, 'Delimiting Antitrust', 76 Georgetown Law Journal 271 (1987), 274
(contending that TCE worked a 'genuine scientific revolution'); Williamson, see above n 8,
at 15-42 (summarizing TCE); ibid, at 365-84 (discussing various antitrust ramifications of
TCE).
15 Williamson, above n 8, at 28 (articulating this presumption) See also Carl Dahlman, 'The
Problem of Externality', 22 JLE 141 (1979) (defining transaction costs).
16 See Alan J. Meese, 'Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason', 2003 Illinois Law
Review 77 (2003), 136-41. See also William F. Baxter, 'The Viability of Vertical Restraints
Doctrine', 75 California Law Review 933 (1987), 945-46; Wesley J. Liebeler, 'Horizontal
Restrictions, Efficiency, and the Per Se Rule', 33 UCLA Law Review 1019 (1986); Frank
H. Easterbrook, 'Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason', 53 Antitrust Law Journal 135
(1984) (contending that vertical distribution restraints are generally methods of reducing the
cost of relying upon markets); Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1976) 159-67 (arguing that vertical and horizontal
distribution restraints are generally procompetitive); Robert H. Bork, 'The Rule of Reason and
the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division', 75 Yale Law Journal 373 (1966), 430-
38 (explaining how ancillary horizontal exclusive territories can ensure optimal promotion by
joint ventures).
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transaction costs are best understood as the result of voluntary integration
between the parties.1 7 For instance, firms that fear future opportunism by
their trading partners may offer those partners favorable pricing or other
treatment if the partners agree to contractual provisions that attenuate the
prospect of such opportunism.1 8 In this way, the at-risk party can induce its
trading partners to internalize the harm that future opportunism would
cause, thereby persuading the partner to adopt a contractual restraint that
maximizes the parties' joint welfare over time. 19 Moreover, while some
non-standard agreements result in prices or other terms of trade different
from those that existed before the restraint, such changes may simply reflect
the elimination of market failure and the resulting internalization of
externality that had produced inefficient market outcomes.20 This intern-
alization, in turn, will change the firms' costs and thus alter the price
consumers pay for what is now a different product.2 ' In short, TCE
undermines any claim that non-standard contracts generally reflect an
exercise of market power.
Despite this sea-change in economic thought, various aspects of antitrust
doctrine still reflect an undue focus on 'market power' as the cause or
consequence of non-standard contracts. While TCE has led courts to abandon
17 See Alan J. Meese, 'Monopolization, Exclusion, and the Theory of the Firm', 89 Minnesota
Law Review 743, 822-29, 832-42 (2005) (explaining how beneficial non-standard contracts
obtained by a monopolist are in fact instances of voluntary integration); Alan J. Meese,
'Tying Meets The New Institutional Economics', 146 University of Pennsylvania Law
Review 1 (1997), 61-94 (explaining how tying contracts that overcome market failure are in
fact instances of voluntary integration); Williamson, see above n 8, at 33; Benjamin Klein,
'Transaction Cost Determinants of "Unfair" Contractual Arrangements', 70 American
Economic Review 356 (1980), 360-61 (explaining how parties can enter non-standard
contracts without regard to market power).
8 Williamson, see above n 8, at 33; Benjamin Klein, 'Transaction Cost Determinants of
"Unfair" Contractual Arrangements', 70 American Economic Review 356 (1980), 357-58
(contract price will reflect prospect of opportunism in light of contractual terms). See also
Alan J. Meese, 'Tying Meets The New Institutional Economics', 146 University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 1 (1997), 61-94 (showing that sellers can obtain agreement to
tying contracts by offering to sell tying product separately at a premium that reflects the
risk of opportunism that seller would suffer absent some mechanism preventing such
conduct).
19 See Charles Goetz and Robert Scott, 'Principles of Relational Contracts', 67 Virginia Law
Review 1089 (1981), 1094-95 (predicting that parties will adopt relational contracts that will
induce them to replicate the behavior of a single, unified firm over time).
20 See Alan J. Meese, 'Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason', 2003 Illinois Law
Review 77 (2003), 138-41 (explaining TCE's conclusion that unbridled competition can result
in market failure correctable by non-standard contracts); Frank H. Easterbrook, 'Vertical
Arrangements and the Rule of Reason', 53 Antitrust Law Journal 135 (1984), 156 (beneficial
vertical restraints often increase prices).
21 See Frank H. Easterbrook, 'Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason', 53 Antitrust Law
Journal 135 (1984), 147-49 (explaining that vertical arrangements can create new product that
includes information that consumers desire); nn 266-69, below and accompanying text
(explaining how non-standard contracts can facilitate specialization and thus help firms produce
unique products).
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certain per se rules, judges have reaffirmed others.22 At the same time, judges
and the enforcement agencies have stubbornly clung to the modes of rule of
reason analysis that reflect unjustified assumptions that certain non-standard
agreements involve the exercise of market power.2 3 The following discussion
highlights three such instances of undue hostility: (1) rule of reason analysis of
horizontal arrangements in the courts; (2) rule of reason analysis of such
agreements by the enforcement agencies and (3) the analysis of non-standard
'exclusionary' agreements obtained by monopolists and scrutinized under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
A. NCAA and the Rule of Reason
Consider the Supreme Court's most fulsome application of the Rule of
Reason: NCAA v Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, which set the
tone for modern rule of reason analysis.2 4 There the Court evaluated the
NCAA's restrictions on the price and output of games licensed to television
networks by the league's members. The Court acknowledged that such
restrictions would ordinarily be unlawful per se under then-current law, even
if ancillary to an otherwise lawful venture, because they interfered with
rivalry between competing firms. 25 Nonetheless, the Court held that
application of the per se rule would be inappropriate, given that some
cooperation between rivals was necessary to produce the venture product:
college football.2 6 While the Court emphasized the necessity of cooperation
on items like rules of the game, eligibility requirements, and scheduling, it
also approved (in dicta) the league's rule, placing a ceiling on the amount
that a school could pay an athlete to attend.2 7 According to the Court, if a
single school tried to maintain amateur-level compensation on its own, it
22 See Business Electronics Corp. v Sharp Electronics, 485 US 723 (US Supreme Court 1988)
(reaffirming per se ban on minimum resale price maintenance) (dicta); Arizona v Maricopa
County Medical Society, 457 US 332 (US Supreme Court 1982) 343 (reaffirming per se ban on
ancillary horizontal maximum price fixing).
23 See State Oil v Khan, 522 US 3 (US Supreme Court 1997) (rejecting per se rule against
maximum resale price maintenance); Continental T V v GTE Sylvania, 433 US 36 (US Supreme
Court 1977) (rejecting per se rule against vertical exclusive territories).
24 468 US 85 (US Supreme Court 1984).
25 See NCAA v Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 US 85 (US Supreme Court
1984) 98-100, nn 18-19 (citing TOPCO, 405 U.S. at 608-611); (declaring horizontal
limitation on territories ancillary to legitimate joint venture unlawful per se, despite absence of
market power by venture); United States v Sealy, Inc., 388 US 350 (US Supreme Court 1967)
(declaring ancillary price restrictions unlawful per se without any analysis of market power).
26 See NCAA v Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 US 85 (US Supreme Court
1984) 101-03; ibid, at 101 ('What is critical [to rejection of the per se rule] is that this case
involves an industry in which horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is
to be available at all.').
27 See NCAA v Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 US 85 (US Supreme Court
1984) 101-02.
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would soon lose attractive athletes and suffer on the playing field and thus in
the marketplace. 28 Only collective action setting the price paid for the
athletes' services could preserve the integrity of the game by ensuring that
amateur college football did not degenerate into semi-pro football.2 9 In this
way, the Court said, such a restraint could increase the number of
entertainment options available to consumers.
30
The Court's refusal to apply the per se rule in NCAA seems to reflect a
nascent recognition that some horizontal restrictions on rivalry can overcome
market failures and thus enhance the results of overall competition. 31 After all,
the Court approved (in dicta) a horizontal agreement that presumably reduced
'wages' paid student athletes below the level that a 'free market' would
produce. 32 The Court did so because it believed that unbridled competition
between member schools would produce the 'wrong' price for labor, because
schools would not internalize the impact of their salary decisions on the
integrity of the league product.3 3 Indeed, in reaching its conclusion, the Court
expressly invoked its earlier decision in Continental T.V. v GTE Sylvania, for
the proposition that 'a restraint in a limited aspect of a market may actually
enhance market wide competition.' 3 4 Sylvania, of course, relied quite expressly
28 Ibid, at 101 -02 ('The NCAA seeks to market a particular brand of football-college football.
The identification of this "product" with an academic tradition differentiates college football
from and makes it more popular than professional sports to which it might otherwise be
comparable, such as, for example, minor league baseball. In order to preserve the character and
quality of "the product," athletes must not be paid, must be required to attend class, and the
like. And the integrity of "the product" cannot be preserved except by mutual agreement; if an
institution adopted such restrictions unilaterally, its effectiveness as a competitor on the playing
field might soon be destroyed.').
29 See NCAA v Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 US 85 (US Supreme Court
1984) 102 (explaining that such limits were necessary to prevent college football from becoming
identified in the public mind with 'professional sports to which it might otherwise be
comparable, such as, for example, minor league baseball.').
30 See ibid ('In performing this role [enforcing limits on payments to athletes] its actions widen
consumer choice-not only the choices available to sports fans but also those available to
athletes-and hence can be viewed as procompetitive.').
31 See Alan J. Meese, 'Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason', 2003 Illinois Law
Review 77 (2003), 142-43 (interpreting NCAA and related decisions in this manner). See
Chicago Professional Sports Limited Partnership v NBA, 95 F3d 593 (US 7"h Circuit 1996) (relying
on NCAA for proposition that horizontal restrictions that may combat free riding should be
analyzed under the Rule of Reason); Polk Brothers, Inc. v Forest City Enterprises, 776 F2d 185
(US 7th Circuit 1985) (same).
32 See NCAA v Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 US 85 (US Supreme Court
1984) 101-02.
33 See Alan J. Meese, 'Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason', 2003 Illinois Law
Review 77 (2003), 142-43. But see Gary R. Roberts, 'The NCAA, Antitrust, and Consumer
Welfare', 70 Tulane Law Review 2631 (1996) (contending, without mention of market failure
concept, that unbridled competition between schools would produce amateurism if consumers
demanded it).
34 See NCAA v Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 US 85 (US Supreme Court
1984) 103 (citing Continental TV v GTE Sylvania, 433 US 36 (US Supreme Court 1977)).
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on market failure reasoning. 35 Such reasoning would seem to imply that a
restraint could enhance competition by increasing prices.
36
While nominally limited to collective action with respect to price, similar logic
readily carries over to restraints impacting output as well. Almost by their nature,
after all, sports leagues must determine the total output of their members.37 In
the absence of such an agreement, unbridled decision making could result in 'too
many' games, transforming student athletes into quasi-professionals. While
such restrictions could reduce output measured in the raw number of games,
they likely enhance other measures of output.38 In the same way, numerous
other collective restrictions on output can enhance the welfare of society and
consumers.
39
35 See Continental T Vv GTE Sylvania, 433 US 36 (US Supreme Court 1977) 55 ('The availability
and quality of such services [i.e., promotional expenditures] affect the manufacturer's goodwill
and the competitiveness of his product. Because of market imperfections such as the so-called
"free rider" effect, these services might not be provided by retailers in a purely competitive
situation, despite the fact that each retailer's benefit would be greater if all provided the services
than if none did'); Williamson, see above n 8, at 372 (asserting that Sylvania decision was the
result of changes in economic theory wrought by TCE); ibid ('The intellectual basis for
assessing the merits of alternative modes of organization evidently experienced substantial
changes in the 10-year interval [before Sylvania]. Public policy was transformed as a
consequence.').
36 See Alan J. Meese, 'Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason', 2003 Illinois Law
Review 77 (2003), 156-58. See also William F. Baxter, 'The Viability of Vertical Restraints
Doctrine', 75 California Law Review 933 (1987), 945-46 (vertical restrictions that
overcome market failure naturally lead to higher dealer prices); Frank H. Easterbrook,
'Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason', 53 Antitrust Law Journal 135 (1984), 156
(same).
37 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy (St Paul, MN: West Publishing 1999) 262
(NCAA football will not work without an agreement regulating the number of games that the
teams will play.).
38 Cf. Chicago Professional Sports Limited Partnership v NBA, 95 F3d 593, 598-99 (US 7h Circuit
1996) (explaining how output decisions by a joint venture can be analogous to similar decisions
by single entities).
39 For instance, partners in a law firm may agree that they will only practice law as members of the
partnership and thus not 'moonlight,' i.e., practice law in their individual capacity. Such
ancillary contractual restrictions may well reduce the total hours practiced by the two partners,
i.e., output. Nonetheless, such agreements are generally enforced--even 'encouraged.' See
United States v Addyston Ipe & Steel Co., 85 F 271,280 (US 6"h Circuit 1898) (Taft, J.) (treating
such restrictions as paradigmatic ancillary restraints that the law should 'encourage.'); Robert
Bork, 'The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division', 75 Yale
Law Journal 373 (1965), 381-83 (explaining how such restrictions could prevent free riding by
partners and thus enhance welfare). Similarly, a covenant not to compete can reduce the output
of the party bound to it. At the same time, such restrictions can create incentives for individuals
to create and build up businesses in the first place. Ibid; Michael Trebilcock, The Common Law
of Restraint of Trade: A Legal and Economic Analysis (Toronto: Carswell 1986) 252-53. Finally,
collective restrictions on the use of natural resources can eliminate wasteful over-investment in
resource exploitation while at the same time preventing overuse of the resources themselves. See
Jonathan Adler, 'Antitrust as an Obstacle to Marine Resource Conservation', 61 Washington &
Lee Law Review 3 (2004); Fred S. McChesney, 'Talking 'Bout My Antitrust Generation:
Competition For and In The Field of Competition Law', 52 Emory Law Journal 1401 (2003),
1418-21.
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Nonetheless, the Court conducted rule of reason analysis in a manner that
was inconsistent with any recognition that horizontal restraints could overcome
market failures and produce price or output better than that produced by an
unbridled market. After deciding not to condemn the restraints outright, the
Court went on to analyze them in light of numerous findings made by the trial
court.40 The Court began by noting the lower court's finding that, because of the
restraints, prices were higher, and output was lower, than they otherwise would
have been.41 The Court defined 'output' as the total number of games broadcast
by the member schools, without adjusting for any impact the restraints might
have had on the quality of the games and the resulting broadcasts.4 2
Such proof, the Court said, sufficed to establish a prima facie case that the
restrictions were unreasonable.4 3 In so doing, the Court rejected the
defendants' argument that proof of market power was an indispensable
element of a prima facie case. 44 Instead, the Court embraced the assertion by
the United States that proof of higher price or lower output established a prima
facie case, because such proof itself established that the defendants possessed
the market power necessary to create anticompetitive harm.4 5 Indeed, the
Court went even further, a few pages later, suggesting that the mere existence
of a restraint that expressly invoked price or output would itself suffice to
establish a prima facie case.4 6
40 See NCAA v Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 US 85 (US Supreme Court
1984) 104-20 (evaluating purportedly harmful effects and defendants' various justifications).
41 Ibid, at 105-06 ('The district court found that if member institutions were free to sell television
rights, many more games would be shown on television, and that the NCAA's output restriction
has the effect of raising the price the networks pay for television rights.').
42 See NCAA v Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 US 85 (US Supreme Court
1984) 104-07; cf. ibid, at 129-30 (White, J. dissenting) (taking the Court to task for relying
upon number of games simpliciter as the measure of output).
43 See NCAA v Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 US 85 (US Supreme Court
1984) 112-13.
44 Ibid, at 110. See also Frank H. Easterbrook, 'The Limits of Antitrust', 63 Texas Law Review 1
(1984), 17-23 (arguing that absence of market power should doom a plaintiff's case).
45 See NCAA v Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 US 85 (US Supreme Court
1984) 110, n 42 ('Because a judgment about market power is the means by which the effects of
the conduct on the market place can be assessed, market power is only one test of
reasonableness... where the anticompetitive effects of conduct can be ascertained through
means short of extensive market analysis, and where no countervailing competitive virtues are
evident, a lengthy analysis of market power is not necessary.') (quoting Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae, at 19-20).
46 Responding to the defendants' claim that proof of market power was necessary to establish a
prima facie case, the Court stated that the mere existence of what it called a 'naked' restraint
sufficed to establish a prima facie case without regard to the presence of market power. See
NCAA v Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 US 85 (US Supreme Court 1984)
110 ('We have never required proof of market power in such a case. This market restraint on
price and output requires some competitive justification even in the absence of a detailed market
analysis.'). The Court then went on to affirm the trial court's finding that the NCAA did, in fact,
possess power in the relevant market. Ibid, at 111 - 12; ibid, at 115 (rejecting one of defendants'
justifications because the defendants did not face interbrand competition). See also Gary
R. Roberts, 'The NCAA, Antitrust, and Consumer Welfare', 70 Tulane Law Review 2631
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The Court's conclusion that higher prices or lower output establish a prima
facie case seems inconsistent with its previous conclusion that such restraints
avoid per se condemnation because they may overcome market failure and
improve upon the price and output produced by an unbridled market. 47 Still,
reliance on 'actual anticompetitive harm' to establish a prima facie case does
not itself preclude judicial recognition that a restraint is reasonable because it
overcomes a market failure. After all, courts could allow defendants to adduce
evidence that such restraints overcome a market failure and allow such
evidence to rebut any presumption that the restrictions in question produce
anticompetitive harm. Such proof would not simply meet a defendant's
burden of production; it would, if unrebutted, entitle the defendant to a
judgment.4 8
The NCAA opinion, however, suggested a much different approach
endorsed by leading scholars.4 9 In particular, the Court made it clear that
proof that a restraint overcomes a market failure does not in any way rebut the
presumption that arises if a plaintiff shows that a restraint affects price or
output. According to the Court, proof of such effects casts upon the defendant
a burden of proof, not simply a burden of production. 50 Moreover, mere proof
that such restrictions overcome a market failure cannot satisfy that burden.
Instead, the Court rejected the defendants' various justifications on the ground
that the proof offered did not tend to undermine the district court's factual
finding that the restrictions reduced output and increased price. 51 This
(1996), 2651 (concluding expressly that existence of'legitimate competitive counterarguments
that allow [the NCAA] to avoid the per se bullet should not also allow it to call into question the
underlying assumptions about the anticompetitive nature of a uniform wage.').
47 See Alan J. Meese, 'Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason', 2003 Illinois Law
Review 77 (2003), 145- 61; Matsushita Electric Industrial Corp. v Zenith Radio Corp., 475 US 574
(US Supreme Court 1986) 587-95 (evidence that is equally consistent with benign and
harmful interpretations of challenged conduct cannot by itself support an inference of harm).
48 See Alan J. Meese, 'Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason', 2003 Illinois Law
Review 77 (2003), 161-67 (arguing that proof that a restraint overcomes a market failure
should suffice to rebut a prima facie case that is based solely on actual detrimental effects). Cf.
Phillip Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law (New York: Aspen Law & Business
2003) vol. 7,1 1507c, 385-86 (such proof by defendants meets a burden of production and thus
sends case to a jury absent additional proof by the plaintiff).
49 See n 67, below (collecting works by leading scholars endorsing the approach taken in
NCAA).
50 See NCAA v Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 US 85 (US Supreme Court
1984) 113 ('Under the Rule of Reason, these hallmarks of anticompetitive behavior place upon
petitioners a heavy burden of establishing an affirmative defense which competitively justifies
this apparent deviation from the operation of a free market.') (citing National Society of
Professional Engineers v United States, 435 US 679 (US Supreme Court 1978) 692-96.
51 See NCAA v Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 US 85 (US Supreme Court
1984) 114 ('There is therefore no predicate in the district court's factual findings for petitioner's
efficiency justification. Indeed, petitioner's argument is refuted by the district court's finding
concerning price and output. If the NCAA's television plan produced procompetitive
efficiencies, the plan would increase output and reduce the price of televised games. The
district court's findings accordingly undermine petitioner's position.'); ibid, at 115 (rejecting
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approach was consistent with the Court's holding in a previous case that a
justification is not even cognizable in the first place unless it rests on a claim
that the restraint will reduce price and increase output as measured by the
Court when determining the existence of a prima facie case.
52
The Court's approach to rule of reason analysis contradicted its apparent
recognition that horizontal restrictions can overcome market failure.53 For one
thing, the Court's requirement that the defendants establish an 'affirmative
defense' that 'justified' the restrictions on rivalry signaled an assumption that
any benefit of the restraint coexisted with the anticompetitive exercise of
market power irrevocably presumed, once the plaintiff established a prima
facie case.54 Given this assumption, proof that the restrictions overcame a
market failure would in no way 'rebut' the presumption of market power
underlying the prima facie case; they would instead justify the anticompetitive
harm that exists despite such benefits. 55 Similarly, the Court's requirement
that any procompetitive benefits manifest themselves through prices that were
lower than those that existed before the restraint is entirely at odds with the
Court's earlier suggestion that horizontal restraints can be 'reasonable' if they
overcome a market failure through contractual collective action that results in
price or output that is different from that previously produced by unbridled
rivalry.56 Thus, NCAA reflects an incomplete understanding of the meaning of
market failure and the relationship between contracts that overcome market
failure, on the one hand, and market power, on the other.
NCAA is not an isolated decision. Just 2 years later the Court repeated its
claim that a restraint's impact on price or output sufficed to establish that the
defendants had exercised market power to the detriment of consumers.
57
claim that plan was necessary to penetrate the market through an effective package sale because
the district court found that the restrictions reduced output); Ibid, at 119-20 (holding that the
'most important reason' for rejecting defendants' claim that the restriction enhanced
'competitive balance' between venture participants was the 'finding that consumption [i.e.,
the raw number of games] will materially increase if the [restraints] are lifted.').
52 See National Society of Professional Engineers v United States, 435 US 679 (US Supreme Court
1978) 693 (justification that rests on claim that the restraint will increase prices is not
cognizable).
53 See nn 31-36, above and accompanying text.
54 See Alan J. Meese, 'Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason', 2003 Illinois Law
Review 77 (2003), 146-47, 162 (explaining how rule of reason balancing test applied by NCAA
and other courts rests on such an assumption). Cf. Oliver Williamson, 'Economies as an
Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Trade-Offs', 58 American Economic Review 18 (1968)
(articulating partial equilibrium trade-off model for analyzing mergers that simultaneously
create market power and economies of scale).
55 Alan J. Meese, 'Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason', 2003 Illinois Law Review
77 (2003), 108-10 (explaining this aspect of NCAA and other rule of reason caselaw).
56 See nn 31-36, above and accompanying text.
57 See Federal Trade Commission v Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 US 447 (US Supreme Court
1986) 460-61 (explaining that proof of market power is simply 'a 'surrogate for detrimental
effects,' and that proof of the latter was sufficient to establish a prima facie case) (quoting Phillip
Areeda, Antitrust Law (New York: Aspen Law & Business 1986) vol. 7, 1511, at 429).
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Moreover, in its most recent statement on the Rule of Reason, the Court
approved NCAA's dicta to the effect that the mere existence of certain
restraints should itself suffice to establish a prima facie case and that, in any
event, rule of reason analysis does not always require a full blown market
analysis.58
Most lower courts have also followed NCAA's lead. 59 To be sure, these
courts purport to assign defendants only a burden of production once the
plaintiff makes out a prima facie case. 60 At the same time, these decisions
generally embrace NCAA's approach to establishing such a case in the first
place, holding that proof that a restraint results in higher prices or reduced
output itself establishes such a case without regard to the restraint's impact on
the quality of the product. 61 This is so, it should be noted, regardless of
whether the challenged restraint expressly mentions price or output. Thus,
even when the defendant avoids per se treatment by arguing that an agreement
to increase price will overcome a market failure, proof that the agreement in
fact has its beneficial, intended effect creates a presumption that the restraint is
anticompetitive.62 Moreover, even if the defendants adduce unchallenged
proof that the restraint in fact overcomes a market failure, such proof does not
58 See Federal Trade Commission v California Dental Association, 526 US 756 (US Supreme Court
1999) (stating that courts should presume a restraint unlawful when 'an observer with even a
rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that the arrangements in question
have an anticompetitive effect on consumers and markets.') (citing NCAA v Board of Regents of
the University of Oklahoma, 468 US 85 (US Supreme Court 1984)). See also Stephen Calkins,
'California Dental Association: Not the Quick Look, But Not The Full Monty, Either', 67
Antitrust Law Journal 495 (2000).
59 See Michael Carrier, 'The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging The Disconnect', 1999 Brigham
Young University Law Review 1265 (1999).
60 See Capital Imaging Associates, PC. v Mohawk Valley MedicalAssociation, 996 F.2d 537 (US 2 d
Circuit 1993) 543 ('After the plaintiff satisfies its threshold burden of proof under the Rule of
Reason, the burden shifts to the defendant to offer evidence of pro-competitive "redeeming
virtues" of their combination. Assuming defendant comes forward with such proof the burden
shifts back to plaintiff...') (emphasis added); Areeda, see above n 48, at vol. 7,1 1507c, at 385
('Once the plaintiff satisfies his burden of persuasion... he will prevail unless the defendants
introduce evidence sufficient to allow the tribunal to find that their conduct promotes a
legitimate objective.'). See also Michael Carrier, 'The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging The
Disconnect', 1999 Brigham Young University Law Review 1265 (1999), 1268.
61 Re/Max International, Inc. v Realty One, Inc., 173 F3d 995 (US 6 th Circuit 1999) 1014-15
(proof that restraint raised commissions paid by the plaintiff established a prima facie case)
(citing Indiana Federation of Dentists); Law v NCAA, 134 F3d 1010 (US 10' Circuit 1998)
1019-20 (proof that restrictions reduced the salaries paid to a certain subset of college coaches
established a prima facie case); United States v Brown University, 5 F3d 658 (3rd Circuit 1993)
668 ('The plaintiff may satisfy [its initial burden of proof under the Rule of Reason] by proving
the existence of actual anticompetitive effects such as reduction in output, increase in price, or
deterioration in the quality of goods and services.'). See also Alan J. Meese, 'Price Theory,
Competition, and the Rule of Reason', 2003 Illinois Law Review 77 (2003), 105-07; Mark
Patterson, 'Market Power In Rule of Reason Cases', 37 San Diego Law Review 1 (2000)
(summarizing case law to this effect).
62 See Alan J. Meese, 'Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason', 2003 Illinois Law
Review 77 (2003), 147-48 (explaining this disconnect in current law).
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rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case. Instead, courts instruct juries to 'balance'
any such benefits against the restraint's purported harms.63 Indeed, even if
the benefits of the restraint outweigh its harms, courts will nonetheless enter a
judgment for the plaintiff if the plaintiff can show that the defendants could
achieve the same benefits by means of a less restrictive alternative.6 4 Both the
balancing and the less restrictive alternative components of the analysis are
premised upon an assumption, rarely made explicit, that any benefits
produced by a restraint in fact coexist with harms that are presumed to exist
once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case.65 Such harms, of course,
purportedly flow from an exercise of market power. 66 Leading scholars have
endorsed the approach outlined by NCAA and the lower courts.
6 7
63 See Law vNCAA, 134 F3d 1010 (US 10 th Circuit 1998) 1019 ('the harms and benefits must be
weighed against each other in order to judge whether the challenged behavior is, on balance,
reasonable.') (citing Areeda, see above n 48, at vol. 7,1 1502, at 372); Doctor's Hospital of
Jefferson, Inc. v Southeast Medical Alliance, 123 F3d 301 (US 5"h Circuit 1997) 307 ('the
anticompetitive evils of a restrictive practice must be balanced against any procompetitive
benefits or justifications within the confines of the relevant market.'); Capital Imaging Associates,
PC. v Mohawk Valley Medical Association, 996 F2d 537 (US 2 nd Circuit 1993) 543 (once
defendant produces evidence of benefits, the fact finder must weigh the costs and benefits of a
restraint).
64 See Law v NCAA, 134 F3d 1010 (US 10 th Circuit 1998) 1019 (once defendants prove that
benefits are present, the plaintiff can prevail by showing that 'those objectives can be achieved in
a substantially less restrictive manner'); Sullivan v National Football League, 34 F3d 1091 (US 1 st
Circuit 1994) 1103 (same); United States v Brown University, 5 F3d 658 (3 rd Circuit 1993) 679
(same); Capital Imaging Associates, PC. v Mohawk Valley Medical Association, 996 F.2d 537 (US
2 nd Circuit 1993) 543 ('Assuming defendant comes forward with such proof, the burden shifts
back to plaintifffor it to demonstrate that any legitimate collaborative objectives could have been
achieved by less restrictive alternatives.'); United States Healthcare, Inc. v Healthsource, Inc., 986
F2d 589 (1 t Circuit 1993) 594 (rule of reason analysis requires 'the most careful weighing of
costs and benefits'); see also Chicago Professional Sports Limited Partnership v NBA, 961 F2d 667
(US 7 th Circuit 1992) (presence of less restrictive alternative doomed defendants' attempt to
justify explicit restraint on output of broadcast games).
65 Alan J. Meese, 'Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason', 2003 Illinois Law Review
77 (2003), 109-10, 167-70 (explaining how current approach to rule of reason balancing rests
upon assumption that harms and benefits coexist); Hovenkamp, see above n 37, at 255-59;
Areeda, see above n 48, at vol. 7, 1502, at 345-46; ibid, at 370 (less restrictive alternative test
asks whether defendants can achieve objective 'in a manner that restrains competition less').
66 See Alan J. Meese, 'Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason', 2003 Illinois Law
Review 77 (2003), 105-07; Mark Patterson, 'Market Power In Rule of Reason Cases', 37 San
Diego Law Review 1 (2000), 39. See also Todd v Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 206 (2,d Circuit
2001) (claiming that 'an actual adverse effect on competition... arguably is more direct evidence
of market power than elusive market share figures'); Areeda, see above n 48, at vol. 7, 1507, at
400 (various methods of establishing existence of prima facie case are alternate vehicles of
establishing possession and use of market power).
67 For instance, many leading scholars have embraced the balancing metaphor. See Areeda, above
n 48, at vol. 7, 1507b, at 397 (1986) (absent showing that defendants could achieve benefits via
less restrictive means, 'the tribunal must somehow weigh and balance the harm against the
benefit'); Hovenkamp, see above n 37, at 257-58 (same); Lawrence Sullivan and Warren
Grimes, The Law ofAntitrust: An Integrated Handbook (St Paul, MN: West Publishing 2000) 211
(Rule of Reason applied to horizontal restraints requires court to determine 'whether benefits
are attained and, if so, whether they exceed the harms'); ibid, at 333-35 (endorsing such an
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B. The Agencies' View of Horizontal Restraints: The 1996 Competitor
Collaboration Guidelines
One could perhaps attribute doctrinal inconsistencies to a lack of judicial
expertise and resulting caution. However, NCAA relied at least in part upon
the advice of the United States and the period's most influential antitrust
scholar. 68 Moreover, more than two decades later, the nation's two expert
enforcement agencies announced guidelines that manifest some of the same
internal inconsistencies. In 1996, the Department of Justice and Federal
Trade Commission promulgated guidelines governing their assessment of
horizontal restraints that limit rivalry between competitors. 69 These
Guidelines begin with a statement of 'General Principles' that purportedly
guide the more detailed provisions that follow. According to these principles,
an agreement among rivals may benefit consumers by 'allow[ing] its
participants to better use existing assets, or may provide incentives for
them to make output-enhancing investments that would not occur absent
the collaboration.' 70 Such collaboration, it is said, may allow cooperating
rivals to achieve 'lower prices, improved quality, or bring new products to
the market faster.'
7 1
The Guidelines then explain how the agencies distinguish between
contracts that are unlawful per se, on the one hand, from those subject to
rule of reason analysis, on the other.7 2 Here the Guidelines begin by
condemning as 'unlawful per se' any agreement 'not to compete on price or
approach to vertical restraints). Moreover, the same scholars have endorsed the conclusion that
proof of actual detrimental effects should suffice to establish a prima facie case. See Areeda,
above n 48, at vol. 7,1 1511c; Sullivan & Grimes, see above, at 210-12 (approving NCAA's
rejection of market power inquiry given proof of increased prices); Hovenkamp, see above n 37,
at 256. Finally, several leading scholars have endorsed the less restrictive alternative test as
applied in this context. See Areeda, above n 48, at vol. 7, 1507b; ibid, at I 1505b; Hovenkamp,
see above n 37, at 257 (endorsing such a test for evaluation of horizontal restraints ancillary to
joint ventures); ibid, at 489 (endorsing such a test when evaluating vertical distribution
restraints); Stephen Ross, Principles of Antitrust Law (Westbury, NY: Foundation Press 1993)
157-58 (contending that an ancillary restraint should be unlawful if 'broader than necessary to
achieve its purpose'); Sullivan & Grimes, see above, at 223 (endorsing such a test for analysis of
horizontal restraints); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., 'Reconciling Competition And Cooperation: A
New Antitrust Standard For Joint Ventures', 35 William & Mary Law Review 871 (1994), 930
(endorsing application of less restrictive alternative test to restraints ancillary to legitimate joint
ventures). See also Gary R. Roberts, 'The NCAA, Antitrust, and Consumer Welfare', 70
Tulane Law Review 2631 (1996), 2649-51 (endorsing NCAA dicta to the effect that mere proof
that schools set wages or prices collectively should suffice to establish a prima facie case).
68 See NCAA v Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 US 85 (US Supreme Court
1984) 110, n 42 (invoking views of the United States); ibid, at 109, n 39 (invoking the views of
Professor Areeda). See also n 340, below and accompanying text (collecting statistics regarding
Professor Areeda's influence).
69 See FTC and DOJ Competitor Collaboration Guidelines (1996).
70 Ibid, at § 2.1.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid, at % 3.1 and 3.2.
36 Journal of Competition Law and Economics 1(1)
output.' 73 Two sentences later, however, the Guidelines create an exception
for such agreements that are 'reasonably necessary to achieve [the]
procompetitive benefits' of an 'efficiency enhancing integration of economic
activity.' 7 4 Agreements on price or output that fall into this category are
analyzed under the Rule of Reason, even if they are 'of a type that might
otherwise be considered per se illegal.'75
Thus, the Competitor Collaboration Guidelines apparently recognize that
agreements between rivals eliminating competition on price or output can in
some cases plausibly enhance consumer welfare and thus properly avoid per se
treatment. Moreover, the Guidelines do not limit this category to restraints
designed to reduce prices or increase output; thus, restrictions that purport to
increase prices or reduce output are included as well. In carving out this
exception, the Guidelines are consistent with recent caselaw, including NCAA,
which has recognized exceptions to the once-firm per se rule against all
76collective price or output restrictions.
It would seem, then, that the enforcement agencies are amenable to claims
that collaboration between rivals on price or output is necessary to overcome
some form of market failure that could defeat or attenuate the benefits of a
legitimate venture. A fortiori, the Guidelines purport not to condemn outright
non-price restrictions that nonetheless increase price or reduce output.7 7 At
the same time, however, the Guidelines articulate a rule of reason
methodology that is unduly hostile to such agreements. According to the
73 Ibid, at § 3.1.
74 Ibid, at § 3.2.
75 Ibid, at § 3.2 ('If, however, participants in an efficiency-enhancing integration of economic
activity enter into an agreement that is reasonably related to the integration and reasonably
necessary achieve its procompetitive benefits, the Agencies analyze the agreement under the
rule of reason, even if it is of a type that might otherwise be considered per se illegal.'). See also In
re Polygram Holding, Inc., 2003 FTC Lexis 120 (US Federal Trade Commission 4 July
2003) * 61 (defendants may avoid summary condemnation of a restraint that is 'inherently
suspect' by offering claim that the restriction produces plausible efficiencies that are cognizable
under the Sherman Act).
76 See Law v NCAA, 134 F3d 1010 (US 10th Circuit 1998) 1019-20; Chicago Professional Sports
Limited Partnership v NBA, 95 F3d 593 (US 7 h Circuit 1996) 600 (Easterbrook, J.); United
States v Brown University, 5 F3d 658 (US 3 rd Circuit 1993). See also NCAA v Board of Regents of
the University of Oklahoma, 468 US 85 (US Supreme Court 1984). Compare United States v
TOPCO, 405 US 596 (US Supreme Court 1972) (even ancillary horizontal restraints on prices
or territories are unlawful per se) with Rothery Storage v Atlas Van Lines Co., 792 F2d 210 (US
District of Columbia Circuit 1986) (Bork, J.) (concluding that Topco is no longer good law in
light of decisions like NCAA). See also Fred S. McChesney, 'Talking 'Bout My Antitrust
Generation: Competition For And In The Field of Competition Law', 52 Emory Law Journal
1401 (2003), 1410-11 (suggesting that Rothery Storage rested on very creative claim that Topco
is no longer good law).
77 See United States v TOPCO, 405 US 596 (US Supreme Court 1972) (declaring territorial
restraints ancillary to legitimate joint venture unlawful per se). But see Joel L. Klein, 'A Stepwise
Approach for Analyzing Horizontal Agreements' (Nov. 7, 1996) (available at http//:www.usdoj.
gov.atr/public/speeches/0979.htm)(agencies will subject TOPCO-like agreements to rule of
reason analysis).
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Guidelines, the central focus of rule of reason analysis involves a comparison of
the 'state of competition' before the challenged agreement, as opposed to the
state of competition after it.78 This approach is quite sensible on its face:
restraints-even those on price or output-that overcome market failure can
enhance 'competition' and produce results that enhance consumer welfare.7 9
It might seem, then, that the Guidelines 'before and after' approach to the Rule
of Reason can accommodate arguments that a restraint which increases price
or reduces output actually enhances overall 'competition.' 80 Closer inspection,
however, reveals a less sophisticated definition of competition, and one ill-
suited for the recognition and validation of restraints that overcome market
failure. In particular, the Guidelines focus on the results of rivalry that exists
before and after the agreement, expressly equating the 'state of competition'
with the magnitude of variables such as price, output and quality. To be
precise, the Guidelines provide that an agreement injures 'competition' and
thus offends the Rule of Reason if it results in prices that are higher, or an
output that is lower, than what would have obtained without it.
8 1
This standard seems inconsistent with the Guidelines' threshold
recognition that even restraints on price or output can enhance the efficiency
of joint ventures.8 2 Why allow rule of reason analysis of restrictions on price or
output if restraints that actually impact such variables are uniformly
condemned?
Examination of the Guidelines' precise process for analyzing such
restraints confirms this apparent contradiction. The Guidelines require the
agencies to begin by examining the agreement to determine whether it creates
78 See FTC and DOJ Competitor Collaboration Guidelines, S 1.2.
79 See Alan J. Meese, 'Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason', 2003 Illinois Law
Review 77 (2003), 134-41; ibid at 145-61 (explaining that application of transaction cost
economics confirms that horizontal restrictions on price or output can overcome market failure
and thus enhance overall market rivalry). See also Standard Oil Co. v United States, 221 US 1
(US Supreme Court 1911) 59-60 (explaining how restraints on parties' freedom of action can
further overall process of competition); Chicago Board of Trade v United States, 246 US 231 (US
Supreme Court 1918) 238 (Brandeis, J.) (explaining that partial restraint on price rivalry may
actually promote competition); Polk Brothers v Forest City Enterprises, 776 F2d 185 (US 7"
h
Circuit 1985) 188 (Easterbrook, J.) ('The war of all against all is not a good model for any
economy. Antitrust law is designed to ensure an appropriate blend of cooperation and
competition, not to require all economic actors to compete full tilt at every moment. When
cooperation contributes to productivity through integration of efforts, the Rule of Reason is the
norm.').
so See Alan J. Meese, 'Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason', 2003 Illinois Law
Review 77 (2003), 134-41.
81 See FTC and DOJ Competitor Collaboration Guidelines, § 3.1 ('Under the rule of reason, the
central question is whether the relevant agreement likely harms competition by increasing the
ability or incentive profitably to raise price or reduce output, quality or service below what likely
would prevail in the absence of the relevant agreement.'); ibid, at § 2.1 (same); ibid, at § 2.2
(stating that an agreement creates 'anticompetitive harm' if it 'increas [es] the ability or incentive
profitably to raise price above or reduce output, quality, service, or innovation below what likely
would prevail in the absence of the relevant agreement.').
82 See nn 74-75, above and accompanying text.
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'anticompetitive harm.' 83 Such an analysis sometimes requires definition of the
relevant market and a determination of defendants' market power, if any.
84
The Guidelines also provide that the Agencies will dispense with such
an analysis where 'the likelihood of anticompetitive harm is evident from the
nature of the agreement.'8 5 The Guidelines cite NCAA in support of such an
approach and presumably endorse its approach to defining a prima facie
case. 86
The Guidelines also follow NCAA when examining claims that restraints
produce significant benefits that overcome any presumed harm. It is the
possibility that a restraint produces benefits, such as the elimination of market
failure, that avoids per se treatment in the first place.8 7 The existence of such
benefits does not by itself save the agreement from challenge. Instead, the
Guidelines ask whether there is a less restrictive means of achieving such
benefits. 88 Even if there is no less restrictive means, the Guidelines still ask
whether the benefits adduced by the defendant 'offset' any anticompetitive
harm by preventing price increases or reducing prices. 89 Here again the
Guidelines judge the 'state of competition' by focusing on a single variable:
price, without asking whether any price increase reflects an exercise of market
power or, instead, the elimination of market failure. Like NCAA and similar
decisions in the lower courts, the Guidelines reflect significant confusion about
the relationship between market power, on the one hand, and restraints that
overcome market failure, on the other. In short, the Guidelines are unduly
biased against restraints that avoid per se condemnation because they plausibly
overcome market failure.
C. Monopolization and the 'Use' of Monopoly Power
Similar shortcomings beset the law of monopolization. Under current law,
mere possession of monopoly power does not suffice to establish a violation of
83 See FTC and DOJ Competitor Collaboration Guidelines, § 3.3.
84 Ibid, at § 3.3.
85 Ibid, at § 3.3 ('The Agencies focus on only those factors, and undertake only that factual
inquiry, necessary to make a sound determination of the overall competitive effect of the relevant
agreement.').
86 Ibid, at § 3.3, n 28. See also Joel L. Klein, 'A Stepwise Approach to Antitrust Review of
Horizontal Agreements,' at 3 (stating that mere existence of ancillary horizontal restrictions on
territories sufficed to establish a prima facie case) (Nov. 7, 1996).
87 See n 74-75, above and accompanying text (describing Guidelines' conclusion that a plausible
claim of efficiencies will suffice to save an otherwise unlawful restraint from per se
condemnation); In re Polygram Holding, Inc., 2003 FTC Lexis 120 (US Federal Trade
Commission 4 July 2003) * 61-62 (same).
88 See FTC and DOJ Competitor Collaboration Guidelines, § 3.36(b) ('If the participants could
have achieved or could achieve similar efficiencies by practical, significantly less restrictive
means, then the Agencies conclude that the relevant agreement is not reasonably necessary to
their achievement.'). See also In re Polygram Holding, Inc., 2003 FTC Lexis 120 (US Federal
Trade Commission 4 July 2003) * 66.
89 See FTC and DOJ Competitor Collaboration Guidelines, § 3.36.
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Section 2 of the Sherman Act; plaintiffs must also show that the monopolist 'used'
that power to 'foreclose competition' and thereby maintain its monopoly
position. 90 Courts treat non-standard contracts like exclusive dealing and tying as
quintessential examples of such 'anticompetitive exclusion,' as these restrictions
are said to coercively foreclose rivals from the marketplace and produce unnatural
patterns of trade. 91 While monopolists may compete vigorously, they must do so
'on the merits,' that is, by improving product quality or realizing production
efficiencies through innovation or economies of scale. 9 2 Such competition is
purely technological in nature. 9 3 Exclusionary contracts, it is said, interfere with
such competition and deprive consumers of the benefits of unbridled rivalry.9 4
Though once unlawful per se, a monopolist's 'exclusionary' contracts are now
analyzed under a truncated Rule of Reason.95 Under this approach a plaintiff
may make out a prima facie case by showing that a non-standard contract
90 See Eastman Kodak v Image Technical Services, 504 US 451 (US Supreme Court 1992) 483
(offense of monopolization involves 'use of monopoly power to foreclose competition'), quoting
United States v Griffith, 334 US 100 (US Supreme Court 1948) 107. See also United States v
American Tobacco Co., 221 US 106 (US Supreme Court 1911) (mere possession of monopoly
power does not suffice to establish offense of monopolization).
91 See Eastman Kodak v Image Technical Services, 504 US 451 (US Supreme Court 1992) 483-84
(treating tying contract as use of monopoly power to foreclose competition); United States v
Grinnell Corp., 384 US 563 (US Supreme Court 1966) 578 (5 year 'coercive' exclusive dealing
agreement offended Section 2). See also United States v Microsoft, 253 F3d 34 (US District of
Columbia Circuit 2001) (tying and exclusive dealing contracts deemed independently unlawful
because they 'foreclosed' rivals from significant portion of the marketplace); ibid, at 64 (tying
contracts involve 'use' of monopoly power).
92 Brooke Group, Ltd v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 US 209 (US Supreme Court 1993)
223 (above-cost pricing cannot violate Section 2); Aspen Skiing v Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.,
472 US 585 (US Supreme Court 1985) 600 (Sherman Act requires firms to compete through
'internal expansion'); Conwood Co., L.P v United States Tobacco, 290 F3d 768 (US 6t' Circuit
2002) 783 (realization of economies of scale cannot offend Section 2); United.States v Microsoft,
253 F3d 34 (US District of Columbia Circuit 2001) passim (distinguishing between
technological innovation and lower prices, on the one hand, and contracts that disadvantage
rivals, on the other); Berkey Photo, Inc. v Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F2d 263 (US 2 n'd Circuit
1979) 274-75, 281-82 (realization of economies of scale or technological innovation cannot
violate Section 2).
93 See Alan J. Meese, 'Monopolization, Exclusion, and the Theory of the Firm', 89 Minnesota
Law Review 743, 755-71 (2005) (describing the sort of technological competition that courts
treat as legitimate).
94 See United States v Microsoft, 253 F3d 34 (US District of Columbia Circuit 2001) 70-74. See
also Eastman Kodak v Image Technical Services, 504 US 451 (US Supreme Court 1992) 483-84;
Jefferson Parish Hospital District Number 2 v Hyde, 466 US 2 (US Supreme Court 1985) 12 (tying
contracts 'imposed' by firms with market power interfere with 'competition on the merits').
95 Cf. United States v Grinnell Co., 384 US 563 (US Supreme Court 1966) 578 (declaring five year
exclusive dealing contracts obtained by a monopolist unlawful despite claim of benefits); ibid
(stating that trial court should consider benefits at remedy stage); United States v United Shoe
Machinery Co., 110 FSupp 295 (US District of Massachusetts 1953), aff'd United Shoe
Machinery Co. v United States, 347 US 521 (US Supreme Court 1954) (per curiam) (declaring
tying and exclusionary leasing provisions unlawful without regard to any benefits they might
produce). See also United States vAmerican Tobacco Co., 221 US 106 (US Supreme Court 1911)
175-81 (holding that courts should analyze monopolization claims under the Rule of Reason).
40 Journal of Competition Law and Economics 1(1)
'excludes' rivals from a significant portion of the marketplace.9 6 Here again,
however, the standards governing such justifications are unduly hostile to these
contracts. Even if a defendant proves that the agreement produces significant
benefits, courts will nonetheless void the practice if a plaintiff adduces a less
restrictive means of achieving the same objective. 9 7 Some courts go even
further, 'balancing' such benefits against the harms of such exclusion. 98 Both
approaches rest upon an assumption that any benefits of such restraints
necessarily coexist with anticompetitive effects-the exclusionary impact of
contracts that reflect the use of market power. 99 The enforcement agencies and
leading scholars agree with this test, and the distinction between 'competition
on the merits' and contractual exclusion on which it rests.100
II. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE STANDARD ACCOUNT OF THE
INHOSPITALITY TRADITION
It is now commonplace among economists that most non-standard
contracts reduce the cost of transacting-reliance on an unbridled market to
conduct economic activity. 0 1 In the absence of such contracts, reliance on the
96 See Eastman Kodak v Image Technical Services, 504 US 451 (US Supreme Court 1992) 483-84;
United States v Microsoft, 253 F3d 34 (US District of Columbia Circuit 2001) 68-71.
97 See Eastman Kodak v Image Technical Services, 504 US 451 (US Supreme Court 1992) 483-86
(rejecting defendant's motion for summary judgment because the plaintiff adduced evidence of
less restrictive means); see also Aspen Skiing Co. v Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 US 585
(US Supreme Court 1985) 605 (court should consider whether exclusion is broader than
necessary to achieve legitimate benefits); United States v Microsoft, 253 F3d 34 (US District of
Columbia Circuit 2001) 64-72 (same).
98 See United States v Microsoft, 253 F3d 34 (US District of Columbia Circuit 2001) 59, 61
(holding that courts should balance a restraint's benefits against the harms it produces once the
defendant rebuts a prima facie case).
99 See Alan J Meese, 'Monopolization, Exclusion, and the Theory of the Firm', 89 Minnesota Law
Review 743, 760-61 (2005).
100 Herbert Hovenkamp, 'The Monopolization Offense', 61 Ohio State Law Journal 1035 (2001);
Jonathan B Baker, 'Promoting Innovation Competition Through The Aspen/Kodak Rule', 7
George Mason Law Review 495 (1999); Steven C. Salop and R. Craig Romaine, 'Preserving
Monopoly: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards, and the Microsoft Case', 7 George Mason
Law Review 617 (1999). See also Alan J. Meese, 'Monopolization, Exclusion, and the Theory
of the Firm', 89 Minnesota Law Review 743, 811, n. 307. (2005) (collecting other authorities,
including works by Professors Areeda, Grimes, Sullivan, and Piraino).
It should be noted that courts have taken a similar approach under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act to tying contracts imposed by firms with market power. See Jefferson Parish
Hospital District Number 2 v Hyde, 466 US 2 (US Supreme Court 1985) (ties imposed by firms
with market power irrevocably presumed to be 'forced' on purchasers via market power).
Moreover, lower courts that allow defendants to 'justify' per se unlawful tying contracts do so in
a manner that assumes that any benefits of these agreements coexist with harms. See Alan
J. Meese, 'Antitrust Balancing in a (Near) Coasean World: The Case of Franchise Tying
Contracts', 95 Michigan Law Review 111 (1996).
101 Williamson, see above n 8, at 28 (concluding that there is a 'rebuttable presumption that
nonstandard forms of contracting have efficiency purposes'); Benjamin Klein & Lester F. Saft,
'The Law and Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts', 28 JLE 345 (1985) (arguing that
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market may produce a market failure, that is, a departure from the allocation of
resources that would occur in the absence of transaction costs.1 0 2 Antitrust
scholars have followed suit and recognized that such agreements can often be
'procompetitive,' although these scholars rarely mention the concept of market
failure. 1
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This benign interpretation of non-standard contracts is relatively recent.
For decades economists, antitrust scholars, and enforcement agencies were
uniformly hostile to such agreements, and the courts followed suit.10 4 The
result was the so-called inhospitality-era, during which courts banned most
non-standard contracts as unlawful per se or nearly so.' 0 5 This section seeks to
identify the source of this hostility in the economic theory of the time. Why is it
that courts, legal scholars, and economists-all of whom were so quick to
invoke 'market failure' as a rationale for banning 'harmful' agreements-were
franchise tying contracts can protect goodwill of the franchise system); Howard Marvel,
'Exclusive Dealing', 25 JLE 1 (1982) (arguing that exclusive dealing contracts can confer the
equivalent of a property right upon manufacturers that advertise their products directly to
consumers); Benjamin Klein, 'Transaction Cost Determinants of "Unfair" Contractual
Arrangements', 70 American Economic Review 356 (1980); Lester G. Telser, 'Why Should
Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?', 3 JLE 86 (1960); see also Ronald Coase, 'The Firm The
Market, and The Law', in Ronald H. Coase, The Firm, The Market and the Law (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press 1988) 26 (noting the ubiquity of transaction costs and resulting
market failure in the real world).
102 See Alan J. Meese, 'Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason', 2003 Illinois Law
Review 77 (2003), 134-41; Guido Calabresi, 'Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation, and
Liability Rules-A Comment,' 11 JLE 67 (1968) (defining market failure in this manner). See
also Ronald Coase, 'The Problem of Social Cost', 3 JLE 1 (1960). Compare George J. Stigler,
The Theory of Price (New York: Macmillan 1966) 113 (claiming that the Coase theorem is
simply an implication of the perfect competition model); ibid, at 176-80 (perfect competition
maximizes welfare).
103 Hovenkamp, see above n 37, at 450-58; William F. Baxter, 'The Viability of Vertical Restraints
Doctrine', 75 California Law Review 933 (1987), 945-46; Frank H. Easterbrook, 'Vertical
Arrangements and the Rule of Reason', 53 Antitrust Law Journal 135 (1984); Richard
A. Posner, 'Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger, and Potential
Competition Decisions', 75 Columbia Law Review 282 (1975); 284; Robert H. Bork, 'The
Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division', 75 Yale Law
Journal 373 (1966), 429-52.
104 See Alan J. Meese, 'Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason', 2003 Illinois Law
Review 77 (2003), 124-34 (describing hostile Section 1 caselaw of this period); Alan J. Meese,
'Monopolization, Exclusion, and the Theory of the Firm', 89 Minnesota Law Review 743,
793-808 (2005) (describing hostile caselaw under Section 2).
105 Williamson, see above n 8, at 19 (describing inhospitality tradition of antitrust); ibid, at 370-
73 (describing influence of inhospitality tradition on antitrust treatment of non-standard
contracts); Frank H. Easterbrook, 'Is There A Ratchet In Antitrust Law?', 60 Texas Law
Review 705 (1982), 715 ('[The] inhospitality tradition of antitrust... called for courts to strike
down business practices that were not clearly procompetitive. In this tradition an inference of
monopolization followed from the courts' inability to grasp how a practice might be consistent
with substantial competition. The tradition took hold when many practices were genuine
mysteries to economists, and monopolistic explanations were congenial. The same tradition
emphasized competition in the spot market. Long-term contracts, even those arrived at by
competitive processes, were deemed anticompetitive because they shut off day-to-day rivalry.').
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unable to see that such contracts could, in some cases anyway, actually defeat
market failure and improve the allocation of resources in a given market? As
will be seen, the results of this inquiry will also shed light on the source of the
modern attitudes toward such agreements.
A. The Conventional Account: Technology, the Firm, and
Non-Standard Contracting from the 'Inside Out'
The conventional account of the inhospitality-era, promulgated mainly by
Oliver Williamson, goes something like this. 1 0 6 In the 1940s, neoclassical price
theory was the dominant economic paradigm and thus served as the basis for
industrial organization. 10 7 Price theory treated the firm as a production
106 Williamson, see above n 8, at 7, 18-19, 365-73. Other contributions along the same lines
include: Richard N. Langlois, 'Contract, Competition, and Efficiency', 55 Brooklyn Law
Review 831 (1989). See also Ronald H. Coase, 'Industrial Organization: a Proposal for
Research', in Victor R. Fuchs (ed), Policy Issues and Research Opportunities in Industrial
Organization (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research 1972).
107 Williamson, above n 8, at 6-8. See also Ronald H. Coase, 'Industrial Organization: a Proposal
for Research', in Victor R. Fuchs (ed), Policy Issues and Research Opportunities in Industrial
Organization (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research 1972) 67(surveying leading
industrial organization textbooks in 1972 and concluding that they were manifestations of
applied price theory). See generally Kuhn, see above n 4.
I am well aware of the definitional complexities surrounding the application of Kuhn's
terminology and framework to this context. For one thing, Kuhn himself was ambivalent about
whether economics was sufficiently 'scientific' to qualify for his analysis. Moreover, Kuhn has
embraced a definition of 'paradigm' that is quite different from the now popular usage of the
term. In particular, Kuhn originally used this term to refer to concrete problem solutions that a
given profession has accepted as the basis for further research, often by analogy. See Thomas
S. Kuhn, The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press 1977) xvii-xx (recognizing that the definition of the concept
expanded in The Structure of Scientific Revolution to refer to the set of values and pre-
commitments shared by a particular scientific community); Kuhn, see above, at 225-39
(articulating Kuhn's original, narrower definition). See also Kuhn, 'Second Thoughts on
Paradigms', in Kuhn, see above, 293, 294-308.
In limited defense of my application of a Kuhnian methodology, let me note the following. First,
leading economists of the day treated economics as a discipline amenable to the scientific
method, just like physics. See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Competitive Price (New York:
Macmillan 1942) 3-26 (discussing scientific method as applied to economics); A.C. Pigou, The
Economics of Welfare (London: Macmillan 1932) 3 -11 (discussing 'realistic' nature of economic
science); Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit (Boston, New York: Houghton Mifflin
1921) 51-55 (discussing scientific nature of economic analysis); ibid, at 6-11 (justifying
economists' modeling techniques by invoking analogy to approach taken by physicists and other
scientists). Of course, the mere fact that these scholars believed economics to be a science does
not make it so. On the other hand, it does establish that these scholars were attempting to employ
the scientific method, and that may be all that matters for those who are modeling their behavior.
Second, other scholars, particularly those who have critiqued price-theoretic industrial
organization, have invoked Kuhn's framework. See Ronald H. Coase, 'The Institutional
Structure of Production', 82 American Economic Review 713 (1992), 718; OliverE. Williamson,
'Delimiting Antitrust', 76 Georgetown Law Journal 271 (1987), 274 (contending that TCE
worked a 'genuine scientific revolution'); Frank H. Easterbrook, 'Is There A Ratchet In Antitrust
Law?', 60 Texas Law Review 705 (1982), 707, n 11 (invoking Kuhn for the claim that adherents
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function, which took in inputs and converted them into outputs according to
the physical laws reflected in the function.10 8 Thus, the work of the firm
took place within its boundaries, during the process of production. Once this
process was complete, the firm's work was done, and the title to its product
passed to consumers or another firm.' 
09
Price theory's technological conception of the firm implied a (exclusively)
technological rationale for vertical integration, the common ownership of the
successive stages of production. The classic example was the integration of
iron production with steel production to avoid the need to reheat iron ingot
before transforming it into steel. 110 Such integration, of course, tended to
lower the cost of production and thus reduce prices and increase output.
Economists of this era employed this technological paradigm when examining
vertical integration in their efforts to determine the causes of business
to the inhospitality approach would not lightly abandon their preexisting beliefs). See also Frank
M. Machovec, Perfect Competition and the Transformation of Economics (London, New York:
Routledge 1995) (arguing that the emergence of the perfect competition model early in the 20 th
century was a Kuhnian scientific revolution); William H. Page, 'The Chicago School And The
Evolution of Antitrust: Characterization, Antitrust Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency', 75
Virginia Law Review 1221 (1989), 1225-26, n 6 (offering a defense of using Kuhnian framework
to interpret evolution of antitrust law in response to changes in economic theory).
108 Williamson, see above n 8, at 7, 26; Richard N Langolis, 'Contract, Competition, and
Efficiency', 55 Brooklyn Law Review 831 (1989), 834 ('The economist's firm-at least until
recently-was a black box, a production function that took in inputs and transformed them
into outputs').
109 See Richard N. Langlois, 'Contract, Competition, and Efficiency', 55 Brooklyn Law Review
831 (1989), 835 (explaining how price theory's theory of the firm only recognized 'classical
contracting'). Professor Williamson summarized this milieu as follows:
The prevailing orientation toward economic organization in the 30-year hiatus between 1940
and 1970 was that technological features of firm and market organization were determinative.
The allocation of economic activity as between firms and markets was taken as a datum, firms
were characterized as production functions; markets served as signalling devices, contracting
was accomplished through an auctioneer; and disputes were disregarded because of the
presumed efficacy of court adjudication. The possibility that subtle economizing purposes are
served by organizational variety does not arise within-indeed is effectively beyond the reach
of-this orthodox framework. Correspondingly, the prevailing public policy toward unfamiliar
or nonstandard business practices during that interval was deep suspicion or even hostility.
Williamson, see above n 8, at 7.
110 Williamson, see above n 8, at 86-87 (identifying this as the classic exemplar of technologically-
induced vertical integration) (citing Joe S. Bain, Industrial Organization (2 1d edn, New York:
Wiley 1968) 381). I have located several other texts invoking this example. There may well be
more. See F.M. Scherer, Industrial Structure and Economic Performance (2, d edn, Chicago: Rand
McNally College Publishing 1970) 70; Carl Kaysen and Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Policy: An
Economic Analysis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1959) 120; Joel Dirlam and
Alfred Kahn, Fair Competition: The Law and Economics of Antitrust Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press 1954) 23. See also Stigler, see above n 107, at 109-10 ('Production functions
are descriptive of techniques or systems of organization of productive services, and they are
therefore taken from disciplines such as engineering and industrial chemistry: to the economic
theorists they are data of analysis.').
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conduct. 1 1 ' In the absence of a technological explanation for such integration,
economists presumed it to be anticompetitive.'
12
Price theory's technological conception of the firm did more than explain
vertical integration. Technological considerations were also said to explain
horizontal integration whether by merger or internal expansion. Such
integration, it was said, could help firms realize economies of scale and thus
reduce production costs. While such expansion could confer market power on
the expanding firm, such power was a necessary and often reasonable price for
the technological benefits of increased scale. 1 3 The goal of antitrust policy,
then, was to distinguish efficient from inefficient horizontal integration by
balancing the harms of such integration against its benefits.
1 14
In this price-theoretic world, Williamson's story goes, there was simply no
place for partial integration in the form of non-standard contracts. According
to the accepted paradigm, efficiencies arose within the firm, before a product's
title passed. 1 5 Non-standard contracts, on the other hand, sought to influence
the behavior of trading partners-and interfere with rivalry-after the product
had left the firm's boundaries.1 16 There was no apparent way that such
" Kuhn, see above n 4, at 24-34 (describing enterprise of'normal science' as involving repeated
applications of accepted paradigm to analogous problems).
112 Williamson, see above n 8, at 366 (according to neoclassical price theory, 'efforts to reconfigure
firm and market structures that violated "natural" boundaries were believed to have market
power origins.'). See also Joe S. Bain, Industrial Organization (2 n d edn, New York: Wiley 1968)
381) ('The trained observer tends to form a considerable suspicion from casual observation
that there is a good deal of vertical integration which, although not actually uneconomical, is
also not justified on the basis of any cost savings. This is apparently true in particular of the
integration of distributive facilities by manufacturing firms. In most cases the rationale of the
integration is evidently the increase of market power of the firms rather than a reduction in
cost.'). Even the Chicago school shared the belief that vertical integration produced only
technological efficiencies. See Robert H. Bork, 'Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act', 22
University of Chicago Law Review 157 (1954), 200 (describing the benefits of vertical
integration as 'bypassing a monopoly at one level, or... enabling the achievement of internal
efficiencies').
113 Kaysen & Turner, see above n 110, at 128-29; Edward Mason, 'Workable Competition Versus
Workable Monopoly', in Edward Mason (ed), Economic Concentration and the Monopoly Problem
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1957) 387 ('Some power there has to be, both
because of the inescapable limitations of the process of atomization and because power is
needed to do the job the American public expects of its industrial machine.'); Joe S. Bain,
Pricing, Distribution, And Employment: The Economics of an Enterprise System (New York: Holt
1948) 84-85. See also Oliver E. Williamson, 'Economies As An Antitrust Defense: The
Welfare Tradeoffs', 58 American Economic Review 18 (1968).
114 Kaysen & Turner, see above n 110, at 111-19, 127-40; Oliver E. Williamson, 'Economies As
An Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs', 58 American Economic Review 18 (1968)
passim. It should be noted that Williamson prepared the analysis in this article at Turner's
behest while serving in the Antitrust Division at the Department of Justice.
115 Williamson, see above n 8, at 370-71 (contending that the hostility toward non-standard
contracts 'was buttressed by the view that true economies take a technological form [and]
hence are fully realized within firms.').
116 Williamson, see above n 8, at 25-26 (describing price theory's anticompetitive account of such
agreements in this manner).
Market Failure and Non-Standard Contracting 45
agreements could produce technological efficiencies of any sort. Thus, the
logical inference-and it was mainly that-was that such agreements
necessarily reflected the exercise of market power, either to impose the
agreement, or alter the terms of trade."1 7 Such reasoning, it is said, led to
condemnation of a wide variety of contracts-tying, minimum and maximum
rpm, exclusive dealing, and horizontal restraints ancillary to otherwise
legitimate joint ventures.1 18
According to Williamson and others, the chief contribution of transaction
cost economics (TCE) has been to undermine price theory's paradigmatic
technological conception of the firm. In particular, practitioners of TCE
performed a unique thought experiment, imagining a world without firms. 
1 1 9
In this way, it is said, these scholars were able to debunk the price-theoretic
117 Williamson, see above n 8, at 26 ('In as much as the natural boundaries of the firm are therein
[i e., within the neoclassical framework] defined by technology, any effort by the firm to extend
its reach by resource to nonstandard contracting was presumed to have monopoly purpose and
effect.'); ibid, at 189 ('There being no place for the nonstandard (or, in Coase's terms,
"ununderstandable") contracting practices within the applied price theory tradition, the merits
of these practices were rejected or dismissed.'), quoting Ronald H. Coase, 'Industrial
Organization: A Proposal For Research', in Fuchs (ed), above n 107, at 67; Williamson, see
above n 8, at 370-72 ('Since there was nothing to be gained by introducing non-standard
terms into market-mediated exchange, the use of contract restraints was presumed to have
anticompetitive purpose and effect.'). According to Coase,
[1]f an economist finds something-a business practice of one sort or another-that he does not
understand, he looks for a monopoly explanation. And as in this field we are very ignorant, the
number of ununderstandable practices tends to be rather large, and the reliance on a monopoly
explanation, frequent.
Ronald H. Coase, 'Industrial Organization: A Proposal For Research', in Fuchs (ed), see above
n 107, at 67.
In the same way, of course, modem courts infer the exercise of market power from the
existence of a restraint on competition for which parties are not willing or able to supply a
plausible benign explanation. See Alan J. Meese, 'Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of
Reason', 2003 Illinois Law Review 77 (2003), 98.
118 Williamson, see above n 8, at 25 (explaining how orthodox economic theory once inferred that
all non-standard contracts were monopolistic); ibid, at 370-71 ('The inhospitality tradition to
which I referred earlier held that nonstandard modes of contracting were presumptively
anticompetitive. The argument, moreover, was very sweeping. No effort was made to delimit
applications to a subset of activity where the anticompetitive concerns were thought to be
especially severe. Rather, customer, territorial, and related contract restraints were held to be
presumptively unlawful, without qualification.').
119 Ronald H. Coase, 'Nature of the Firm', 4 Economica (n.s.) 386 (1937), 388 ('Having regard to
the fact that if production is regulated by price movements, production could be carried on
without any organization at all, well might we ask, why is there any organization?'); Harold
Demsetz, 'The Theory of the Firm Revisited', 4 Journal of Law, Economics & Organization
141 (1988), 145 ('Why do firms emerge as viable institutions when the perfect decentralization
model amply demonstrates the allocative efficiency of the prices that emerge from impersonal
markets?'). See also Steven N.S. Cheung, 'Contractual Nature of the Firm', 26J7LE 1 (1983),
4 ('If all the costs of transaction were zero, a customer buying a part would make a separate
payment to each of the many contributing to its production.'). See also Thomas S. Kuhn,
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paradigm and its claim that technology itself could justify the creation and
existence of firms.' 20 For instance, the existence of thermal economies in steel
manufacture could suggest that iron production and steel-making should take
place in close proximity. But, these considerations did not mandate that the
same individual or firm should own both production processes. 12 1 Instead, it
was said, such common ownership was designed to reduce the transaction
costs that parties would have to endure if they relied upon market contracting
to coordinate such an activity. 1
22
Having explained why firms exist, practitioners of TCE then went on to
apply the same logic to arrangements 'between' the unbridled 'spot' market
and complete vertical integration. These scholars argued that non-standard
contracts-partial integration-could also reduce the cost of transacting
through an atomistic market by limiting the discretion of trading partners.'
2 3
Though less 'iron-clad' than complete integration, such partial integration
could also obviate some of the disadvantages of complete integration.' 2 4 Thus,
it was said, firms presumably chose that sort of integration, complete or
partial, that maximized the sum of the cost and benefits of each alternative
arrangement. 12 5 According to practitioners of TCE, these considerations
'A Function for Thought Experiments', reprinted in Kuhn, above n 107 (examining role of
thought experiments in challenging assumptions behind existing models).
120 Williamson, see above n 8, at 86-89; Victor P. Goldberg, 'Production Functions and
Transaction Costs', in George R. Feiwel (ed), Issues in Contemporary Microeconomics & Welfare
(Albany: State University of New York Press 1985) 397 (explaining that technical economies
cannot explain boundaries of the firm because, absent transaction costs, such economies can
'be achieved equally well if the factors of production are owned by independent individuals.').
See also Ronald H. Coase, 'Nature of the Firm', 4 Economica (n.s.) 386 (1937), 388
(explaining that individuals could theoretically rely on continuous market contracting to direct
production).
121 Williamson, see above n 8, at 86-90; Victor P. Goldberg, 'Production Functions and
Transaction Costs', in Feiwel (ed), above n 120, at 397; Ronald H. Coase, 'Nature of the
Firm', 4 Economica (n.s.) 386 (1937), 388-89 (explaining that continuous market contracting
could perform any coordination function in the absence of transaction costs).
122 Williamson, see above n 8, at 88-90; Benjamin Klein, Robert Crawford, and Armen Alchian,
'Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process', 21 JLE
297 (1978).
123 See Benjamin Klein, 'Transaction Cost Determinants of"Unfair" Contractual Arrangements',
70 American Economic Review 356 (1980); Oliver E Williamson, 'Assessing Vertical Market
Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications of the Transaction Cost Approach', 127 University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 953 (1979); Victor P. Goldberg, 'The Law And Economics of
Vertical Restrictions: A Relational Perspective', 58 Texas Law Review 91 (1979); Ronald
H. Coase, 'Nature of the Firm: Meaning', 4 Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 19
(1988), 28 (suggesting that franchising provides an example of a 'mixed relationship'
combining attributes of the firm and the market).
124 Williamson, see above n 8, at 157-58 (outlining considerations that might lead manufacturers
to rely upon independent sellers instead of employees to distribute its goods); Benjamin Klein,
'Transaction Cost Determinants of "Unfair" Contractual Arrangements', 70 American
Economic Review 356 (1980), 359, n 2 (same).
125 See Alan J. Meese, 'Property Rights and Intrabrand Restraints', 89 Cornell Law Review 553,
595-97 (2004) (explaining why firms may choose to rely upon the market to distribute their
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justified a presumption that complete or partial integration was designed to
minimize the cost of conducting an economic activity.1 2 6 While such restraints
could alter the terms of trade when compared to what would have occurred in
a competitive market, such changes were the result of purely voluntary
integration that eliminated market failure.
1 27
B. Shortcomings in the Conventional Account
Williamson's historical account seems accurate as far as it goes, and his
theoretical contributions are extremely important. There is no doubt, for
instance, that inhospitality-era scholars treated complete vertical integration as
a purely technological phenomenon. 12 8 In fact, I have relied upon this account
in my own writings, as have some other antitrust scholars. 12 9 Moreover, most
of these scholars embrace-expressly or implicitly-Williamson's most
important theoretical conclusion, namely, that non-standard contracts are
generally procompetitive attempts to reduce the costs of transactions.
1 30
products); Ronald H. Coase, 'Nature of the Firm: Influence', 4 Journal of Law, Economics &
Organization 33 (1988), 39-40 (contending that interfirm competition leads firms to choose
efficient level of partial or complete integration). Cf. Armen Alchian, 'Uncertainty, Evolution,
and Economic Theory', 58 Journal of Political Economy 211 (1950).
126 Williamson, see above n 8, at 103-30 (contending that 'vertical integration... is more
consistent with transaction cost economizing than with the leading alternatives.').
127 Ibid, at 23-30 (explaining how contracts that reduce transaction costs lie on 'efficiency branch'
of contract and how firms can induce agreement to such terms by employing cost-based price
differentials); Benjamin Klein, 'Transaction Cost Determinants of "Unfair" Contractual
Arrangements', 70 American Economic Review 356 (1980), 357-58. See also Alan J. Meese,
'Tying Meets The New Institutional Economics', 146 University of Pennsylvania Law Review
1 (1997), 67-70 (explaining how firms can obtain agreement to tying contracts by offering
cost-based pricing differentials); Frank H. Easterbrook, 'Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of
Reason', 53 Antitrust Law Journal 135 (1984), 150 (vertical distribution restraints are means
of 'adapt[ing] to the costs of organization and information in a way that economizes on all
costs, including the costs of the markets themselves.').
128 See Alan J. Meese, 'Monopolization, Exclusion, and the Theory of the Firm', 89 Minnesota
Law Review 743, 778-93 (2005) (collecting sources to this effect).
129 See Alan J. Meese, 'Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason', 2003 Illinois Law
Review 77 (2003), 134-41; Alan J. Meese, 'Tying Meets The New Institutional Economics',
146 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1 (1997), 59-66. See also Alan J. Meese,
'Monopolization, Exclusion, and the Theory of the Firm', 89 Minnesota Law Review 743
(2005); Alan J. Meese, 'Intrabrand Restraints and the Theory of the Firm', 83 North
Carolina Law Review 40-44 (2004). See also Thomas C. Arthur, 'Formalistic Line Drawing:
Exclusion of Unauthorized Services From Single-Brand Aftermarkets Under Kodak and
Sylvania', 24 Journal of Corporate Law 603 (1999); Henry N. Butler & Barry D. Baysinger,
'Vertical Restraints of Trade as Contractual Integration: A Synthesis of Relational
Contracting Theory, Transaction-Cost Economics and Organization Theory', 32 Emory
Law Journal 1009 (1983).
130 See AlanJ. Meese, 'Monopolization, Exclusion, and the Theory ofthe Firm', 89 Minnesota Law
Review 743, 812-29 (2005); Alan J. Meese, 'Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of
Reason', 2003 Illinois Law Review 77 (2003), 134-41; Thomas C. Arthur, 'AWorkable Rule of
Reason: A Less Ambitious Antitrust Role For The Federal Courts', 68 Antitrust Law Journal
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Finally, many scholars who are not members of the transaction cost school
nonetheless pay lip service to Williamson's theoretical conclusions. 31 At the
same time, however, courts, enforcement agencies, and antitrust scholars have
not fully internalized the lessons of the transaction cost school, and much of
antitrust doctrine is unduly hostile to contracts that may overcome market
failures, i.e., avoid the 'transaction costs' that would result from reliance upon
an atomistic market. 132 Why is it, then, that mainstream antitrust policy does
not yet fully reflect the implications of Williamson's theoretical conclusions?
To answer this question, let me begin with what might sound like an
unflattering statement, although it is not meant to be critical: Williamson's
important and accurate historical account of price theory's hostility toward non-
standard contract is mainly descriptive. That is, while Williamson tells us what
economists thought about the source and locus of efficiencies, he tells us far less
about why economists believed what they believed. Why is it, for instance, that
economists believed that all efficiencies were technological in nature and thus
arose 'within' the firm, before title to the firm's product passed?1 33 After all, the
mere fact that intra-firm efficiencies are solely technological does not exclude
the possibility that there are inter-firm or 'market' efficiencies with a different
source. Put another way, what, if anything, prevented economists from
recognizing that some efficiencies could arise outside the firm, after title
passed? In the end, Williamson's claim-that recognition of such efficiencies 'is
effectively beyond the reach of the orthodox framework' or 'effectively
suppressed' by that framework seems based upon the following syllogism: (1)
all efficiencies are technological; (2) technological efficiencies only arise within
the firm; (3) therefore, no efficiencies arise after passage of the title.1 34 While
this conclusion follows the given initial premise, Williamson does not explore
why economists embraced this premise in the first place.
Viewed up close, Williamson's account and others like it take what one might
call a firm-centric 'inside-out' approach to an explanation of the inhospitality-
era. According to this account, inhospitality-era economists identified the
337 (2000); Frank H. Easterbrook, 'Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason', 53
Antitrust Law Journal 135 (1984) passim. See Williamson, above n 8, at 28 (articulating a
'rebuttable presumption that nonstandard forms of contracting have efficiency purposes.').
131 Hovenkamp, see above n 37, 37-38.
132 See AlanJ. Meese, 'Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason', 2003 Illinois Law Review
77 (2003), 144-70 (explaining how current structure of rule of reason analysis is unduly hostile to
various restraints given the teachings of transaction cost economics). See also nn 24-100, above
and accompanying text (explaining how judicial and enforcement agency approaches to horizontal
restraints and monopolization doctrine are unduly biased against such agreements).
133 See nn 109-18, above and accompanying text (outlining Williamson's account).
134 See Williamson, above n 8, at 7; Oliver E. Williamson, 'Delimiting Antitrust', 76 Georgetown
Law Journal 271 (1987), 272 (describing the 'prevailing practice [under price theory] of
describing the firm as a production function whose natural boundaries were defined by
technology. Economic inputs were thus transformed by the production technology into
economic outputs. Organizational considerations [that might explain the boundaries of firms)
were effectively suppressed.') (emphasis added).
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technological explanation for the firm and complete vertical integration and
then tried to extend that explanation outside and beyond the firm to various
forms of partial integration. 135 Of course, the technological explanation cannot
apply to partial integration: by their nature, technological efficiencies can only
arise 'within' the boundaries of a particular firm, where, for instance, firms
realize economies of scale. 136 This 'inside-out' approach, then, rules non-
standard contracts 'non-efficient' by a sort of negative implication. In the
absence of an efficiency explanation, they are presumed harmful.
Such an approach makes sense in the light of Professor Williamson's own
intellectual journey. Like Coase's seminal work, Williamson's early writings
seek to explain why firms choose complete vertical integration over market
contracting; they make no effort to explain why non-standard contracts might
be superior to an unbridled market. 13 7 Indeed, some of Williamson's early
works expressly disclaimed any effort to explain even complete integration into
distribution, the quintessential subject of partial integration in the form of
non-standard contracts.' 3 8 For Williamson, then, TCE re-emerged because
economists like himself rediscovered Coase's explanation for complete
integration and then subsequently applied that explanation to non-standard
contracts. 139
135 See nn 115-18, above and accompanying text.
136 Williamson, see above n 8, at 371.
137 See Oliver E. Williamson, 'The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure
Considerations', 61 American Economic Review 112 (1971) (examining transaction cost
considerations that lead firms to integrate completely); Oliver E. Williamson, 'Hierarchical
Control and Optimal Firm Size', 75 Journal of Political Economy 123 (1966). Only in 1973
did Williamson begin offering explanations for one form of partial integration: so-called 'inside
contracting,' whereby a single firm creates an internal market from which it purchases the final
product and then sells it to consumers. See Oliver E. Williamson, 'Markets and Hierarchies:
Some Elementary Considerations', 63 American Economic Review 316 (1973), 323-24. It
appears that Williamson first applied TCE to non-standard contracts of antitrust concern in
1979. See Oliver E. Williamson, 'Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions', 127 University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 953 (1979). See also Ronald H. Coase, 'Nature of the Firm', 4
Economica (n.s.) 386 (1937) (offering transaction cost explanation for firm's decision to
perform task itself instead of relying upon the spot market).
138 See Oliver E. Williamson, 'Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations',
61 American Economic Review 112 (1971), 122.
139 See Oliver E. Williamson, 'The Logic of Economic Organization', 4 Journal of Law,
Economics & Organization 65 (1988), 73 (asserting that (complete) 'vertical integration' is the
'paradigm problem to which transaction cost economics recurrently returns' and that the
solution to this problem is then applied to other economic problems); Oliver E. Williamson,
'Delimiting Antitrust', 76 Georgetown Law Journal 271 (1987), 273 (contending that
revolution in antitrust began with reconceptualization of the purposes of the business firm);
Williamson, above n 8, at 7-14. See also Ronald H. Coase, 'Nature of the Firm: Origin', 4
Journal Law, Economics & Organization 3 (1988), 7-17 (describing evolution of Coase's
thinking regarding the rationale for complete vertical integration); Ronald H. Coase, 'Nature
of the Firm', 4 Economica (n.s.) 386 (1937) passim (seeking explanation for why a firm may
choose complete integration instead of the spot market). To be sure, Coase recognized that the
concept of 'firm' was not self-defining. Nonetheless, he argued that the concept was useful even
if the line between 'the firm' and 'the market' was not always entirely clear. Ibid, at 392, n 1.
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While very useful, I hope, for those seeking to explain the origins of antitrust
doctrine, the received account is not entirely satisfying for those seeking the
origins of the economic theory that drove that doctrine. Moreover, William-
son's account and the related critiques of modern doctrine have not been
entirely successful. Instead, as explained earlier, courts, agencies and leading
antitrust scholars have not entirely internalized the lessons of transaction cost
economics, particularly TCE's conclusion that non-standard contracts can
overcome market failure by producing economic outcomes different from
those that would result from an unbridled rivalry.1 40 Instead, modern law often
rests upon the assumption that an agreement that alters the terms of trade
necessarily reflects an exercise of market power.
141
Why is it, then, that Williamson's account has not been entirely persuasive
to antitrust scholars and courts? The answer may lie in the account's failure to
fully grasp the underlying source of price theory's hostility toward non-
standard contracts. A more complete exegesis of the reasons for that failure
could ultimately shed light upon modern antitrust's stubborn resistance to
TCE's teachings.
What then, is missing from Williamson's account? For one thing, the
'inside-out' account seems to rest upon an anachronistic equation of price
theory's 'firm' with non-standard contracts like exclusive dealing and
minimum rpm. It is such an equation, after all, that forms the basis for the
claim that inhospitality-era economists assumed that the efficiencies produced
by non-standard contracts, if any, must be of the same variety as those that
arise within the firm. 142 Such an equation makes perfect sense within the
confines of the transaction cost paradigm, which views the firm as just a special
sort of non-standard contract.' 43 However, this equation seems far less
plausible as an account of economic thought during the inhospitality-era. In
the end, after all, price theory drew a strong distinction between 'the firm' and
'the market,' and this distinction seems to have been antecedent, at least in
part, to price theory's technological conception of the firm. 14 4 To be sure,
140 See nn 24 -100, above and accompanying text.
141 See nn 42-46, above and accompanying text.
142 See nn 110-18, above and accompanying text.
143 Ronald H. Coase, 'Nature of the Firm', 4 Economica (n.s.) 386 (1937), 391. See also Scott
Masten, 'A Legal Basis For The Firm', 4 Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 181
(1988) (arguing that 'the firm' is a series of default rules that parties can alter by contract);
Steven N.S. Cheung, 'The Contractual Nature of the Firm', 26 JLE 1 (1983), 5 (a firm
involves 'a form of contract that binds the input owner to follow directions instead of
determining his own course by continual reference to market prices of a variety of activities he
may perform').
144 See Harold Demsetz, 'The Theory of the Firm Revisited', 4 Journal of Law, Economics &
Organization 141 (1988), 143 ('A firm in the theory of price is simply a rhetorical device
adopted to facilitate discussion of the price mechanism.'); Harold Demsetz, 'The Structure of
Ownership and the Theory of the Firm', 26 JLE 375 (1983), 377 ('It is a mistake to confuse the
firm of economic theory with its real-world namesake. The chief mission of neoclassical
economics [i.e., price theory] is to understand how the price system coordinates the use of
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Coase had already surmised that such a distinction was superfluous and
misleading in his 'Nature of the Firm.' 145 But even he admitted that this article
was 'much cited but little used. ' 14 6 An account of the inhospitality-era that
rests upon price theory's supposed equation of the purposes of the firm and
'other' non-standard contracts retroactively superimposes Coase's insight on
an era that had not yet noticed it. An attempt to understand (and critique) past
science through the lens of modern taxonomies is likely to fail.
147
Common sense suggests a different approach for a scholar seeking a
complete explanation of this period. Once one determines that price theory
imbued 'the firm' with unique efficiency properties, one might then expect
price theorists to look for a type or class of efficiencies distinct from those that
arise within the firm, a category that does not involve or require reliance upon
technology. Thus, a conclusion that price theorists only recognized techno-
logical efficiencies that arose 'within' the firm seems to beg the question just
why they failed to attribute some entirely different sort of efficiency to non-
standard agreements. In fact, if price theorists had identified efficiency
purposes for non-standard agreements, they could possibly have worked 'from
the outside in,' asking whether the explanation for non-standard contracts
might also shed some light on the rationale for the firm. Williamson does not
address this question.
Moreover, Williamson's 'inside-out' approach does not square perfectly
with the actual progress of economic thought away from the inhospitality
tradition. To be sure, Coase's seminal piece on the nature of the firm,
published in 1937, focused solely on the rationale for complete integration,
thus forming the basis for an 'inside-out' approach. 148 But as noted earlier,
economists effectively ignored this article during the relevant period.1 49 When
a transaction cost approach first reappeared in the literature, it did so in the
form of work that sought to explain non-standard contracts, and not complete
integration. First, Aaron Director and Edward Levi sought to explain tying
resources, not to understand the inner workings of real firms.'). See also Ronald H. Coase, The
Firm, the Market, and the Law (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1988) 3 ('The firm to an
economist... is "effectively defined as a cost curve and a demand curve, and the theory [of the
firm] is simply the logic of optimal pricing and input combination."), quoting Mark Slater,
forward to Edith Penrose, The Theory of the Growth of the Firm (2,d edn, White Plains, NY:
M.E. Sharpe 1980) ix.
145 See Ronald H. Coase, 'Nature of the Firm', 4 Economica (n.s.) 386 (1937) passim.
146 Ronald H. Coase, 'Industrial Organization: A Proposal For Research', in Fuchs (ed), above n
107, at 63 (noting that the Nature of The Firm was 'much cited but little used').
147 Kuhn, see above n 4, at 1-4 (explaining how modem scientists often err when they attempt to
interpret past scientific systems as anticipations of modem paradigms).
148 See Ronald H. Coase, 'Nature of the Firm', 4 Economica (n.s.) 386 (1937) passim.
149 See Ronald H. Coase, 'Industrial Organization: A Proposal For Research', in Fuchs (ed),
above n 107, at 63. It should be noted that Coase himself wrestled with the link between
nonstandard contracts and complete integration, but he did not publish the results. See Ronald
H. Coase, 'The Nature of the Firm: Meaning', 4 Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 3
(1988), 29-31 (describing letters from Coase to a colleague on this subject).
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contracts as attempts to overcome the information costs that otherwise
prevented price discrimination. 150 Then, Lester Telser forcefully argued that
some minimum resale price maintenance agreements were designed to prevent
dealers from free riding on each others' promotional efforts, elaborating an
earlier insight by Ward Bowman. 151 Both of these approaches explained how
non-standard contracts could overcome the cost of 'transacting,' viz., reliance
upon the market to conduct economic activity that could conceivably be
handled 'within' the firm.
Telser took the manufacturer's reliance on the market as given and did not
ask why firms exist in the first place. 15 2 Nor did he cite Coase's work or
otherwise attempt to relate his findings to any larger conception of vertical
integration or the theory of the firm. That is, he did not work 'from the outside
in.' At the same time, economists busy rediscovering Coase's insight regarding
complete integration did not mention Telser's contribution.'
53
150 See Aaron Director and Edward Levi, 'Law and the Future: Trade Regulation', 51
Northwestern Law Review 281 (1956). See also Richard N. Langlois, 'Contract,
Competition, and Efficiency', 55 Brooklyn Law Review 831 (1989), 836-37 (explaining
how price discrimination account of tying is really a transaction-cost interpretation). It should
be noted that Frank Knight first suggested this explanation for tying. See Frank Knight,
'Demand and Supply Price', in The Economic Organization (New York: A. M. Kelley 1951) 67,
94 ('Monopolists often try, with more or less success, to practice a policy which [allows them to
expand output]. This is the device of class price, that is, charging different customers different
prices in accordance with their ability or willingness to pay rather than do without the good.
Another method is to rent the monopolized good and charge in proportion to the amount used
instead of selling it outright. This can be done by selling supplies for it at a monopoly price.').
151 See Lester G. Telser, 'Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?', 3 JiLE 86 (1960). See
also Ward Bowman, 'The Prerequisites And Effects Of Resale Price Maintenance', 22
University of Chicago Law Review 825 (1955), 842 -43 (articulating claim that minimum rpm
can prevent free riding, without using that exact term).
According to Bowman:
Circumstances may arise, however, in which dealers cannot be reimbursed for essential services
except through their price margins. Many products, especially new ones, the use of which
requires particular knowledge or special skill, may require costly demonstrations or services by
the dealer which it is not possible for the dealer to charge for directly or for the manufacturer to
pay for directly. If the item sold is of such a nature that a customer may get his service from a
service dealer and a cut price from a non-service dealer, the manufacturer may suffer because of
the elimination of service outlets.
Ibid, at 842. See Lester G. Telser, 'Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?', 3 JLE 86
(1960), 89 n 4 (noting Bowman's recognition of the free rider problem).
152 As I have noted elsewhere, Telser simply took the manufacturer's decision to rely upon the
market as a given, without discussing any possible rationales for doing so. See Alan J. Meese,
'Property Rights and Intrabrand Restraints', 89 Cornell Law Review 553, 563 (2004).
153 See Oliver E. Williamson, 'Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications'
(1975) (no mention of Telser's work); Oliver E. Williamson, 'Vertical Integration of
Production: Market Failure Considerations', 61 American Economic Review 112 (1971)
passim (same); Oliver E. Williamson, 'Hierarchical Control and Optimal Firm Size', 75 Journal
of Political Economy, 123 (1966) passim (same). See also Victor P. Goldberg, 'Production
Functions and Transaction Costs', in Feiwel (ed), above n 120.
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Six years later Robert Bork did work from the outside in. Bork applied Telser's
logic to non-price restraints, showing how exclusive territories, for instance,
could ensure that 'independent' dealers invested sufficient resources in
promoting a manufacturer's product. 15 4 He also explained how manufacturers
or joint ventures that relied on the market to distribute their products could
employ similar horizontal restraints to ensure the same level of promotion that a
completely integrated manufacturer would produce. 155 Citing Coase's 'Nature
of the Firm,' Bork argued that courts should apply the same level of scrutiny to
such agreements as they applied to purely 'unilateral' conduct by a fully
integrated firm. l5 6 In effect, then, Bork worked from the outside in, explaining
how both 'contractual' and 'ownership' integration could overcome the same
sort of market failure, although he did not use that term.1 57 Unfortunately, he
did not pursue this line of inquiry as part of any larger project on the theory of the
firm or transaction cost economics. 158 Nor does it appear that any economist
noticed Bork's contribution. 159
Any complete account of the inhospitality tradition must explain why
economists and others did not anticipate the alternative approach taken by
Bowman and Telser, that is, recognize the efficiency properties of non-
standard contracts without relating that recognition to any larger theory of the
firm. In other words, putting aside any shortcoming in their theory of the firm,
why did price theorists fail to recognize the propensity of non-standard
154 See Robert H. Bork, 'The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division', 75 Yale Law Journal 373 (1966), 430-38 (arguing that exclusive territories can help
manufacturers and joint ventures overcome 'the free ride problem'); ibid, at 453-54 (applying
the same logic to minimum rpm). By contrast, Telser's argument was limited to minimum price
restraints. It should be noted that Bork also credited Bowman with recognizing the propensity
of minimum rpm to prevent free riding. Ibid, at 430, n 111.
155 Ibid, at 435-36.
156 Ibid, at 472. See also Robert H. Bork, 'Resale Price Maintenance and Consumer Welfare', 77
Yale Law Journal 950 (1968), 968.
157 See Robert H. Bork, 'The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division', 75 Yale Law Journal 373 (1966), 452, n 156 ('The fully-integrated firm may, for
example, wish to eliminate the problem of the free ride among its salesmen quite as much as
does a contract-integrated firm.'); Ibid, at 381-83 (explaining how restrictions in articles of
partnership could help fully-integrated firm overcome free riding).
158 For instance, Bork's classic antitrust monograph does not mention Coase's work on the theory
of the firm in connection with partial integration. See Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox
(New York: Basic Books 1978); ibid, at 449-54 (discussing economics of minimum rpm and
exclusive territories without mentioning the theory of the firm or the distinction between
contractual and ownership integration).
159 Indeed, Professor Coase is apparently unaware that Judge Bork rediscovered his seminal work.
Two decades after Bork rediscovered Coase in this manner, Coase claimed that no one
understood his work until the 1970s. See Ronald H. Coase, 'The Nature of the Firm:
Meaning', 4 Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 3 (1988), 23 (claiming that The Nature
of the Firm had no noticeable effect on any scholarly article in the 1960s); Ronald H. Coase,
'The Nature of the Firm: Influence', 4 Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 33 (1988),
35 (claiming that attention was first given to 'The Nature of the Firm' in the 1970s and that the
writings of Oliver Williamson first popularized Coase's work).
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contracts-partial integration-to reduce transaction costs, overcome market
failure, and thus produce non-technological efficiencies? Such a recognition
could have undermined any claim that such contracts necessarily reflect an
exercise of market power.' 60 In the same vein, why did these economists not
anticipate Bork's efforts and rediscover Coase's theory of the firm by working
from the outside in? What, if anything, blocked economists and others from
pursuing these avenues?'16  The answer to this question will shed light on
modern antitrust's continuing hostility toward non-standard contracts.
III. PERFECT COMPETITION, MARKET FAILURE, AND THE
INHOSPITALITY TRADITION
The failure of economists to recognize the efficiency properties of non-
standard contracts during the inhospitality-era poses quite a puzzle. After all,
the practitioners of price theory certainly recognized that real markets could
sometimes fail. Indeed, as Professor Coase would later point out, many were
all too quick to identify such failures and thereby justify government
intervention. 162 Moreover, economists did not always recommend public
regulation, taxes, or subsidies as the solution to such failure. Instead, many
economists recognized that market failure was often the result of incorrect
property right assignments which, if corrected, would overcome the failures in
question. 163 Indeed, in 1958, the President of the American Economic
Association delivered a sort of'call to arms,' encouraging economists to devote
their energies toward the identification of shortcomings in the legal system's
160 See nn 310-28, below and accompanying text (describing basis for price theory's conclusion
that non-standard contacts reflected exercise of market power).
161 Cf. Howard Margolis, Paradigms and Barriers: How Habits of Mind Govern Scientific Beliefs
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1993) (arguing that methodological habits common to a
scientific community can constitute 'barriers' that prevent scientists from recognizing new and
better ways of understanding the world).
162 See Ronald H. Coase, 'The Lighthouse in Economics', 17 JLE 357 (1974). See also George
J. Stigler, 'Perfect Competition: Historically Contemplated', 65 Journal of Political Economy 1
(1957), 10 (contending that Pigou overused the externality concept).
163 See Francis Bator, 'The Anatomy of Market Failure', 72 Quarterly Journal of Economics 351
(1958), 354 ('arbitrary legal and organizational imperfections' can 'leave some inputs or outputs
"hidden," or preclude their explicit allocation or capture by market processes... [market] [f] ailure
is by enforcement.') (emphasis in the original); ibid, at 363-65 (discussing so-called 'ownership
externalities' that exist because of 'legal or practical inabilities to appropriate the full benefit of
private activity'); Anthony Scott, 'The Fishery: The Objective of Sole Ownership', 63 Journal of
Political Economy 116 (1955); ibid, at 124 (concluding that 'the equilibrium of the sole owner who
maximized the present value of the fishery would correspond more closely to the social optimum
than would the competitive equilibrium.'); ibid (concluding that 'the social optimum in both the
long run and the short run would demand that common-property resources be allocated to
maximizing owners, associations, co-operatives, or governments.'). See also Tibor Scitovsky,
Welfare and Competition: The Economics of a Fully Employed Economy (Chicago: R. D. Irwin 1951)
184 (stating that 'all rules and customs' are designed to 'keep one person's consumption from
interfering with other people's welfare.'); Kaysen & Turner, see above n 110, at 67, n 25 (tracing
inequality between private and social costs to 'inappropriate property institutions').
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assignment of rights and duties that caused market failure and then to propose
legal reforms to eliminate the failures.' 64 Pigou himself had recognized this,
explaining as he did that the state could eliminate certain canonical market
failures by changing the background rules governing the parties involved. 16
5
Indeed, Pigou had gone even a little further than this, noting at one point that
the extent of externality could turn on the terms of the contract between two
parties. 16 6 He did not, however, suggest that the parties could or would
eliminate such market failures by negotiating a different contract.
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If economists believed that market failures were prevalent, and if they
understood that society could cure those failures by altering the legal
framework, then why did no economist consider the possibility that at least
some non-standard contracts are designed to alter background rules or duties
so as to mitigate or overcome market failures? 16 3 Why, instead, did economists
automatically and reflexively attribute such contracts to market power? The
next two subsections offer an answer to these questions, an answer that will
ultimately help shed light on the current state of antitrust law.
A. Perfect Competition and Market Failure During the Inhospitality-Era
The answer, it seems, lies in the nature of the perfect competition model
and its relation to the market failure paradigm during the inhospitality-era.
This model was not simply the foundation of price theory; it was also the
jumping off point for any discussion of market failure during this period. 169 In
short, perfect competition and the analysis of market failure were linked in
such a way that scholars who practiced the mainstream economist's art could
not recognize the possibility that private parties could overcome market failure
by non-standard contracts.
Modern scholars treat market failure as a familiar and non-technical
concept. Legal and other scholars tend to discuss it freely, untethered to any
164 Morris A. Copeland, 'Institutionalism and Welfare Economics', 48 American Economic
Review 1 (1958), 2-7; ibid, at 6 ('[There are] a great number and a great variety of such
divergences [between private and social cost or benefit]. It seems to me economists should be
actively concerned both to discover such divergences and to devise remedies for them.'); ibid,
at 11 ('[V]arious forms of government action are aimed at supplementing the regulatory effects
of competition so as to improve the operation of our economy... As time goes on the variety
seems likely to increase. Indeed economists should make it their business to discover and to
propose new possible supplements.').
165 See Pigou, above n 107, at 175-81 (explaining how a change in background rules governing
land tenancy can reduce or eliminate divergences between private and total returns from
investments that tenants make on their leaseholds).
166 See Pigou, above n 107, at 174-75 (concluding that the divergence between private and social
product of investments by tenants in land improvements will depend upon 'the terms of the
contract between lessor and lessee.').
167 Ibid.
168 Cf. Pigou, see above n 107, at 174-75.
169 See generally Machovec, above n 107 (describing how perfect competition model became
foundation for all economic analysis during the twentieth century).
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technical jargon or constraints. Moreover, for modern scholars, any sort of
market can fail. It was not always so. During the inhospitality-era, economists
generally treated market failure as a highly technical concept, which they
usually discussed or analyzed in relation to the perfect competition model
and the outcomes that perfect competition would produce. 170 These scholars
took the term 'market failure' quite literally, as a failure of the market to
produce an optimal allocation of resources. 17 1 Such a failure could occur for
one of two reasons. First, the private market could depart from one or more
assumptions of the perfect competition model. 17 2 Second, even if the market
was perfectly competitive, a divergence between private and social costs could
cause even perfect competition to fail to produce an optimal allocation of
resources. 173
Note here what I did not say. I did not say that the presence of 'market
failure' was an exception to an 'otherwise' perfectly competitive market. For,
economists of the era in question treated 'market failure' as a phenomenon
that could exist even if all the assumptions of perfect competition were
satisfied. The practice of assuming that market failure could and did coexist
with perfect competition had important implications for economists' attempt
to interpret non-standard contracts.
To modern ears, a claim that market failure interfered with the results of
perfect competition and produced a suboptimal allocation of resources does
not quite ring true. After all, the model of perfect competition assumes the
absence of information costs, as well as the perfect mobility of resources.
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Given these assumptions, it seems, market failure is impossible. This is a
Coasean world, and in such a world market failure does not occur, because
market participants can rely upon private contract to eliminate any such
departures from an optimal allocation of resources. 1 75 Or, as George Stigler
put it in 1966: 'The Coase Theorem [ J asserts that under Perfect Competition
private and social costs will be equal and output will not be affected by the
manner in which the law assigns damages.' 176 Building on this reasoning, some
have even claimed that the Coase Theorem was really nothing new, since it
simply restated a somewhat tautological result of the perfect competition
model. 177
170 See Francis Bator, 'The Anatomy of Market Failure', 72 Quarterly Journal of Economics 351
(1955); J.E Meade, 'External Economies and Diseconomies in a Competitive Situation', 62
Economic Journal 54 (1952).
171 See Francis Bator, 'The Anatomy of Market Failure', 72 Quarterly Journal of Economics 351
(1955), 352-56.
172 Ibid, at 352-54.
173 Ibid.
174 Scherer, see above n 110, at 9-21.
175 See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 JLE 1 (1960).
176 Stigler, see above n 102, at 113.
177 See Donald McCloskey, 'The Good Old Coase Theorem and the Good Old Chicago School: A
Comment on Zerbe and Medema', in Steven G. Medema (ed), Coasean Economics: Law and
Economics and the New Institutional Economics (Boston; London: Kluwer Academic Publishers
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But was Coase's contribution really the redundant reformulation of a
tautology? If so, why did inhospitality economists, or any economists for that
matter, not anticipate Coase's insight and conclude that purely private
(non-standard) contracts can reallocate rights and duties so as to overcome
what would otherwise be a market failure?
One finds a clue to the answer in the work of Stigler himself. For Stigler did
not always treat the absence of market failure as a tautological result of the
perfect competition model, as he did after Coase published 'The Problem Of
Social Cost.' Instead, less that 10 years before he coined the 'Coase Theorem,'
Stigler sung a somewhat different tune. 178 In 1957, Stigler traced the history of
the Perfect Competition model, focusing significant attention on the historical
development of each assumption of the model as he saw it. 179 His main
discussion of the model and its requirements does not mention 'market
failure,' 'externality,' or 'external economies or diseconomies.' 18 0 A.C. Pigou,
who popularized the market failure concept, is mentioned only twice, and
only once in connection with externality. '8 1 The concept of market failure does
1998) 239-40 ('Smith, Edgeworth, Arrow, Debreu, with many others, noted that an item
tends to gravitate by exchange into the hands of the person who values it most, if transaction
costs (such as the cost of transportation) are not too high. Why a student of economic thought
like Stigler would call this old idea in economics "remarkable" I do not know, though it is not
the only strange reading that Stigler gave. Applying it to pollution rights is unremarkable. As
Paul Samuelson said sneeringly about the Coase Theorem: Where's the theorem?').
178 See William Breit, Lives of the Laureates: Thirteen Nobel Economists ( 3rd edn, Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press 1995) 247 (explaining how George Stigler actually coined the phrase 'The Coase
Theorem').
179 See George J. Stigler, 'Perfect Competition: Historically Contemplated', 65 Journal of Political
Economy 1 (1957).
180 Ibid, at 1-14. There is one possible exception. In a discussion of Marshall's contributions to
the development of the model, Stigler notes the former's emphasis on the presence of external
economies and diseconomies:
Marshall [added] a new and possibly extremely important exception [to the existence of a single
maximizing equilibrium], arising out of external economies and diseconomies. The doctrine of
external economies in effect asserts that in important areas the choices of an individual are
governed by only part of the consequences, and inevitably the doctrine opens up a wide range of
competitive equilibriums which depart from conventional criteria of optimum arrangement. It
was left for Pigou to elaborate, and exaggerate, the importance of this source of disharmonies in
Wealth and Welfare.
Two things are relevant about this passage. First, according to Stigler, anyway, Marshall had not
yet developed fully the concept of 'perfect competition' extant during the inhospitality era.
Second, Stigler's characterization here of the relevance of externalities is consistent with his
subsequent treatment of the problem, insofar as he concludes that the existence of market failure
results in 'a wide range of competitive equilibriums that depart from the criteria of optimum
arrangement.' Under this formulation, 'market failure' coexists with (various) 'competitive
equilibriums' and thus results in a suboptimal allocation of resources. See nn 181- 87, below and
accompanying text (discussing similar formulation latter in this same article).
181 Ibid, at 10 (explaining that Pigou would overemphasize the importance of external economies
and diseconomies in his Wealth and Welfare, published in 1912); ibid, at 11, n 50, discussing
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not appear in relation to the actual perfect competition model until a
section entitled 'Concluding Reflections,' where Stigler, discussing perfect
competition's usefulness as a normative benchmark to guide policy, opines as
follows:
The vitality of the competitive concept in its normative role has been
remarkable. One might have expected that, as economic analysis became
more precise and as the range of problems to which it was applied widened,
a growing list of disparities between the competitive allocation of resources
and the maximum output allocation would develop. Yet to date there have
been only two major criticisms of the norm. The first is that the competitive
individual ignores external economies and diseconomies, which-rightly or
wrongly-most economists are still content to treat as an exception to be dealt
with in individual cases. The second, and more recent, criticism is that the
competitive system will not provide the right amount (and possibly not the
right types) of economic progress, and this is still an undocumented charge.
The time may well come when the competitive concept is not suitable to
normative analysis, but it is still in the future.
18 2
Under the heading of 'external economies and diseconomies,' then, the
prospect of market failure is treated as a possible basis for criticizing the utility
of the perfect competition model as a guide to policy. The absence of such
failure is simply not treated as a precondition of the model. Instead, under
Stigler's formulation, market failure can persist even if all the assumptions of
the (self-contained) model are met. Market failure is an exception, exogenous
to the world of perfect competition.
Stigler's treatment of market failure as a state of affairs that can coexist with
perfect competition follows the treatment of the problem in his 1942 text 'The
Theory of Competitive Price.' There Stigler devotes a chapter to perfect
competition which, if present in all industries, would produce a general
competitive equilibrium and optimize the allocation of a society's resources.
1 83
Here, again, he does not mention the absence of market failure as a
precondition for invocation of the model.
Stigler does not ignore market failure, either. Several chapters later, in a
chapter on 'The Nature of Costs and the Production Function,' Stigler briefly
treats the possibility that some productive activities may entail a 'discrepancy
between private and social cost.'1 8 4 The discussion consumes all of two
paragraphs, and there is no suggestion that 'perfect competition' would
Pigou, above n 107. Cf. nf 202-209, below (discussing Pigou's 1932 treatment of market
failure as an exception to 'simple competition').
182 See George J. Stigler, 'Perfect Competition: Historically Contemplated', 65 Journal of Political
Economy 1 (1957), 16-17 (emphasis added).
183 Stigler, see above n 107, at 21-31.
184 Ibid, at 106.
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eliminate these external effects by assumption.1 85 On the contrary, Stigler
treats market failure as creating an exception to the conclusion that the
allocation of productive resources will be ideal 'in a competitive
equilibrium.'1 86 According to Stigler, 'such disharmonies... are eliminated
largely by ad hoc policies,' and thus not by the assumption of perfect
competition. 187 Here again, market failure is a sort of add on or afterthought to
the self-contained model of perfect competition.
The assumption that market failure could exist side-by-side with perfect
competition was not new to Stigler. Instead, this treatment seems to reflect the
economic conventions of the time. Consider classic formulations: one by
Frank Knight (Stigler's teacher and dissertation advisor), and one by A.C.
Pigou, who popularized the market failure concept. 188 According to Stigler,
Knight was the first to articulate a complete formulation of the model. 189
Knight lists nine assumptions that, if satisfied, will lead to 'perfect
competition.'1 90
1. The members of society are a 'cross section of normal human beings with
the attributes associated with members of Western Societies.'
2. Members of society act with complete rationality, subject to ordinary
human motives.
3. People are free to act on their motives or, as Knight puts it 'people own
themselves.'
4. There is a complete absence of 'physical obstacles to the making,
execution, and changing of plans at will. That is, there must be 'perfect
mobility' in all economic adjustments, no cost involved in movements or
changes.'
18 Ibid, at 106-07.
186 Ibid, at 107 ('It follows from the determination of costs, that in competitive equilibrium
the allocation of productive services is ideal, in the sense that no other allocation would
increase the product (measured in terms of what consumers are willing to pay). No unit
of a productive service could produce more if transferred to another firm (in the case of
specific factors) or to another industry (in the case of nonspecific factors).').
187 Ibid, at 107 (citing Pigou, see above n 107, at Part II, Ch 9) ('An impressive list of such
disharmonies between individual and social cost can easily be assembled. No single principle
underlies them, and they are eliminated largely by ad hoc policies.'). According to Stigler, one
such 'ad hoc policy' was 'cooperation.' Stigler, see above n 183, at 107. Did Stigler anticipate
Coase?
188 Breit, see above n 178, at 95, 97-100.
189 Knight, see above n 107, at 76-81. See also George J. Stigler, 'Perfect Competition:
Historically Contemplated', 65 Journal of Political Economy 1 (1957), 11 ('The concept
of perfect competition received its complete formulation in Frank Knight's Risk,
Uncertainty, and Profit. It was the meticulous discussion in this work that did most to
drive home to economists generally the austere nature of the rigorously defined
concept.').
190 Knight, see above n 189, at 76-81.
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5. 'It follows as a corollary from assumption number 4 that there is perfect
competition.'
6. 'Every member of Society is to act as an individual only, in entire
independence from other persons... Exchange of finished goods is the only
form of relation between individuals, or at least there is no other form that
influences economic conduct... In exchange between individuals, no
interests of persons not parties to the exchange are to be concerned, either
for good or ill. Individual independence in action excludes all forms of
collusion, all degrees of monopoly or tendency to monopoly.'
7. 'All preying of individuals on each other' is excluded 'This specification
is really a corollary from numbers 2 and 3, which exclude fraud or
deceit and theft or brigandage, respectively, but it deserves explicit
mention.'
8. 'The motives for division of labor and exchange must be present and
active.'
9. 'All given factors and conditions are... to remain absolutely unchanged.'
Taken together, Knight said, these various conditions would result in
'perfect competition' and thus a general competitive equilibrium, viz., an
allocation of resources that maximized the potential welfare of society given
its current endowments.'91
Knight's very thorough description of the conditions necessary and
sufficient for perfect competition does not mention externalities or the
absence of market failure.' 92 To the modern eye, this is no surprise; the various
assumptions Knight lays out seem plainly to preclude the possibility of positive
or negative externality. 193 But strangely, to us anyway, Knight himself did not
seem to think so. For, in a subsequent chapter, entitled 'Minor Prerequisites
For Perfect Competition,' Knight expressly addresses the problem of market
failure and its relation to perfect competition. 1 94 According to Knight, just
191 Knight, see above n 189, at 85-86.
192 It should be noted that Knight's assumption of the independence of actors included the
assumption that 'in exchanges between individuals, no interests of persons not parties to the
exchange are to be concerned, either for good or ill.' Ibid, at 78. One could read this
condition as eliminating the possibility of externality (the interests of persons not parties to
the exchange) and thus market failure by fiat. However, the more natural reading would
interpret this condition as simply positing that individuals ignore whatever positive or
negative impact their conduct may, in fact, have upon other persons under perfect
competition. This seems to be the better reading, given the example that Knight employs,
namely, the individual or firm that does not consider the admitted and necessary impact of
its output decisions on other firms and thus does not collude with them. Ibid. Indeed,
Knight's subsequent recognition that individual actions do impact third parties is not
inconsistent with his stipulation that, for purposes of the perfect competition model,
individuals do not consider these effects. See nn 194-201, below and accompanying text.
Thus, it seems clear that Knight does treat perfect competition and market failure as
coexisting phenomena. I am grateful to Lillian BeVier for pressing me on this point.
193 Stigler, see above n 176, at 113.
194 Knight, see above n 189, at 181-83.
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about every action an individual might take-or not take-in the real world
may affect one or more individuals in a negative or positive way. 195 There is no
suggestion that the presence of these external effects depends upon the
violation of the various assumptions Knight had previously deemed necessary
and sufficient to create perfect competition. Instead, Knight concludes that the
social desirability of perfect competition depends upon the extent to which
private and social interests diverge, that is, the presence or absence of
externalities. 196 These interests can only diverge, it should be emphasized,
given the assumption of the perfect competition model to the effect that
individuals do not consider the impact of their conduct on others.1 9 7 Here
again, despite the chapter's purported focus on 'prerequisites,' Knight
ultimately treats market failure as a phenomenon that could coexist with
perfect competition. Indeed, Knight ends this discussion by exhorting
economists to develop tractable standards for determining when 'free
contract'-a synonym for perfect competition-does, in fact, 'promote
individual interests harmoniously and realize social ideals.' 1 9 8 He ends the
discussion by suggesting that there are two reasons that social and private
interests may diverge. First, certain forms of organization may cause such
divergence.199 Such divergences, of course, would be independent of the
existence vel non of perfect competition, and society could presumably
eliminate such divergences by reforming the institutions that cause such
divergence. 2 0 Second, some such divergences are simply the result of
immutable aspects of human nature, thus perhaps undermining the existence
of perfect competition in the first place.20°
195 Ibid, at 181-82 ('It may be doubted whether in fact any agreement between individuals is ever
made which does not affect for good or ill many persons other than the immediate parties, and
a larger proportion have larger ramifications over 'society.").
196 Ibid, at 181 ('The mere mechanical effectiveness of competitive free contract in producing a
reconciliation of individual interests under given conditions depends largely on [the presence
or absence of externalities]'). Cf. George J. Stigler, 'Perfect Competition: Historically
Contemplated', 65 Journal of Political Economy 1 (1957), 16-17 (employing similar
formulation).
197 Ibid, at 85-86.
198 Ibid, at 182-83 ('It would be well for the progress of science if we had less [argument for
second-guessing preferences] and more serious effort to formulate standards and to determine
the conditions under which free contract does or does not promote individual interests
harmoniously and realize social ideals.'); ibid, at 86 (treating 'free exchange' and 'perfect
exchange' as synonymous); ibid, at 53-54 (treating 'free competitive relations' based on
ownership of private property (freedom) as synonymous with perfect competition).
199 Knight, see above n 189, at 183 ('It is most desirable that some attempt be made to separate the
evils for which the form of organization is more or less reasonably blamable from those which
are inherent in nature and human nature, or in organization as such, irrespective of its form,
and to keep the question in view...'). Cf. nn 163-66, above and accompanying text (explaining
how economists of the era believed that market failure was often the result of poor property
rights assignments).
200 Knight, see above n 189, at 185.
201 Ibid, at 185; ibid, at 51-54 (explaining how concept of perfect competition depends upon
certain idealized assumptions about human motives).
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One finds a similar treatment of the problem in Pigou's classic text,
Economics and Welfare.20 2 While Pigou does not define perfect competition as
such, he plainly employs the equivalent of the concept.2 03 His work begins with
a definition of the 'National Dividend,' what he also calls 'economic
welfare.' 20 4 He then proceeds to consider to what extent the 'free play of self
interest,' leads to the maximization of the national dividend within the given
legal framework.2 0 5 The consideration begins with an examination of various
factors that prevent the equalization of returns across industries, including
imperfect knowledge, obstacles to the movement of factors, and the
indivisibility of certain factors of production. 20 6 The elimination of such
conditions, it is said, leads 'self interest' to ensure that resources move to their
highest valued (private) use, with the result that (private) investment returns
are equal across industries, the result of what Pigou calls 'simple
competition.'20 7
Having shown that the 'free play of self interest' could, in the absence of
numerous potential obstacles, lead to equalized private returns across
industries, Pigou then proceeded to examine the extent to which such
equalization would maximize the national dividend and thus society's
economic welfare. 20 8 While self-interest would equalize private returns, it
would only equalize social returns and thus maximize the national dividend
where private and social returns happened to be identical in all industries.20 9
Here again, 'market failure' was exogenous to the existence vel non of perfect
competition.
Knight's and Pigou's treatment of the interaction between market failure
and perfect competition seems to have set the tone, or at least presaged,
202 See James M. Buchanan, 'External Diseconomies, Corrective Taxes, and Market Structure',
59 American Economic Review 174 (1969) (concluding that both Pigou and Marshall
considered the problem of market failure in a competitive setting).
203 See George J. Stigler, 'Perfect Competition: Historically Contemplated', 65 Journal of Political
Economy 1 (1957), 11, n 50.
204 Pigou, see above n 107, at 31-42.
205 Ibid, at 127-30 (detailing plan of the remainder of the work in this manner); ibid, at xii
(summarizing Part II: 'The Size Of The National Dividend And The Distribution Of
Resources Among Different Uses' as '[ascertaining] how far the free play of self-interest, acting
under the existing legal system, tends to distribute the country's resources in the way most
favorable to the production of a large national dividend.') (emphasis added).
206 Pigou, see above n 107, at 144-48 (exploring impact of removing obstacles to movement);
ibid, at 149-57 (considering 'hindrances to equality of returns due to imperfect knowledge');
ibid, at 158-66 (considering impact of 'imperfect divisibility of the units in which transactions
are conducted').
207 Pigou, see above n 107, at 127-7 1; ibid, at 172 (equating result of unobstructed self-interest
with 'simple competition').
208 Pigou, see above n 107, at 172-74.
209 Pigou, see above n 107, at 213 (defining 'simple competition' as 'conditions such that each
seller produces as much as he can at the ruling market price, and does not restrict his output in
the hope that the price will rise'); ibid (stating that, under simple competition, 'investment and
output must be carried to a point at which the value of the marginal private net product of
investment there conforms to the central value.').
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economists' subsequent treatment of the question. In short, textbooks of the
era either omitted any discussion of market failure or, ala Knight, Stigler, and
Pigou treated the concept as a phenomenon that coexisted side-by-side with
210the state of perfect competition.
The realization that many leading economists treated perfect competition
and market failure as coexisting phenomena seems inconsistent with the claim
that the Coase Theorem was old hat.2 11 This realization also begs the question
why economists clung to the fiction that perfect competition could coexist with
market failure for so long. This is not the place to provide a full answer to this
question, but we can at least surmize that this tenacity was not accidental.
Scientific methodologies usually serve a purpose, helping practitioners solve
the puzzles that the particular scientific community deems most salient.2 12 A
model that solves these salient problems will be deemed 'successful,' even if it
offers no solution to other problems. 2 13 Indeed, scientists will employ
'successful' models even if the particular scientific community demonstrates
that some of the model's predictions are false.2 1 4 Careful consideration
210 Kaysen & Turner, see above n 110, 67, n 25 (treating divergence of private and social costs
as a phenomenon independent of 'the equilibrium of a competitive model' that could
prevent an efficient allocation of resources); Scitovsky, above n 163 (discussing 'Distinction
Between Social And Private Marginal Value and Product' as a note to chapter on production
costs); ibid, at 182-83 (divergence between private and social costs can prevent perfect
competition from producing an optimal allocation of resources); ibid, at 183 ('We retain
perfect competition as the best model for an efficient economy, even though it would be a
perfect model only if the welfare of each consumer depended on his consumption alone.');
Joe S. Bain, Price Theory (New York: Holt 1952) 126-54 (defining pure competition without
reference to market failure); ibid, at 168 (explaining how 'a price system under universal
pure competition... would tend to bring about the best allocation of resources among uses or
composition of aggregate output from the standpoint of consumer satisfaction'); ibid, at
169-70 (explaining how presence of externality 'tends to distort the allocative function of
any price system, purely competitive or otherwise.'); John P. Miller, Unfair Competition
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1941) 360 (stating that a society that is perfectly
competitive will achieve the 'ideal situation' of the 'most effective use of economic resources,'
unless externalities are present). See also William Baumol, Welfare Economics and the Theory
of the State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1965) 72-74; Paul Samuelson,
Economics: An Introductory Analysis (New York: McGraw-Hill 1951) 743, n 1 (discussing
'evil' of negative and positive externalities in a footnote and noting that these 'evils' mean
that 'certain lines of activity deserve to be contracted and others to be expanded.').
211 See n 177, above and accompanying text (some scholars contend that the Coase Theorem was
a tautological restatement of the perfect competition model).
212 Cf. Kuhn, above n 4, at 23 ('Paradigms gain their status because they are more successful than
their competitors in solving a few problems that a group of practitioners has come to recognize
as acute.'); ibid, at 23-34 (explaining how structure of paradigms often responds to problems
that profession or society deems important).
213 Kuhn, see above n 4, at 23 ('To be more successful [than competing paradigms] is not, however,
to be completely successful with a single problem or notably successful with any large number').
214 Ibid, at 79-82; ibid, at 81 (explaining that failure of Newton's theory to predict the speed and
motion of Mercury did not cause scientists to question Newton's theory, given its ability to
solve other important problems).
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suggests three reasons why economists found this approach a useful tool for
examining problems related to market failure.
2 15
First, it is useful to recall the overall agenda of microeconomics during this
period. In short, economists devoted significant energy in determining under
what conditions, if any, a system of private property and free exchange could
produce an optimal allocation of resources.2 16 It therefore made sense to
distinguish between two inquiries: (1) whether a private system-even an ideal
one-could ever produce an optimal allocation of resources and (2) whether a
particular system was in fact ideal. By constructing the model of perfect
competition, economists provided an answer to the first question, articulating
the conditions both necessary and sufficient for a private market to produce
equality between private costs and private benefits of economic activity.
Having constructed such a model, economists could then ask the second
question: did private costs equal social costs in the context of a particular
institutional framework? By decoupling the existence of perfect competition
from the presence or absence of market failure, economists could isolate and
distinguish two questions: (1) the relationship between private costs and
private benefits produced by particular market structures and circumstances,
and (2) the impact on resource allocation of any divergence between private
and social CoStS. 2 1 7 Thus, when addressing the latter question, economists
would begin any analysis of market failure by assuming that the various
underlying assumptions of perfect competition were present.
21 8
By structuring their analysis in this way, economists could imagine that the
'free play of private interest' could produce a general equilibrium in the
absence of the introduction of some extraneous force preventing it. 2 19 Market
215 Cf. Kuhn, above n 4, at 23 (paradigms survive to the extent they help solve problems the
community deems useful); ibid, at 66-71 (failure of paradigms to offer basis for solving
important puzzles leads scientists to doubt the paradigm and to a resulting crisis).
216 Knight, see above n 107, at 51-58 (framing the inquiry in this manner).
217 Cf. Pigou, see above n 107, at 144 (explaining that assumption of equality between social and
private net products allowed economists to isolate impact of complete mobility on allocation of
resources without introducing complication of market failure).
218 See Francis Bator, 'The Anatomy of Market Failure', 72 Quarterly Journal of Economics 351
(1958), 354; J.E. Meade, 'External Economies and Diseconomies in a Competitive Situation',
62 Economic Journal 54 (1952); Anthony Scott, 'The Fishery: The Objective of Sole
Ownership', 63 Journal of Political Economy 116 (1955), 124 (emphasizing that the article's
conclusions held only to the extent that the entire economy was perfectly competitive); ibid
(explaining that the possession of market power by a single owner would ensure 'so many
possible consequences... that it would be impossible to generalize about them.'); Pigou, see
above n 107, at 172-74 (examining the ramifications of divergence between marginal social
and marginal private net product 'under simple competition'); ibid, at 172 (explaining that
divergences between social and private marginal products will prevent self-interest from
maximizing the 'national dividend' in a frictionless world). See also nn 178-210 above and
accompanying text (collecting other sources taking same approach).
219 Bain, see above n 210, at 163-68 (explaining how pure competition in all industries produces
ideal allocation of resources); ibid, at 169-70 (explaining that divergence between private and
social costs results in a distortion of resource allocation 'under universal pure competition').
Market Failure and Non-Standard Contracting 65
failure was one such extraneous force, and the existence of such a failure, on
the other hand, presented economists with various puzzles to be solved. 220 So,
for instance, application of this methodology allowed economists to examine
the exact contours of market failure, distinguishing between illusory pecuniary
externalities, on the one hand, and meaningful technological externalities, on
the other.22 1 Economists could also examine the presence or absence of unique
equilibria in the face of such failure, as well as the efficacy and impact on
general welfare of possible solutions.22 2 In so doing, economists could employ
the sort of advanced mathematical techniques that are the hallmark of a
normal science.2 23 By contrast, any departure from perfect competition would
ensure the absence of the very optimal allocation of resources that served as the
ultimate goal of economic policy. 224 In this way, economists practiced 'normal
science,' solving 'characteristic problems [that] are almost always repetitions,
with minor modifications, of problems that have been undertaken and partially
resolved before.'
22 5
Indeed, and this brings us to a second reason economists may have
clung to this methodology: the absence of perfect competition could even
render market failure analysis counter-productive. After all, the so-called
220 Kuhn, see above n 4, at 37 (explaining how a scientific paradigm helps define the puzzles that
scientists ought to solve); Bain, see above n 210, at 163-72 (summarizing results of perfect
competition, with caveats for market failure); Scitovsky, see above n 163, at 181-87; Stigler,
see above n 107, at 105-07 (explaining that 'discrepancy between private and social cost'
would prevent the 'ideal' 'allocation of productive services' 'in a competitive equilibrium').
221 See Francis Bator, 'The Anatomy of Market Failure', 72 Quarterly Journal of Economics 351
(1958), 356 -58 (discussing distinction between mere pecuniary externalities, on the one hand,
and technological externalities, on the other).
222 See Francis Bator, 'The Anatomy of Market Failure', 72 Quarterly Journal of Economics 351
(1958), 363 -77 (developing a taxonomy of various market failures and suggesting potential
responses thereto); J.E. Meade, 'External Economies and Diseconomies in a Competitive
Situation', 62 Economic Journal 54 (1952), 56-66 (distinguishing two types of externalities in
'the simplest competitive model'); Anthony Scott, 'The Fishery: The Objective of Sole
Ownership', 63 Journal of Political Economy 116 (1955), 117-24 (examining extent to which
a fishery held in common will result in allocation of resources consistent with wealth
maximization given perfect competition). See also H. Scott Gordon, 'Economic Theory of a
Common-Property Resource: The Fishery', 62 Journal of Political Economy 124 (1954),
128-42 (same).
223 See J.E. Meade, 'External Economies and Diseconomies in a Competitive Situation', 62
Economic Journal 54 (1952), 55-61, 63-66; Kuhn, see above n 4, at 36 ('Bringing a normal
research problem to a conclusion is achieving the anticipated in a new way, and it requires the
solution of all sorts of complex instrumental, conceptual, and mathematical puzzles. The man
who succeeds proves himself an expert puzzle-solver, and the challenge of the puzzle is an
important part of what usually drives him on.').
224 See Anthony Scott, 'The Fishery: The Objective of Sole Ownership', 63 Journal of Political
Economy 116 (1955), 124 (introduction of market power into the model would result in too
many analytical complications); Francis Bator, 'The Anatomy of Market Failure', 72 Quarterly
Journal of Economics 351 (1958), 378 ('Despite the host of crucial feasibility considerations
which render choice in the real world inevitably a problem in the strategy of the "second best,"
it is surely interesting and useful to explore the implications of Paretian efficiency.').
225 Kuhn, see above n 107, at 233.
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'general theory of second best' holds that the elimination of distortions in
one sector of the economy can actually reduce total welfare in some
circumstances.22 6 In fact, the theory concludes that the elimination of
market failure will only certainly improve welfare if there are no other
market failures. 227 Thus, by assuming that perfect competition and a
single market failure coexisted, economists framed their inquiry so that a
solution to a particular market failure would necessarily enhance and
indeed perfect economic welfare. 22 3 This approach allowed economists to
focus their analysis on one market failure at a time, without the distracting
complications posed by the possible interactions of several market
failures .229
Third and finally, the bifurcation of perfect competition, on the one hand,
and market failure on the other rested upon a convenient and natural distinction
between empirical inquiry and policy analysis. Under this approach, the
existence vel non of 'perfect competition' was generally an empirical question,
one that economists could answer by gathering data in the 'real world.' 230 By
contrast, if competition was, in fact, perfect, the presence or not of market
failure almost always depended on the legal framework, since most market
failures were traceable to poor assignments of property rights that the state
could remedy via legislation. This natural, commonsense distinction likely gave
this methodology significant staying power.
2 3 1
By framing the market failure inquiry in this manner, economic theory
necessarily transformed the study of market failure into an exercise in public
226 See Kelvin Lancaster and Richard Lipsey, 'The General Theory of Second Best', 24 Review of
Economic Studies 11 (1956); Scherer, see above n 110, 26-29 (1980).
227 Ibid.
228 See James Buchanan, 'External Diseconomies, Corrective Taxes, and Market Structure', 59
American Economic Review 174 (1969), 175 (concluding that both Marshall and Pigou
avoided second best problems by considering the problem of market failure 'implicitly based on
the assumption of competitive structures'); Kuhn, see above n 4, at 35-37 (explaining that
reification of a paradigm leads scientists to spend their professional lives pursuing narrow
problems suggested by the paradigm).
229 See Anthony Scott, 'The Fishery: The Objective of Sole Ownership', 63 Journal of Political
Economy 116 (1955), 124 (explaining how departure from assumption of perfect competition
would introduce so many complications as to render useful conclusions impossible); Kuhn, see
above n 4, at 37-38 (chosen paradigms effectively insulate scientists from addressing problems
for which paradigms offer no methodology for solution); see Kuhn, above n 107, at 232 ('The
practitioner of a mature science does not pause to examine divergent modes of explanation or
experimentation.').
230 See Francis Bator, 'The Anatomy of Market Failure', 72 Quarterly Journal of Economics
351 (1958), 352-54. To be sure, the existence of perfect competition theoretically depended
upon a legal framework that assigned property rights and provided remedies to enforce those
rights. Still, economists (somewhat arbitrarily) treated a basic system of private property and
free contract as sufficiently exogenous to support the bifurcation between empirical and
policy analysis. Pigou, see above n 107, at 127-30 (explaining that book's analysis takes
place within the given legal framework); ibid, at xii (summarizing plan of Part II in this
manner).
231 Margolis, see above n 161, at 32-36.
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policy analysis.2 32 By positing a world where the 'free play of self-interest' could
produce a general competitive equilibrium and optimize the allocation of
resources, this methodology effectively 'laid the blame' for a suboptimal
allocation at the feet of the government, which could, after all, change the rules
of the game to eliminate any divergence between private and social cost. Indeed,
according to Pigou, the study of economic science was worthwhile only to the
extent that such a study might lead to 'practical results in social
improvements.'23 3 He thus framed a large part of his 'Economics of Welfare'
as a study of how states could alter their legal institutions so as to 'interfere[ ]
with normal economic processes' and therefore bring about equality between
social and private costs. 234 Such interference would channel 'the free play of
self-interest' into socially-optimal directions and thus enhance the national
dividend. 35 Taking their cue from Pigou, many economists sought to identify
market failures and propose solutions designed to thwart these failures and
thereby bring the economy closer to an optimal allocation of resources. 2 3 6 Some
pursued this project with almost missionary zeal, treating the allocation of
resources that an omniscient central planner would produce as their goal.23 7
These economists were not trying to solve market failure for the sake of doing so.
Instead, economists were hoping to create an institutional framework in which
232 Cf. Richard 0. Zerbe, 'The Failure of Market Failure', in Economic Efficiency in Law and
Economics (Northampton, MA: Edgar Elgar Publishing 2001) 165-66 (explaining how market
failure analysis has been employed as 'a diagnostic tool by which policy makers learned how to
objectively determine the exact scope and type of intervention needed.').
233 Pigou, see above n 107, at 4-5; ibid, at 5 ('Here, if in no other field, Comte's great phrase holds
good: "It is for the heart to suggest our problems; it is for the intellect to solve them"... The
only position for which the intellect is primarily adopted is to be the servant of the social
sympathies.'); Knight, see above n 107, at 16 ('the aim of science is to predict the future for the
purpose of making our conduct intelligent.').
234 Pigou, see above n 107, at 172 ('When there is a divergence between these two sorts of marginal
net products, self-interest will not, therefore, tend to make the national dividend a maximum;
and, consequently, certain specific acts of interference with normal economic processes may be
expected, not to diminish, but to increase the dividend.').
235 Pigou, see above n 107, at 128-29.
There is ground, however, for believing that even Adam Smith had not realised fully the extent
to which the System of Natural Liberty needs to be qualified and guarded by special laws,
before it will promote the most productive employment of a country's resources. It has been
said by a recent writer that 'the working of self-interest is generally beneficent, not because of
some natural coincidence between the self-interest of each and the good of all, but because
human institutions are arranged so as to compel self-interest to work in directions in which it
will be beneficent.'
Ibid (quoting Carman, Economic Review, July 1913, at 333).
236 Pigou, see above n 107, at 172-203.
237 See Morris A. Copeland, 'Institutionalism and Welfare Economics', 48 American Economic
Review 1 (1958), 2-17; Samuelson, above n 210, at 743 (arguing that examination of pricing
and allocational decisions in a hypothetical socialist economy 'teaches us how to appraise the
mechanical efficiency of pricing in a non-socialist society').
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'the free play of self interest' would produce an optimal allocation of resources
and thus maximize Pigou's national dividend. 23 3 In short, the practice of
holding perfect competition constant while examining the problem of market
failures supplied economists with a rich and tractable research agenda and thus
may have helped entrench this methodology within the minds of these
scholars.2 39
B. Perfect Competition and the Inhospitality Tradition
What though does all of this have to do with the inhospitality tradition? After
all, economists of the inhospitality-era did not believe that the real world either
did or should entirely replicate the world imagined by perfect competition.
Instead, these scholars recognized certain desirable departures from perfect
competition, including the existence of market power that came with
economies of scale or product differentiation. 240 Given this level of practical
sophistication, how much influence could the idealized model of perfect
competition really have had on antitrust policy?
24 1
The answer, it seems, is 'plenty,' though in a somewhat indirect way. To
understand why, one must attempt to see the problem through the eyes of
economists as they practiced their art in the 1950s. Scientists working with an
accepted paradigm do not invent a new model for every new problem they
238 See Morris A. Copeland, 'Institutionalism and Welfare Economics', 48 American Economic
Review 1 (1958), 2-4; see Pigou, above n 107, at 127-30.
239 Kuhn, see above n 4, at 24-25 (a paradigm is successful in part because it suggests numerous
useful problems that it can help scientists solve); Kuhn, see above n 107, at 230-31 (different
paradigms suggest different research agendas and different criteria governing what constitutes
an acceptable solution).
240 See Alan J. Meese, 'Price Theory, Competition and the Rule of Reason', 2003 Illinois Law
Review 77 (2003), 121-22.
241 It should be noted that some scholars have argued that the inhospitality tradition derived from
undue adherence to the perfect competition model as a guide to antitrust policy. Machovec, see
above n 107, at 203-08; Richard N. Langlois, 'Contract, Competition, and Efficiency', 55
Brooklyn Law Review 831 (1989), 834-35. See also Frank H. Easterbrook, 'Is There A
Ratchet In Antitrust Law?', 60 Texas Law Review 705 (1980), 715 (asserting that inhospitality
tradition of antitrust law 'emphasized competition in the spot market'). While each makes an
important contribution, none of these scholars explores the link between perfect competition,
on the one hand, and the analysis of market failure, on the other. Moreover, none reconciles his
argument with the fact that inhospitality era scholars recognized certain departures from
perfect competition as desirable. By contrast, this paper explains how economists interested in
antitrust policy could embrace certain departures from the perfect competition model without
also recognizing that non-standard contracts can overcome market failure without exercising or
creating market power. At the same time, the paper seeks to explain how modem scholars can
recognize that non-standard contracts produce significant benefits while at the same time
questioning all such contracts that result in higher prices, for instance.
It should also be noted that Professor Williamson does not discuss the influence of the perfect
competition model on the inhospitality tradition. Instead, Williamson attributes the
inhospitality tradition to 'applied price theory.' See nn 107-18, above and accompanying
text (describing Williamson's invocation of 'price theory' as source of inhospitality tradition);
Ronald H. Coase, above n 107, at 61-64 (same).
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24encounter. 42 Economists interested in antitrust policy did not construct their
own paradigms from scratch, but instead quite naturally employed the
paradigms that their professional colleagues had developed to solve other
243problems.  For these scholars, antitrust regulation was a subset of a larger
effort to quash externalities and thus ensure that private markets produced the
best possible allocation of resources.
244
As explained above, when economists considered questions of market
failure, they did so against the backdrop of perfect competition. More
precisely, economists considering market failures that did not derive from
market power began with the assumption, never relaxed, that the various
conditions necessary and sufficient for 'perfect competition' obtained, with the
result that private returns were equalized across all of society's industries.
245
By holding the existence of perfect competition constant, economists were able
to identify and focus on instances in which, despite perfect competition,
private returns diverged from social returns, with the result that some change
in the background legal framework was necessary to eliminate market
failure. 246 Such a change would, given the methodology, result in the optimal
allocation of resources. As shown below, this paradigm for examining market
failure created substantial barriers to the recognition that private contracts
were methods for overcoming market failure by economizing on the costs of
relying upon the sort of unbridled market imagined by perfect competition.
These barriers explain why-separate and apart from their technological
theory of the firm-economists of this era could not recognize that
non-standard contracts could overcome market failures and also why these
same economists concluded that such agreements reflected an exercise of
market power.
Earlier, this article explained how economists have identified several
conditions that are necessary to the existence of 'perfect competition' and the
resulting equalization of private returns across industries.2 4 7 Several of these
assumptions, it will be seen, effectively raise the cost of recognizing the
possibility that non-standard contracts can be vehicles for overcoming market
242 Kuhn, see above n 4, at 22 (explaining how scientists employ community's dominant paradigm
to explore analogous problems); ibid, at 19-20 (explaining that scientists working in field with
an accepted paradigm 'need no longer, in [their] major works, attempt to build [their] field
anew.'); Kuhn, see above n 107, at 233 ('The man who suspected the existence of a totally new
type of phenomenon or who had basic doubts about the validity of existing theory would not
think problems so closely modeled on textbook paradigms worth undertaking.').
243 See Ronald H. Coase, above n 107, at 67 (explaining that, during this era, industrial
organization was simply 'applied price theory').
244 Kaysen & Turner, see above n 110, at 3-14; ibid, at 12 (expressly linking their own
methodology to that of Pigou); Bain, above n 210, at 22- 23 (stating that general equilibrium
theory, 'is our primary source of standards of what constitutes desirable performance by firms
and industries.'); see Miller, above n 210, at 360.
245 See nn 169-210, above and accompanying text.
246 Pigou, see above n 107, at 144.
247 See nn 190-91, above and accompanying text.
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failure. 248 The first two: perfect knowledge and the absence of time, could
block the recognition of certain market failures in the first place, particularly
certain failures that are salient to antitrust analysis. 249 The other three-
perfect mobility of factors, lack of cooperation between rivals, and a fixed
definition of property rights-all acted so as to make private solutions to
recognized market failure beyond the ken of those economists applying the
dominant methodology of the day.
1. Blocking Recognition of Market Failure in the First Place
a. Perfect knowledge
Consider first the impact of the 'complete knowledge' assumption of the
perfect competition model. Many of the market failures identified by
TCE's practitioners result in a failure of firms to produce an optimal
amount of information. For instance, manufacturers that rely upon an
unbridled market-dealers-to distribute their goods may find that dealers
under-invest in promotion and advertising, given the prospect that other
dealers may free-ride on these efforts.25 ° Similarly, manufacturers may find
that their own promotional expenditures that lure consumers to dealers
may 'spill over' and benefit other manufacturers who distribute products
through the same dealers.2 5 1 Given such spillovers, these manufacturers
may also under-invest in promotion, thus depriving consumers of
information they might find useful. 2 52 Finally, independent organizations
that repair complex machinery may lack the incentives necessary to
produce information that might help the manufacturer improve its
products. 
253
Today economists recognize that complete integration can solve these and
other similar market failures. 254 Even before economists focused on complete
integration as a solution to these problems, however, scholars began to
recognize that non-standard contracts can overcome such market failures.
Minimum rpm or exclusive territories can ensure that dealers internalize
248 Cf. Margolis, see above n 161, at 29-42 (explaining how deeply entrenched habits of mind can
constitute barriers that prevent scientists from properly understanding natural phenomena).
249 Knight, see above n 107, at 77-78 (explaining role of perfect knowledge assumption in perfect
competition model); Pigou, see above n 107, at 149-58 (explaining how absence of perfect
knowledge can serve as a barrier to the realization of equal private returns across markets).
250 See Lester G. Telser, 'Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?', 3 JLE 86 (1960); Ward
Bowman, 'The Prerequisites And Effects Of Resale Price Maintenance', 22 University of
Chicago Law Review 825 (1955), 842-43 (articulating claim that minimum rpm can prevent
free riding, without using that exact term).
251 See Howard Marvel, 'Exclusive Dealing', 25 JLE 1 (1982).
252 See Howard Marvel, 'Exclusive Dealing', 25 JLE 1 (1982), 6-11.
253 See Alan J. Meese, 'Tying Meets The New Institutional Economics', 146 University of
Pennsylvania Law Review at 1 (1997), 65.
254 See Benjamin Klein, 'Transaction Cost Determinants of"Unfair" Contractual Arrangements',
70 American Economic Review 356 (1980), 359, n 2; Victor Goldberg, 'The Law and
Economics of Vertical Restrictions', 58 Texas Law Review 91 (1979), 109.
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the results of their promotional efforts.25 5 Subsequently scholars determined
that exclusive dealing can ensure that manufacturers that invest in promotion
and entice customers to their dealers will realize the benefits of such
expenditures.2 56 Contracts that require purchasers of complex machinery
also to purchase repair and maintenance services from the manufacturer allow
the manufacturer to reap the rewards of generating information about the
underlying machine while repairing it.
2 57
Note, however, that the methodology employed during the inhospitality-era
for identifying, analyzing, and correcting market failure would raise the cost of
recognizing these information-based market failures in the first place. Recall that
economists searching for market failures in need of state correction would do so in
an effort to move the economy closer to an optimal allocation of resources. To this
end, these practitioners assumed that any such failure would coexist with the
conditions necessary and sufficient for perfect competition, including the
possession of perfect knowledge by all market participants.25 8 In a world of
complete knowledge, consumers completely understand the attributes of various
products and fully know the locations where they are sold. There is no fraud in this
world, and trading partners cannot behave in an opportunistic fashion.
25 9
In this world, advertising, trademarks, and other promotional devices
indispensable in the real world simply have no place, as consumers already
know everything advertising might teach them.260 In such an environment, a
255 See Robert H. Bork, 'The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division II', 75 Yale Law Journal 373 (1965), 430-38, 453- 54; Lester G. Telser, 'Why Should
Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?', 3 JLE 86 (1960), 89-96.
256 See Howard Marvel, 'Exclusive Dealing', 25 JLE 1 (1982), 6-11.
257 See Alan J. Meese, 'Tying Meets The New Institutional Economics', 146 University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 1 (1997), 65-66.
258 See nn 169-210, above and accompanying text (summarizing this argument).
259 Stigler, above n 107, at 22 (explaining that state regulation is unnecessary in world
characterized by complete knowledge); Knight, above n 107, at 78-79 (explaining that perfect
competition's assumption of no fraud is simply a redundant implication of the perfect
knowledge assumption); Miller, above n 210, at 115 (incomplete knowledge a necessary
condition for fraud).
260 Bain, see above n 210, at 157 ('It is significant that in pure competition production occurs
without any selling cost, since no seller has anything unique to advertise.'); Stigler, see above n
107, at 23 ('If consumers know the technical properties of all commodities, there will be no
advertising, for all claims for a product would be true, and hence already known, or false, and
then merely irritating.'); F. A. Hayek, 'The Meaning of Competition', in Individualism and
Economic Order (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1948) 96 (explaining that, under the
concept of perfect competition employed in general equilibrium models, '[a]dvertising,
undercutting and improving ("differentiating") the goods or services produced are all excluded
by definition-"perfect" competition means indeed the absence of all competitive activities.');
Joan Robinson, 'The Impossibility of Competition', in E. H. Chamberlin (ed), Monopoly and
Competition and Their Regulation (London: Macmillan 1954) 245 (noting that 'competition in
practice is very imperfect'); ibid, at 245-46 ('in the broad sense in which business men
understand it, [competition] largely consists in destroying competition in the
narrow economist's sense by product differentiation, advertisement, and the creation of
goodwill.').
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claim that market failure could result in too little advertising would seem
backwards: any such claim would rest upon a departure from the perfect
competition model and thus contradict the methodology of market failure
analysis during this period.261 Indeed, during this period, economists and legal
scholars often saw much advertising as an evil, part of an effort to enhance
undue product differentiation and the resulting market power by duping
consumers into attributing illusory distinctions to rival products. 26 2 If
successful, it was said, such counter-productive advertising could cause even
further divergence from the allocation of resources that perfect competition
would produce. In fact, some scholars recognized that minimum rpm, for
instance, did increase promotion, but viewed such additional promotion as a
vehicle for producing undue product differentiation and the resulting market
power!2 63 It is no surprise, then, that scholars failed to identify these
informational market failures, which rested upon a departure from perfect
competition and could not plausibly coexist with that ideal state of affairs.2 6 a
Adherence to the perfect competition model simply blocked these scholars
from recognizing the presence of market failure.
26 5
b. The absence of time
Not all market failures involve the failure to produce information. Sometimes,
reliance on unbridled market contracting will expose a firm to other forms of
opportunism. For instance, a desire to minimize production costs or create a
unique product may induce a supplier to invest in equipment that is useful only
261 See nn 169-210, above.
262 Bain, see above n 210, at 367-69; ibid, at 449-50 ('Although some selling costs are likely to be
desirable as a means of disseminating information, there is at least a strong possibility that they
may be incurred in such quantity-and qualitatively for certain sorts of sales promotion-that
buyers are not rewarded for the loss of aggregate output which they may necessitate.'); see
Miller, above n 210, at 114-17.
263 See J. R. Gould and B. S. Yamey, 'Professor Bork on Vertical Price Fixing: A Rejoinder', 77
Yale Law Journal 936 (1968), 938-41 (provision of additional promotional information as a
result of minimum rpm may not increase welfare); William Commanor, 'White Motor And Its
Aftermath', 81 Harvard Law Review 1419 (1967) (additional promotion caused by exclusive
territories likely leads to undue product differentiation). Cf. In re Sandura, 61 FTC 756 (US
Federal Trade Commission 1962) 814-15 (concluding that existence of significant product
differentiation militated against defendant's claim that exclusive territories were necessary to
ensure effective distribution because such differentiation would enhance the market power that
such territories supposedly created).
264 I do not mean to suggest that these economists believed that the real world mimicked the world
of perfect competition, or even that they believed that such an identity was always desirable. On
the contrary, these scholars argued that some departures from perfect competition could
actually enhance welfare on balance. See nn 319-24, below and accompanying text. On the
other hand, when considering the narrower question of market failure, these same scholars did
so on the hypothetical assumption that perfect competition obtained.
265 Cf. Margolis, see above n 161, at 130-6 1 (explaining how Ptolemaic assumption that universe
was characterized by nested spheres blocked realization that the Earth revolved around the Sun
in an elliptical orbit).
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in the context of a particular relationship. 266 By making such a specific
investment, the firm may place itself at risk of opportunism by its trading
partner, who could 'hold out' for a better bargain during the next period.2 67 In
the absence of some remedy, the prospect of such opportunism may deter such
investment in the first place, thereby reducing the welfare of both parties and
the consumers who would purchase the product in question.
2 68
Both complete vertical integration and non-standard contracts can reduce
the prospect of such opportunism and thus encourage firms to make specific
investments that deepen specialization and thus enhance welfare. 2 69 Here
again, however, there is an aspect of the perfect competition model that would
block recognition of this market failure in the first place. The perfect
competition model seems to operate in a world divorced from time.2 70 Given
266 See Richard N. Langlois, 'Transaction Costs, Production Costs, and the Passage of Time', in
Steven G. Medema (ed), Coasean Economics: Law and Economics and the New Institutional
Economics (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997) 11-12 (explaining how specific
investments can be a manifestation of specialization).
267 Williamson, see above n 8, at 78; ibid, at 91; Benjamin Klein, Robert Crawford and Armen
Alchian, 'Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents and the Competitive Contracting Process',
21 JLE 297 (1978), 298-301. See also Benjamin Klein, 'Fisher-General Motors and the
Nature of the Firm', 43 JLE 105 (2000) passim (arguing that opportunistic behavior by Fisher
Body led General Motors to integrate backward into the production of automobile bodies);
Michael E. Levine, 'Airline Competition in Deregulated Markets: Theory, Firm Strategy, and
Public Policy', 4 Yale Journal on Regulation 393 (1987), 439-40 (explaining how threat of
opportunism by commuter carriers led major carriers to integrate vertically, despite higher
operating costs).
268 See Langlois, 'Transaction Costs, Production Costs, and the Passage of Time', in Steven G
Medema (ed), Coasean Economics: Law And Economics And The New Institutional Economics
(Boston; London: Kluwer Academic 1998) 2-4, 11-12; Benjamin Klein, 'Transaction Cost
Determinants of "Unfair" Contractual Arrangements', 70 American Economic Review 356
(1980), 357 (explaining that opportunistic exploitation of relationship -specific investments'is
not a long-run equilibrium phenomenon').
269 See Benjamin Klein, 'Fisher-General Motors and the Nature of the Firm', 43JILE 105 (2000)
passim (arguing that opportunistic behavior by Fisher Body led General Motors to integrate
backward into the production of automobile bodies); Benjamin Klein, 'Vertical Integration as
Organizational Ownership: The Fisher Body General Motors Relationship Revisited', 4 Journal
of Law, Economics & Organization 199 (1988), 201 (explaining that requirement that General
Motors purchase only from Fisher Body protected the latter from opportunism and thus induced
relationship-specific investment); Milton Handler, 'Statement Before The Small Business
Administration', 11 Antitrust Bulletin 417 (1966), 424- 25 (suggesting that 'an exclusive buying
provision can constitute a vital quidpro quo to avoid placing the seller at the dealer's mercy.'). See
also Benjamin Klein, Robert Crawford and Armen Alchian, 'Vertical Integration, Appropriable
Rents and the Competitive Contracting Process', 21JLE 297 (1978), 307, n 23 (susceptibility of
specific investments to opportunism can change the production function). But compare Ronald
H. Coase, 'The Nature of the Firm: Influence', 4 Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 33
(1988), 42-44 (contending that long-term contracts can adequately address prospect of
opportunism, with the result that fear of such opportunism rarely leads to integration) with
Benjamin Klein, 'Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership: The Fisher Body General
Motors Relationship Revisited', 4 Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 199 (1988), 200-
11 (responding to Coase's critique).
270 Knight, see above n 107, at 81 (within model of perfect competition, production occurs in a
'brief interval of time,' after which all market participants 'meet[ ] in a central marketplace to
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perfect information and the costless movement of resources, time-even the
time necessary to produce goods-becomes irrelevant.2 71 Consumers and
firms instantaneously know their preferences and costs, respectively and act
accordingly, allocating resources between infinite possible uses in a world with
absolutely no barriers to movement.
By contrast, the possibility of opportunism requires the existence and the
passage of time. Take the example above. A firm that makes a specific
investment can only suffer at the hands of a customer or supplier in the next
period, after the investment has occurred and become specific to the
relationship in question. 27 2 By contrast, in the world of perfect competition,
'each person continuously produces a complete commodity which is
consumed as fast as produced. The exchange of commodities must be
virtually instantaneous and costless.'2 73 In a world where markets clear in an
instant, opportunism becomes extinct. By narrowing its focus to market
failures that could coexist with perfect competition and therefore excluding
time from its analysis, the methodology of the inhospitality-era made it more
difficult to recognize this form of opportunism. 27 4
2. Perfect Competition and Private Solutions to Market Failure
Let us assume, however, that an economist of the inhospitality-era had
overcome the perfect knowledge and absence of time barriers and identified
a market failure that resulted in the underproduction of promotional
information or the threat of opportunism directed at parties who have made
relationship-specific investments. Would that economist have recognized that
non-standard contracts could solve such market failures? Here again, certain
barriers rooted in the perfect competition model would have stood in the way
of such a recognition.
exchange their wares'); Machovec, see above n 107, at 178-79 (describing instantaneous
process of market clearing that occurs under perfect competition); F. A. Hayek, 'The Meaning
of Competition', in Individualism and Economic Order (Chicago: University of Chicago Press
1948) 92, 96 (satisfaction of various assumptions of perfect competition model results in
instantaneous state of 'perfect competition' and thus excludes by hypothesis any activities
deemed 'competition' in ordinary life).
271 See Leon Walras, Elements of Pure Economics (first published in 1874); (Homewood, IL:
Richard D Irwin, Inc. 1954) 242 (trans. William Jaffe) ('Once the equilibrium has been
established in principle, exchange can take place immediately. Production, however,
requires a certain lapse of time. We shall resolve the second difficulty purely and simply by
ignoring the time element at this point.').
272 Langlois, 'Transaction Costs, Production Costs, and the Passage of Time', in Steven G
Medema (ed), Coasean Economics: Law And Economics And The New Institutional Economics
(Boston; London: Kluwer Academic 1998) 6-9; Williamson, above n 8, at 29-31
(opportunism occurs because parties make specific investments in a world where bounded
rationality prevents perfect planning for future contingencies).
273 Knight, see above n 107, at 78.
274 Cf. Margolis, see above n 161, at 130-61 (explaining how central habits of mind of Ptolemaic
cosmology blocked recognition of heliocentric solar system).
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a. Perfect mobility of factors
Consider first the assumption of perfect mobility of factors of production,
including labor. This assumption served a key function in the model, ensuring
that resources could readily and immediately move from underperforming
sectors to those with higher returns. 27 5 Adherence to it, however, would
certainly raise the cost of recognizing the function of non-standard contracts.
By their nature, after all, such agreements would, if enforced, hinder the
mobility of labor and capital and thereby cause a departure from perfect
competition.2 7 6 Take, for instance, an exclusive dealing contract. By
preventing a dealer from carrying the products of several rival manufacturers,
such an agreement would hinder the movement of goods from the
manufacturer to consumers.27 7 Such an agreement would also hinder the
discretion of dealers to invest their own resources in stocking and promoting
the products of several manufacturers. In short, such a contract would result in
an allocation of resources that was 'anti-competitive' in a straightforward
way.278 In the same way, of course, exclusive territories or minimum rpm
would also hinder the movement of resources by, for instance, preventing a
dealer from opening a new shop outside her assigned territory.
27 9
By their nature, then, non-standard contracts thwarted the 'free mobility'
assumption of perfect competition. As a result, economists could not have seen
these agreements as solutions to the problem of 'market failure' as they
conceived and tried to solve it. Recall here that economists of this era examined
market failures and the solutions thereto on the assumption that the economy
satisfied the various conditions for perfect competition. 2 0 Within this
framework, the solution for market failure caused private and social costs to
converge and thus, given the existence of perfect competition, led to a perfect
allocation of resources. 2 81 By contrast, a non-standard contract would by
hypothesis thwart the existence of perfect competition and prevent the
275 Knight, see above n 107, at 77-78; Pigou, above n 107, at 144-49.
276 Cf. Chicago Board of Trade v United States, 246 US 231, 238 (US Supreme Court 1918) ('But
the legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so simple a test, as whether
it restrains competition. Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains.
To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence. The true test of legality is whether the restraint
imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is
such as may suppress or even destroy competition.').
277 Standard Oil Company v United States, 337 US 293, 314 (US Supreme Court 1949) (exclusive
dealing contracts create a 'clog on competition').
278 Cf. Alan J. Meese, 'Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason', 2003 Illinois Law
Review 77 (2003), 94 (discussing similar definition of 'anticompetitive' that courts employ
when administering per se rules).
279 Cf. Continental TV v G.TE. Sylvania, 433 US 36 (US Supreme Court 1977) (evaluating
restraint that prevented dealer from opening new store in different city). See also United States v
TOPCO, 405 US 596 (US Supreme Court 1972) (criticizing horizontal allocation of territories
ancillary to legitimate joint venture on these grounds); In re Sandura, 61 FTC 756 (US Federal
Trade Commission 1962) 813-16 (condemning exclusive territories on this basis).
280 See nn 178-210, above and accompanying text.
281 See nn 216-25, above and accompanying text.
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equalization of private returns across markets. Even if such contracts did
eliminate a market failure, they would at the same time eliminate the very
perfect competition that was the foundation of market failure analysis. Thus,
non-standard contracts could not solve the market failure puzzle in a manner
acceptable to the paradigm that economists embraced.2 s2
b. Independent action
The assumption of perfect mobility is not the only prerequisite of perfect
competition that would hinder recognition of private solutions to market
failure: there is also the entirely separate assumption that market
participants do not cooperate with one another on price or output.28 3
This assumption may seem redundant, given the model's attempt to discern
the results of a system of 'free contract' and the assumption of numerous
market participants.2 8 4 In such an environment, it seems, collusion would
not be possible.28 5
Still, this condition is in fact fundamental, given the model's other
assumptions. For, if market participants possess perfect information about
their rivals' plans and can costlessly bargain with them over a division of
profits, collusion is a simple proposition, no matter how many firms remain in
the market.2 86 As Stigler stated in 1958, 'one of the assumptions of perfect
competition is the existence of the Sherman Act.'28 7 Otherwise, market
participants would cartelize and exercise market power.
282 Kuhn, see above n 4, at 38 (paradigms imply 'rules that limit both the nature of acceptable
solutions and the steps by which they are to be obtained.').
283 Knight, see above n 107, at 78 ('Every member of society is to act as an individual only, in
entire independence of all other persons... Individual independence in action excludes all
forms of collusion, all degrees of monopoly or tendency towards monopoly'); George J. Stigler,
Perfect Competition: Historically Contemplated, 65 Journal of Political Economy 1 (1957), 14.
284 Knight, see above n 107, at 55, 174 (characterizing analysis in this way); Pigou, see above n 107
(same).
285 See Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
1971) 9-11 (explaining how only government intervention could preserve cartel pricing in
otherwise competitive market).
286 See George J. Stigler, Perfect Competition: Historically Contemplated, 65 Journal of Political
Economy 1 (1957), 14 ('[I]t seems essential to assume the absence of collusion as a supplement
to the presence of large numbers.'); see also Milton Friedman, Price Theory (Chicago: Alding
Publishing 1962) 11 (value of price system 'implicitly supposes the existence of effective
competition in translating consumer wishes into productive activity. It is assumed that people
can affect their incomes only through use of their resources and not through interference with
the price system. There is freedom to compete but not freedom to combine.').
287 See George J. Stigler, Perfect Competition: Historically Contemplated, 65 Journal of Political
Economy 1 (1957), 14. See also Ronald H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, 82
American Economic Review 713 (1992), 717-18 (background rules construct an institutional
framework that impacts the allocation of resources); F. A. Hayek, 'Free Enterprise and the
Competitive Order', in Individualism and Economic Order (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press 1948) 115 ('We cannot regard "freedom of contract" as a real answer to our problems if
we know that not all contracts out to be made enforceable and in fact are bound to argue that
contracts 'in restraint of trade' ought not be enforced.').
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How, then, might this non-cooperation assumption block the recognition that
private contracts can overcome market failure? Most if not all contracts that
overcome market failure violate or appear to violate this assumption in some way.
Consider two examples often invoked as paradigms of market failure: the
extraction of oil and gas, and fishing.288 Under a rule of capture, firms with access
to a particular pool of minerals or fish may extract either too quickly and invest too
many resources in doing so.289 The classic solution to this market failure was a
change in background legal rules, namely, the assignment of all minerals or fish in
the relevant pool to a single owner, for instance.29 ° Such a solution would have
vested control over the resources in a single firm, which could compete with
numerous other firms that had received similar resource assignments.
2 9
'
At first glance, such a solution would itself offend perfect competition, by
unifying previously independent firms and thus effectively fixing prices.29 2 But
economists who proposed such a solution (somewhat arbitrarily) avoided this
critique by assuming that enough firms would remain to satisfy the model's
numerosity requirement.29 3 After all, a subset of infinity is still infinity!
288 Kaysen & Turner, see above n 110, at 13, n 12 (describing oil extraction as an activity where
improper property arrangements such as the rule of capture could result in a divergence
between private and social costs); Samuelson, see above n 210, at 743 n 1 (employing this as
single example of market failure); Anthony Scott, 'The Fishery: The Objective of Sole
Ownership', 63 Journal of Political Economy 116 (1955).
289 See Jonathan Adler, 'Conservation Through Collusion: Antitrust As An Obstacle To Marine
Resource Conservation', 61 Washington & Lee Law Review 3 (2004), 16-17 (describing so-
called 'race to fish' caused when fish are part of common pool accessible to all); Anthony Scott,
'The Fishery: The Objective of Sole Ownership', 63 Journal of Political Economy 116 (1955)
passim. In part this is analogous to the salvage problem, whereby private salvors may overinvest
in locating and raising a sunken ship filled with treasure. See William M. Landes and Richard
A. Posner, 'Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of
Altruism', 7 Journal of Legal Studies 83 (1978).
290 Kaysen & Turner, see above n 110, at 13, n 12 (proper assignment of property rights would
solve market failure in the extraction of oil); Anthony Scott, 'The Fishery: The Objective of
Sole Ownership', 63 Journal of Political Economy 116 (1955) passim (assignment of relevant
pool of fish to a single owner would overcome market failure). See also Francis Bator, 'The
Anatomy of Market Failure', 72 Quarterly Journal of Economics 351 (1958), 354 ('arbitrary
legal and organizational imperfections' can 'leave some inputs or outputs 'hidden,' or preclude
their explicit allocation or capture by market processes... [market] [fl ailure is by enforcement.')
(emphasis in the original); ibid, at 363-65 (discussing so-called 'ownership externalities' that
exist because of legal or practical inabilities to appropriate the full benefit of private activity).
291 Cf. Anthony Scott, 'The Fishery: The Objective of Sole Ownership', 63 Journal of Political
Economy 116 (1955), 124 (examining such a reform on the assumption of perfect competition
in the output market).
292 Cf. Copperweld v Independence Sheet and Tube Co., 467 US 752 (US Supreme Court 1984) 769
(conceding that internal coordination is a form of price fixing); Broadcast Music, Inc. v CBS,
441 US 1, 9, 23-24 (US Supreme Court 1979) 9, 23-24 (explaining that merger or operation
of a partnership can be the equivalent of price fixing).
293 See Anthony Scott, 'The Fishery: The Objective of Sole Ownership', 63 Journal of Political
Economy 116 (1955), 124 (elaborating on assumption that sole owner does not possess power
over price); ibid, at 117, n 4 ('Sole ownership" is not monopoly but merely complete
appropriation of all of a natural resource in a particular location.'). Moreover, price theory's
account of the firm as a point source with a single profit-maximizing consciousness allowed
78 Journal of Competition Law and Economics 1(I)
Turn now to a private solution. One solution would be an agreement among
those with access to the minerals to curtail their production so as to conserve
the resource.2 94 While such an agreement would obviate the 'overfishing' or
overdrilling problem, it might not eliminate the problem of duplicative
investment, as each rival could retain incentives to purchase and utilize
equipment that overlapped with that used by rivals.2 95 Thus, any agreement
would also have to prevent duplicative investment.
The private agreements necessary to overcome this paradigmatic market
failure would quite obviously offend at least two assumptions of the perfect
competition model. For one thing, such agreements would plainly contra-
dict the assumed absence of any obstructions to the movement of
resources, be they capital or labor. 29 6 At the same time, such agreements
would offend the assumption that market participants act independently,
i.e., do not coordinate their decisions, particularly when it comes to price
or output.2 97 An agreement to eliminate market failure by preventing
'overdrilling' or 'overfishing' would quite obviously require a reduction in
the output below the level that 'free' drilling or fishing would produce.
298
As a result, this 'solution' to the market failure puzzle would not satisfy the
criteria for puzzle solutions implied by the market failure paradigm
economists employed.2 99 An economist who sought solutions to market
failure on the assumption that perfect competition nonetheless obtained
would simply not see such contracts as vehicles for solving the problem as
then conceived.
economists of the era to treat the assignment of resources to a single, perhaps larger, firm as
consistent with perfect competition. Indeed, some modem antitrust scholars still maintain the
assumption that 'the firm' possesses a single unified consciousness and thus ignore TCE's
insight that the firm is in fact a nexus of contracts. See generally Areeda, see above n 48, vol. 7
1464c, at 236 ('Intraenterprise contracts, like the pure unilateral cooperation within the very
smallest firms are natural and efficient. Such contracts are unlike collaboration of unrelated
firms which is dangerous to competition and therefore forbidden unless redeemed by some
pro-competitive virtue.'); Hovenkamp, see above n 37, at 187 ('Agreements within the firm are
to be treated as the conduct of a single actor, on the presumption that such a firm is a single
profit-maximizer.'); see ibid ('When the firm is unmistakably a single profit-maximizing entity
and has always been so, it makes no sense to find a Sherman Act "conspiracy" among any of its
personnel, subsidiaries or other subordinate organizations.'). See also Alan J. Meese,
'Intrabrand Restraints and the Theory of the Firm', 83 North Carolina Law Review at 5
(2004), 45-49 (discussing price theory's influence on the characterization of the firm).
294 See generally Jonathan Adler, 'Conservation Through Collusion: Antitrust As An Obstacle To
Marine Resource Conservation', 61 Washington & Lee Law Review 3 (2004), 58-60
(explaining that the natural response to overfishing is a horizontal agreement that limits
production).
295 Ibid, at 16-17.
296 See nn 275-82, above and accompanying text (explaining role played by this assumption in the
perfect competition model).
297 See nn 283-85, above and accompanying text (explaining this assumption).
298 See Jonathan Adler, 'Conservation Through Collusion: Antitrust As An Obstacle To Marine
Resource Conservation', 61 Washington & Lee Law Review 3 (2004), 24-26, 58-60.
299 Kuhn, see above n 4, at 38.
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Similar considerations would block a proper interpretation of various
non-standard contracts that were the traditional objects of antitrust concern.
Take, for instance, minimum resale price maintenance. While technically a
vertical agreement between manufacturers and dealers, courts and lawyers
had long treated such arrangements as the functional equivalent of a cartel
between otherwise competing dealers. 30 0 For an economist operating within
this milieu, then, such agreements would plainly offend the 'independent
action' requirement and thus could not solve market failure without also
thwarting the existence of perfect competition. Thus, such agreements could
not unravel the puzzle that welfare economists were seeking to solve, i.e., the
elimination of market failure in a manner that would simultaneously
preserve perfect competition throughout the economy. Similar consider-
ations would foreclose even more strongly recognition of efficient horizontal
price restraints or group boycotts ancillary to otherwise legitimate
ventures.
30 1
c. Fixed property rights
This brings us to the final assumption ofperfect competition that could block the
proper interpretation ofnon-standard agreements, namely, the fixed assignment
of property rights and legal obligations. 30 2 While not always explicit, this
assumption seems well-ingrained, particularly given the model's treatment (or
non-treatment) of time. 30 3 The question for analysis-the puzzle to be solved-
was to determine whether a system of private property and free contract could
result in an optimal allocation of resources. 30 4 By its nature, the model-a
proposed solution-must assume some 'rules of the game,' that is, some
300 See Dr Miles Medical Co. v John D. Park & Sons, 220 US 373, 407 -08 (US Supreme Court
1911) (finding that the advantage of the minimum rpm agreement before it 'primarily concerns
the dealers' and was indistinguishable from horizontal cartel agreements that the state and
federal courts had previously condemned); In re Snap-On Tools Corp., 59 FTC 1035, 1047-48
(US Federal Trade Commission 1961) (analogizing vertical territorial restraints to naked
horizontal allocation of territories).
301 See United States v Topco, 405 US 596 (US Supreme Court 1972) (declaring ancillary restraints
allocating territories among joint venture partners unlawful per se, despite district court finding
that participants possessed no market power and that venture enhanced competition); United
States v Sealy, Inc., 388 US 350 (US Supreme Court 1967) (same); Radiant Burners, Inc. v
Peoples Gas Light and Coke Company, 364 US 365 (US Supreme Court 1961) (declaring gas
companies' collective refusal to deal with customers of burner manufacturer unlawful per se);
Kior's, Inc. v Broadway Hale Stores, 359 US 207 (US Supreme Court 1959) (declaring
collective refusal by appliance dealers to deal with retailer unlawful per se); Kiefer-Stewart v
Joseph Seagram & Sons, 340 US 211, 213 (US Supreme Court 1951) (declaring maximum
price fixing by closely-related subsidiaries unlawful per se).
302 Stigler, see above n 107, at 22 (noting that perfect competition depends upon enforcement of
contracts and protection of private property).
303 Pigou, see above n 107, at xii (framing the forthcoming analysis as involving an examination of
the results of the free play of self interest 'under the existing legal system').
304 Knight, see above n 107, at 56-57 ('The foundation of the process [to be studied] is the private
ownership of productive resources-a synonym for individual freedom.') (emphasis in original).
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background assumption of property rights and tort rules.30 5 Given the model's
other assumptions, 'the game begins' once the state creates and enforces a
certain set of background rules of property and tort. Moreover, given perfect
knowledge and the completely free movement of resources, the game ends
exactly when it begins.
30 6
Such a hypothetical world would seem to exclude by assumption any
change-within the confines of the model-in the background rules, whether
those changes have a legal or contractual basis. Thus, once the 'game' of perfect
competition begins, participants must play within the rules as they exist, and
may not seek to alter them by seeking legislative changes to the initial
assignment of rights and duties.30 7 While economists recognized that legal
reform could eliminate market failure that coexisted with perfect competition,
they assumed that such a reform was exogenous and antecedent to the operation
of the model. 30 8 Thus, just as the model assumes away any legal reform internal
or endogenous to the model that could correct market failure, so too does it
preclude parties from reforming background rules by negotiating agreements
that alter property rights so as to overcome market failure. 30 9 According to the
accepted paradigm, then, a 'market failure' was the result of an imperfection in
the antecedent rules of the game that caused otherwise well-functioning private
forces to diverge from the optimal allocation of resources. Only the sovereign
that made the rules in the first place could solve this problem.
C. Market Power
Of course, the mere fact that economists could not recognize the efficiency
properties of non-standard contracts would not itself establish that such
contracts are anticompetitive efforts to use or exercise market power. Still,
unable to identify any redeeming virtue for such agreements, economists who
saw perfect competition and the allocation of resources that it produced as
desirable naturally inferred that such contracts were manifestations of such
power. 3 10 Such agreements limited rivalry in one way or another, often against
305 Stigler, see above n 107, at 22; Pigou, see above n 107, at 127-30. See also Williamson, see
above note 8, at 370-71 (explaining how inhospitality tradition erred by considering impact of
a contract at a particular point in time and not in its entirety); F.A. Hayek, 'Free Enterprise and
Competitive Order', in Individualism and Economic Order (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press 1948) 110-16 (explaining that well-functioning competitive order depends upon
properly-designed 'legal framework' of contract, property, tort, and business law).
306 See tn 270-71, above and accompanying text.
307 Cf. Victor Goldberg, 'Institutional Change and the Quasi-Invisible Hand', 17JLE461 (1974),
461 ('not only will people pursue their self-interest within the rules; they will also allocate
resources toward changing the rules toward their own benefits.').
308 See nn 163-67, above and accompanying text. See also Morris A. Copeland, 'Institutionalism
and Welfare Economics', 48 American Economic Review 1 (1958), 2-17.
309 Kuhn, see above n 4, at 38 (explaining that paradigms narrow the range of acceptable solutions
and methods for achieving such solutions).
310 See Kaysen & Turner, above n 110, at 8 (behavior inconsistent with that found. in perfectly
competitive market indicates possession of market power).
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the 'will' of one of the parties to them, at least in the relevant period. For
instance, tying or exclusive dealing arrangements limited the discretion of
dealers and consumers and seemed to produce no corresponding benefits that
the parties could not achieve by relying upon the sort of 'free market' that
perfect competition entailed. 3 1' There was simply no reason for a dealer or
consumer to enter such an agreement voluntarily. Because these agreements
thwarted the existence of perfect competition, the conclusion that manufac-
turers who limited rivalry by entering such agreements were exercising market
power seemed inescapable.31 2
This market power interpretation seemed particularly appropriate for
agreements that used price or output controls to overcome market failures.
Recall that the state of perfect competition produced a natural, equilibrium
price and output in each industry. Taken together, these various price and
output levels brought about a general competitive equilibrium that maximized
the returns from society's existing resources, assuming the absence of market
311 For instance, economists argued that, if exclusive dealing between parties produced mutual
benefits, dealers would observe such exclusivity voluntarily, without contractual requirement
to do so. See Derek C. Bok, 'The Tampa Electric Case And The Problem of Exclusive
Arrangements Under The Clayton Act', 1961 Supreme Court Review 267 (1961), 307-08 ('If
a strong and legitimate business need for exclusive selling actually does exist, it is strange that
dealers will not follow this policy without being compelled to do so by contract, for the
advantages that result should benefit them as well as the firms from which they buy. Perhaps an
occasional dealer will be too inept or short sighted to perceive his best interests, but such men
could presumably be replaced for demonstrable inefficiency without resorting to the
widespread use of restrictive contracts.'); Dirlam & Kahn, above n 110, at 181-87 ('It is
difficult to see why many of the mutual benefits and socially beneficial consequences of
exclusive dealing require coercion [i.e., contractual requirement] for their achievement.').
Other economists argued that sellers who imposed tying contracts could achieve any benefits of
such agreements by allowing buyers to choose what products to purchase in a 'free market.' See
James M. Ferguson, 'Tying Arrangements and Reciprocity: An Economic Analysis', 30 Law &
Contemporary Problems 522 (1965), 558-64; Donald Turner, 'The Validity of Tying
Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws', 72 Harvard Law Review 50 (1958), 66-67; Alfred
E. Kahn, 'A Legal and Economic Appraisal of the 'New' Sherman and Clayton Acts', 63 Yale
Law Journal 293 (1954), 324, n 160.
John Harrison suggests that the assumption that non-standard contracts are 'coercive' could
also reflect the legal realist tradition, which treated all private property and resulting contracts
as 'coercive' because both institutions depended upon state enforcement. See Robert L. Hale,
'Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty', 43 Columbia Law Review 603 (1943). I do not
disagree with the suggestion that this strand of legal realism reinforced conclusions driven by
price theory (or vice versa!). In a previous article, I explain why this legal realist approach is
inconsistent with TCE. See Alan J. Meese, 'Price Theory and Vertical Restraints: A
Misunderstood Relation', 45 UCLA L Review 143 (1997), 199-202 (rebutting claim that
mere creation and enforcement of property rights confers bargaining power in any sense that is
meaningful for antitrust purposes). See also William H. Page, Legal Realism and the Shaping
of Modem Antitrust, 44 Emory L.J.I (1995) (describing influence of "coercion" and other
realist concepts on antitrust doctrine).
312 See Donald Turner, 'The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws', 72
Harvard Law Review 50 (1958) (tying arrangements are necessarily the result of market
power); Miller, see above n 210, at 199 (same).
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failure. 31 3 Putting aside government action, only three factors could influence
prices or output in this world: changes in demand, industry-wide changes in
(production) costs, and the exercise of market power. Blocked as they were
from recognizing private responses to market failure, economists could not see
a fourth possibility: the contractual internalization of externalities that could
alter costs and result in a different price or output from that which an
unbridled market would produce. 3 14 As a result, economists fell back on
the only available explanation for such departures from perfect competition:
the use or exercise of market power.
This 'market power' interpretation was quite natural, given that (1) such
arrangements often involved or seemed to involve cooperation between
potential rivals and (2) market failures and contractual solutions thereto were
most likely in those industries where product differentiation and its nominal
market power was an important aspect of interbrand rivalry.31 5 Finally, 'on
their face' such agreements seemed designed to increase price or reduce
output, the exact opposite of what one would expect from an agreement that
produced 'efficiencies.' Within this framework, 'market power'-the ability to
price above the competitive, i.e., preexisting, level-became a convenient
universal solvent that helped economists explain arrangements that were
anomalies within the confines of the paradigm they embraced.3 16 In so doing,
economists preserved their existing paradigms entirely intact and thus had no
reason to seek alternative explanations for such agreements. 317 Indeed, given
the limitations of the framework, it was the only possible explanation. Without
the right 'thinking cap,' economists could not see what was 'right before their
eyes,' namely, contractual solutions to market failure that helped move the
market to a different equilibrium and thus enhanced the welfare of consumers
and society.
3 18
It bears emphasis that these scholars did not believe that antitrust law
should seek to replicate perfect atomistic competition in all industries. To be
313 See nn 190-91, above and accompanying text.
314 See nn 14-21, above and accompanying text (explaining TCE's conclusion that non-standard
contracts overcome market failure by internalizing externalities by contract).315 See nn 266-68, above and accompanying text (explaining how market failures often arise in
industries where product differentiation requires significant promotional expenditures or
relationship-specific investments that facilitate such differentiation); Lester G. Telser, 'Why
Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?', 3JLE86 (1960), 87 (minimum rpm is only useful to
further promotion where the manufacturer sells a differentiated product).
316 Kuhn, see above n 4, at 63-64 (explaining that scientists seek to 'tame' anamolies by adjusting
conceptual categories within existing paradigm); ibid, at 78 (concluding that scientists 'will
devise numerous articulations and ad hoc modifications of their theory in order to eliminate any
apparent conflict' between predicted and actual results under existing paradigm).
317 See Kuhn, see above n 4, at 64-65 (explaining how scientists cling to paradigms despite
contrary evidence); ibid, at 97 (explaining that scientists rarely seek new explanations for
phenomena that are 'well-explained by existing paradigms.').
318 See Herbert Butterfield, The Origins of Modern Science (New York: Macmillan 1957) 13
(scientists often see old data in new ways if they put on a 'different thinking cap').
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sure, these scholars treated perfect competition as the presumptive goal of
antitrust and other public policies. 319 On the other hand, these scholars did
not believe that all departures from perfect competition reduced economic
welfare. Instead, these scholars believed that certain departures from perfect
competition could actually increase society's wealth. For instance, these
scholars believed that product differentiation could cater to heterogenous
consumer tastes.320 They also believed that technological economies of scale
could lead a market's firms to expand beyond the size consistent with
the model's numerosity requirement. 3 21 Both of these departures would, given
the model's assumptions, lead to the possession and exercise of market power.
For instance, product differentiation would eliminate the model's homogen-
eity assumption and thus ensure that some consumers prefer the manufac-
turer's product to that of its competitors. 322 Moreover, the existence of
economies of scale would lead firms to expand by merger or otherwise, thereby
undermining the model's numerosity assumption.3 23 Nonetheless, scholars
believed that the benefits of such practices could outweigh any harm associated
with market power.
32 4
At the same time, for reasons outlined above, scholars considering
questions of market failure did so on the assumption that markets were
perfectly competitive. 32 5 This assumption was not a statement about the
actual state of the world, but instead a component of a theoretical model
designed to guide scientific research.3 26 This methodological habit prevented
these scholars from recognizing that various non-standard contracts could
overcome market failure. 327 In the absence of a beneficial explanation for these
agreements, scholars naturally treated these departures from perfect compe-
tition as manifestations of market power.
319 See nn 266-68, above and accompanying text.
320 Bain, see above n 113, 242-47 (1948); Miller, see above n 210, at 114-17.
321 Kaysen & Turner, see above n 110, at 5-8; Miller, see above n 210, at 411 ('It would not be
feasible to pulverize industry sufficiently to approximate pure competition' because doing so
would 'interfere [ ] with the attainment of the optimal scale of plant and rate of operation');
Bain, see above n 113, at 84 (stating that, 'in most industries, a small firm is quiet inefficient');
ibid, at 153 (concluding that comparison of output levels in monopolized and competitive
industries is 'idle' because monopolized industries often realize economies of scale and thus
may produce more output than a competitive industry).
322 Bain, see above n 113, at 146-56; Edward Mason, 'Monopoly in Law and Economics', 47 Yale
Law Journal 34 (1937), 36 (concluding that economists should not oppose all instances of
product differentiation despite the resulting market power).
323 Miller, see above n 210, at 411; George J. Stigler, 'The Extent and Bases of Monopoly', 32
American Economic Review 1 (1942), 8-13 (noting an 'incompatability of competition and
continuing economies of scale' and examining the extent to which such economies do require
market power).
324 See nn 113-14, above and accompanying text.
325 See nn 212-39, above and accompanying text.
326 Stigler, see above n 107, at 8-11 (describing importance of abstraction in economics).
327 See nn 245-309, above and accompanying text.
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IV. MODERN RELEVANCE
Modern antitrust scholars and practitioners may view the discussion thus far as
an interesting history lesson, with little relevance to modern antitrust policy.
After all, most modern antitrust scholars-particularly those with significant
influence in the courts-seem, on the surface at least, fully to embrace the
teachings of transaction cost economics, particularly the claim that vertical
integration is often a method of overcoming or avoiding transaction costs.
328
Moreover, these scholars are generally critical of the more excessive lingering
manifestations of the inhospitality tradition. 329 Thus, it would seem that
mainstream antitrust scholars have fully internalized the teachings of TCE;
any fault for excessive antitrust regulation must therefore rest with the courts
and the officials charged with enforcing the antitrust laws.
Closer analysis, however, suggests that all is not well with antitrust
scholarship, particularly when it comes to scholars' treatment of the origins of
non-standard contracts that plausibly overcome market failure. For one thing,
some of the same scholars who rhetorically embrace transaction cost
economics also support various aspects of rule of reason analysis that are
unduly hostile to non-standard agreements. 3 30 The same scholars also support
the distinction that monopolization law currently draws between (technologi-
cal) competition on the merits, on the one hand, and non-standard
exclusionary contracts, on the other.3 31 As explained earlier, this distinction
supports current law's undue hostility toward non-standard contracts that
exclude rivals from portions of the marketplace. 332 While these scholars
support significant departures from the inhospitality tradition, particularly the
relaxation of various per se rules, they simultaneously endorse the rule of reason
methodology that undermines these reforms.3 33
328 Hovenkamp, see above n 37, at 372-74; Areeda and Hovenkamp, see above n 48, vol. 3A, at
757c; HI; Bork, see above n 158.
329 Hovenkamp, see above n 37, at 441-58 (rejecting economic basis of per se rule against
minimum rpm).
330 Ibid, at 256 (approving NCAA's approach to defining a prima facie case); ibid, at 257
(endorsing less restrictive alternative test); Areeda, see above n 48, vol. 7 1507b, at 397
(endorsing NCAA's approach to defining a prima facie case because proof of actual detrimental
effects itself proves possession of market power); ibid, at 1505b, 1507b (endorsing application
of less restrictive alternative test in this context). Moreover, Professor Hovenkamp has
expressly argued that restrictions such as those scrutinized in NCAA could only be obtained by
means of market power. See Herbert Hovenkamp, 'Competitor Collaboration after California
Dental Association', 2000 University of Chicago Legal Forum 149 (2000), 179-80.
331 See Alan J. Meese, 'Monopolization, Exclusion, and the Theory of the Firm', 89 Minnesota
Law Review 743, 809-11 (2005) (discussing treatise by Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp as
well as work by other scholars endorsing this distinction); Herbert Hovenkamp, 'The
Monopolization Offense', 61 Ohio State Law Journal 1035 (2001).
332 See nn 91-94, above and accompanying text.
333 One exception, of course, is Judge Bork, who has endorsed the application of a 'market power'
filter in Rule of Reason cases, thus implicitly rejecting the 'actual detrimental effects' approach
to establishing a prima facie case. See Rothery Storage v Adas Van Lines, 792 F2d 210 (US
District of Columbia Circuit Court 1986) (Bork, J.).
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In an earlier work I have explained how the positions embraced by these
scholars do not square well with the teachings of transaction cost
economics. 334 Identification of these shortcomings begs the obvious question,
namely, why is it that scholars persist in clinging to tests for liability that appear
antiquated in light of not-so-recent developments? The answer, I suggest, lies
in the continued, but more subdued, influence of the perfect competition
model on modern antitrust thinking. Just as inhospitality-era economists
treated the perfect competition model as the foundation of market failure
analysis, so too have antitrust scholars treated perfect competition as the basis
for their analysis of antitrust problems. At the same time, practitioners of TCE
have not directly confronted the culprit of perfect competition, choosing
instead to focus their fire on 'price theory,' its technological conception of the
firm, and the resulting 'inside-out' account of the inhospitality era's hostility to
non-standard contracting. 335 Reliance on the perfect competition model, I
submit, accounts for the failure of modern scholars to offer any account of the
formation and enforcement of non-standard contracts that does not depend on
the possession or exercise of market power. By focusing solely on the
propensity of non-standard contracts to reduce 'transaction costs,' these
scholars ignore the fact that such agreements also reverse market failures by
internalizing externalities and thus altering the costs faced by parties to such
agreements. Thus, such restraints naturally produce prices or output different
from what would obtain in an unbridled market. Part A confirms that the most
influential antitrust scholars have not fully internalized TCE's teachings to the
effect that non-standard agreements can overcome market failure and thus
alter price and output. Part B traces this shortcoming to the continued undue
influence of the perfect competition model.
A. TCE and Market Failure in Modern Antitrust Scholarship
Consider first Professor Hovenkamp's recent and influential treatise,
'Federal Antitrust Policy.'3 36 The book begins with a chapter on the 'Basic
Economics of Antitrust.' The chapter does not discuss market failure, or the
propensity of private contracts to overcome such misallocations and thus
produce efficient changes in price or output. Nor does the chapter discuss
any theories of contract formation. Instead, in a section on 'Less-Than-
Perfect Competition,' the author spends three paragraphs on the common-
place that the firm and other non-standard contracts can 'reduce or avoid
transaction costs,' which the author defines simply as 'the costs of using the
334 See Alan J. Meese, 'Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason', 2003 Illinois Law
Review 77 (2003); Alan J. Meese, 'Monopolization, Exclusion, and the Theory of the Firm', 89
Minnesota Law Review 743, 831-46 (2005).
335 See nn 119-39, above and accompanying text (explaining how practitioners of TCE took an
'inside-out' approach to the problem of complete and partial vertical integration).
336 Lower federal courts have cited this treatise 37 times in the last 5 years.
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market.'33 7 The brief discussion invokes Williamson and Coase (1937)
without mentioning Telser or Bork. 338 The first example of a practice that
reduces transaction costs is the business firm itself, which the discussion
then analogizes to various forms of 'vertical contracting.'3 39 There is no
suggestion that horizontal agreements can reduce transaction costs, and no
attempt to explain how parties form such contracts independent of market
power. Nor is there any attempt to relate transaction cost theory to the
concept of market failure or externality.
One finds similar shortcomings in Professor Areeda's monumental treatise,
which the Supreme Court has cited numerous times since the 1970s. 3 40 Co-
authored with Professor Hovenkamp and an economist, the second volume
examined 'The Economic Basis For Antitrust Policy' just 1 year before the
enforcement agencies issued their Competitor Collaboration Guidelines.
34 1
This examination included a two page discussion of 'externalities,' which
illuminated the authors' thinking about market failure. 342 The authors begin
by noting that 'perfect competition' depends on the absence of externalities,
which in turn can exist only as a result of transaction costs. 34 3 The discussion
then identifies two externalities as examples: one 'negative' (air and stream
pollution) and one 'positive,' (education).344 There is no discussion of
opportunism or other forms of externality amenable to private contractual
solution.
In an analysis that could have been written in 1950, the authors then go on
to conclude that 'although externalities may require corrective public actions,
they do not imply any material alteration of antitrust policy.'345 Such 'public
actions' include 'taxes, subsidies, or specific controls such as safety and
antipollution standards.' 346 The authors mention (and reject) only one
possible change in antitrust policy: 'encouraging monopoly or price fixing
agreements.'347 The authors reject this course of action, with one caveat:
337 Hovenkamp, see above n 37, at 37-38.
338 Ibid, at 37.
339 Ibid, at 37-38.
340 A LEXIS search reveals that the Supreme Court has cited Professor Areeda's work 50 times.
341 See Phillip Areeda, Herbert Hovenkamp, and John Solow, Antitrust Law (New York: Aspen
Law & Business 1995) vol II, 400ff As explained below, the most recent version of this work
is essentially unchanged in relevant respects from the 1995 version. I have focused on the 1995
version because it pre-dates the 1996 Competitor Collaboration Guidelines and the Supreme
Court's most recent decision regarding the Rule of Reason. See FTC v California Dental
Association, 526 US 756 (US Supreme Court 1999). Thus, this version of the treatise is the best
evidence of the scholarly consensus that influenced current law and enforcement policy.
342 Ibid, at 53-55.
343 Ibid, at 53; ibid, at 3 (listing as one condition of perfect competition that 'there are no
"externalities:" producers pay all social costs incurred in the production of goods and services
and receive payment for all social benefits incurred.').
344 Ibid, at 54.
345 Ibid, at 54.
346 Ibid.
347 Areeda, Hovenkamp, and Solow, see above n 341, vol. II, at 54.
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society may want to enforce agreements between rivals that voluntarily abate a
'low private-cost but high social cost method of production,' with the result
that such agreements should be analyzed under the Rule of Reason. 348 The
authors do not relate this suggestion to any actual antitrust controversies and
thus essentially ignore the possibility that 'externalities' are amenable to the
private contractual solution. Indeed, just two paragraphs later, in a section on
collusion, the authors note that 'restrictive agreements sometimes improve
economic performance and benefit consumers,' without elaboration, and
without any attempt to link this statement to the immediately preceding
subsection. 3 4 9 Putting aside deviations from perfect competition, market
failure and externality were for these scholars irrelevant for antitrust purposes
and the proper subject of other bodies of regulatory law.350
A subsequent version, published 5 years later, is virtually indistinguishable
from that published in 1995. 35 1 The authors do add a new paragraph arguing
that the existence of externalities may justify 'relatively benign antitrust rules
toward vertical restraints.' 35 2 At the same time, they repeat their previous
assertion that 'externalities... do not imply any material alteration of antitrust
policy.'353 Moreover, they do not mention the concept of market failure or
explain how contracts that eliminate such failures can impact price and output.
Nor do they mention horizontal restraints or 'exclusionary' agreements
entered by a monopolist.
354
One could perhaps attribute these oversights to undue reliance upon an
economist co-author with little familiarity with antitrust problems. Still, the 1995
version of this section is unchanged from the 1978 version of the treatise,
which Professor Areeda co-authored with Donald Turner, who was certainly
familiar with antitrust problems!35 5 Thus it seems more likely that the section
reflects the views of Professors Areeda and Turner, with little change from when
the latter co-authored the canonical text on antitrust policy during the
348 Ibid, at 55.
349 Ibid, at 55.
350 By assuming away such externalities, these scholars also avoid any 'second best' issues. See
Areeda, Hovenkamp, and Solow, Antitrust, see above n 341, vol. II, at 411 (discussing second
best problems without mentioning market failures unrelated to market power).
351 Areeda and Hovenkamp, see above n 328, vol IIA at 414 (2000).
352 Ibid, at 414, p. 57. Elsewhere I have argued that these scholars have embraced standards
that are unduly biased against vertical restraints. See Alan J. Meese, 'Rule of Reason', 2003
Illinois Law Review 77 (2003), 149, n 393. See also Alan J. Meese, 'Intrabrand Restraints
and the Theory of the Firm', 83 North Carolina Law Review at 5 (2004) (arguing,
contrary to Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp, that intrabrand restraints should be
lawful per se).
353 Areeda and Hovenkamp, see above note 328, Vol II A at 414, p. 56.
354 See nn 24-100, above and accompanying text (describing undue hostility toward such
restraints).
355 See Phillip Areeda and Donald Turner, Antitrust Law (New York: Aspen Law & Business
1978), vol. II, at 413. Professor Turner, of course, served as head of the Antitrust Division
during the Johnson administration and co-authored what was then the leading treatise on
antitrust policy.
88 Journal of Competition Law and Economics 1(1)
inhospitality-era. 3 5 6 Moreover, as noted earlier, Professors Areeda and
Hovenkamp have endorsed versions of the Rule of Reason that reflect imperfect
appreciation of the nature of market failure and the effects of contracts that
overcome such failure.
357
An explicit discussion on market failure in the work of Professor Areeda
confirms this lack of appreciation. In a section discussing the Supreme Court's
rejection of 'public interest' justifications for limiting competition, Professor
Areeda speculates that parties could recast some such 'public interest'
justifications as arguments that the restraints in question overcome 'market
failure.' 35 8 As the sole example, he posits an agreement between television
stations to set aside non-overlapping hours for certain forms of 'cultural'
programming that are under-produced because broadcasters choose to reach
as many viewers as possible by offering fungible but popular programming. 35 9
While such a restraint would reduce the output of popular programming,
Professor Areeda claims that it could increase the overall number of viewers
and thus 'bring about a more "competitive" result.'
3 60
Having suggested this possibility in the context of a purely hypothetical
case, Professor Areeda immediately retreats, concluding that 'this is not
the place to work out the soundness of that argument.' 36 1 Nor does
Professor Areeda or any of his co-authors ever try to work out the
argument or attempt to apply it outside the context of 'public interest'
justifications. Instead, when discussing a real case, NCAA, Professors
Areeda and Hovenkamp both conclude that proof that the restriction
reduced the output of broadcast games in a particular season sufficed to
establish a prima facie case, without regard to the longer run impact of the
restraint on the number of viewers or other more creative indicia of
output.362 Both also conclude that any benefits of such a restraint
necessarily coexist with harms that are presumed once the plaintiff makes
out a prima facie case.3 63 Such an approach is inconsistent with the
hypothetical broadcasting example, which by its nature involved a
reduction in the output of 'fungible' programming supposedly to achieve
increased output when measured by total viewers. 364 Thus, it seems, the
published work of Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp does not evince full
356 Kaysen & Turner, see above n 110.
357 See nn 67, above and accompanying text.
358 Areeda, see above n 57, vol. 7, 1505, at 382-83 ('We might even believe that the apparent
restraint actually moves market performance closer to the competitive result. Rather than
suppressing competition, offsetting a "market failure" promotes competitive results.').
359 Ibid, at 383.
360 Ibid, at 383.
361 Ibid.
362 See nn 67, above and accompanying text.
363 See nn 67, above and accompanying text.
364 Cf. Areeda, see above n 57, vol. 7, 1505 (arguing that agreement reducing output of fungible
programming to set aside hours for specialized programming could overcome a market failure
and thus increase output).
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appreciation of the implications of TCE's conclusion that private contracts
can overcome market failure without exercising market power.3 65 Similar
shortcomings beset the work of other scholars.
366
B. The Lingering Impact of Perfect Competition
How is it, then, that such sophisticated antitrust scholars can overlook the
complete implications of transaction cost economics so long after TCE first
appeared on the scene? The answer, it seems, is the perfect competition model
that still serves as the foundation for so much antitrust thinking-both
normative and descriptive. 3 67 The perfect competition model is 'front and
center' in antitrust monographs and treatises. Robert Bork's classic, 'The
Antitrust Paradox', invokes the allocational results of perfect competition as
the normative ideal that drives the need for, and the limits of, antitrust
regulation.3 68 At the same time, Bork invokes 'price theory' as the only
admissible methodology for interpreting contracts and other commercial
practices for antitrust purposes.3 69 In this vein, Bork has argued that one could
conceptualize all antitrust problems as involving the sort of analysis illustrated
by the partial equilibrium trade-off model that Oliver Williamson first applied
to evaluate claims that mergers to monopoly nonetheless enhanced welfare by
producing significant technological efficiencies. 3 70 Like Bork, Judge Posner
has argued that 'Price Theory' is the appropriate methodology for solving
antitrust problems.3 7 1
365 It should be noted that both scholars are a bit more nuanced when discussing vertical restraints.
See Areeda and Hovenkamp, see above note 48, vol. 8, 1611 cl (noting that free riding is a
type of 'market failure'); Hovenkamp, see above n 37, at 450-59. Still, even in the vertical
context, they continue to endorse the less restrictive alternative test, which rests upon a
misunderstanding of the sort of market failure solved by these contracts. Ibid, at 487-88. Cf.
Alan J. Meese, 'Property Rights and Intrabrand Restraints', 89 Cornell Law Review 553
(2004), 610-11 (explaining how less restrictive alternatives cannot replicate the
decentralization function of intrabrand restraints).
366 Sullivan & Grimes, see above n 67, at 1-80 (discussing basics of antitrust economics without
mentioning market failure or transaction costs).
367 See nn 189-91 (describing assumptions of the model), above and accompanying text.
368 Bork, see above n 158, at 90-104. See also Robert H. Bork, 'Legislative Intent and the Policy
of the Sherman Act', 9 JLE 7 (1966).
369 Bork, see above n 158, at 116-17; ibid, at 117 ('There is no body of knowledge other than
conventional price theory that can serve as a guide to the effects of business behavior upon
consumer welfare. To abandon economic theory is to abandon the possibility of a rational
antitrust law.'); Robert H. Bork, 'The Role of the Courts in Applying Economics', 54 Antitrust
Law Journal 21 (1985), 24 (same). See also Robert H. Bork, 'Resale Price Maintenance and
Consumer Welfare', 77 Yale Law Journal 950 (1968), 952 (claiming that benevolent view of
minimum rpm 'is grounded in basic price theory.').
370 Bork, see above n 158, at 107-10. See also Oliver E. Williamson, 'Economies as an Antitrust
Defense: The Welfare Trade-offs', 58 American Economic Review 18 (1968).
371 See Richard A. Posner, 'The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis', 127 University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 925 (1979), 928-29 (arguing that Chicago School's main
innovation was the application of price theory to antitrust problems).
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Bork and Posner are not the only scholars who invoke perfect competition
and price theory as appropriate guides to antitrust policy. Both of the leading
treatises on antitrust law begin with a chapter on economic theory, as a way of
'setting the stage' for the policy discussions that follow. For instance, Professor
Hovenkamp's 'Federal Antitrust Policy' begins with a chapter on 'The Basic
Economics of Antitrust.' 3 72 As it turns out, these 'basic economics' consist of
applied price theory, almost indistinguishable from that found in the industrial
organization textbooks of the 1950s. 37 3 The chapter devotes 24 pages to
a detailed discussion of perfect competition, and deviations therefrom,
including pure monopoly, market power and their allocational
consequences.
374
One finds a similar emphasis in Professor Areeda's monumental treatise.
The second volume on 'The Economic Basis For Antitrust Policy' spends 25
pages on perfect competition, monopoly, oligopoly, cartels, and the alloca-
tional ramifications of each.37 5 The chapter then devotes another 30 pages to
the antitrust policy consequences of various departures from perfect
372 Hovenkamp, see above n 37, at 2-46.
373 See Ronald H. Coase, 'Industrial Organization: A Proposal For Research', Fuchs (ed), see
above n 107, at 61-64 (explaining that, in 1972, industrial organization was simply applied
price theory).
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competition, including product differentiation, economies of scale, and
concentration-based market power.37 6 All such departures, it is said, produce
market power in the form of prices above marginal cost and can only be
justified by offsetting benefits, if any.3 7 7 According to these scholars, economic
theory provides that any price different from that produced by 'perfect
competition', was the result of market power and thus presumptively harmful.
By embracing the perfect competition model as the foundation of antitrust
analysis, these scholars mimic the approach taken by inhospitality-era
economists. These economists, it will be recalled, also treated perfect
competition as the foundation for their analysis of market failure in general
and antitrust policy in particular. 378 According to scholars of both eras, perfect
competition results in a 'competitive' price and output and presumptively
maximizes the value obtained from society's existing stock of resources. Thus,
this state of affairs serves as a logical goal of economic and antitrust policy, at
least provisionally. 379 Departures from these competitive outcomes are prima
facie market failures and thus logical objects of regulation. 38 0
On the other hand, unlike economists of the inhospitality-era, who assumed
that perfect competition could coexist with externality and market failure,
these scholars eliminate externality by assumption, treating externality as the
exclusive concern of government, which presumably eliminates such harm by
regulation.3 81 In so doing, these scholars contradict their own recognition of
Coase's insight that 'perfect competition' will itself eliminate externality, as
parties eliminate externalities through bargaining and private contract.38 2 In a
sense, then, this unique formulation of perfect competition rests on the
existence of a perfect government, which defines background rules of the game
in a way that eliminates market failures not based on market power.3 83 In the
absence of such rules, competition simply cannot result in an optimal
allocation. By embracing as a benchmark a model that assumes away all
externalities that are not based on market power, these scholars make market
376 Ibid, at 26-55.
377 Areeda, Hovenkamp, and Solow, see above n 341, at vol II 408a, at 291-93 (discussing trade-
off between market power and reduced production costs resulting from economies of scale);
ibid, at 410, 306-07 (discussing similar trade off where product differentiation is concerned).
378 See nn 240-49, above and accompanying text.
379 Areeda, Hovenkamp, and Solow, see above n 341, at vol II 402b.
380 Hovenkamp, see above n 37, at 17-18 (analogizing antitrust regulation of monopoly to
environmental regulation that internalizes externalities).
381 Areeda, Hovenkamp, and Solow, see above n 341, at vol II 402a. Cf. Stigler, see above n 102, at
113.
382 See nn 174-77, above and accompanying text.
383 Cf. nn 173-215, above, and accompanying text (explaining that economists once treated
market failure and perfect competition as co-existing phenomena); George J. Stigler, Perfect
Competition: Historically Contemplated, 65 Journal of Political Economy 1 (1957), 14 (perfect
competition requires existence of the Sherman Act). See also nn 163-67 above and
accompanying text (explaining how market failure is the result of poor property rights
assignments).
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power the sole focus of antitrust law and policy.384 As a result, these scholars
have constructed a framework that excludes all other externalities from their
purview, thus raising the cost of understanding how non-standard contracts
overcome market failure.
To be sure, sophisticated antitrust scholars recognize that some departures
from perfect competition can further total welfare, but then so too did the
scholars who set the tone during the inhospitality-era.385 Moreover, like
inhospitality scholars, many modern scholars treat all departures from perfect
competition as the source or result of market power. 386 Like their
inhospitality-era predecessors, these scholars believe that such harms must
be justified by some countervailing efficiency. 387
Unlike their inhospitality-era counterparts, however, today's scholars
recognize that non-standard contracts can produce significant benefits, by
reducing transaction costs. 388 Nonetheless, these scholars still see these
contracts through the lens of perfect competition and price theory. The very
description of their benefits-a 'reduction in transaction costs' finds
accommodation within the traditional model and conjures up images of
falling cost curves and lower production costs for individual firms. 389 Morever,
by emphasizing the paradigm of complete integration and the theory of the
firm, these scholars seem to conceptualize the benefits of these agreements as
arising within the firm, before passage of title. In so doing, these scholars
obscure the concept of market failure, which by definition manifests itself
outside the firm, in the non-optimal prices and quantities that various (now
cooperating) firms once charged consumers in light of externalities. 390 By
describing the benefits of these agreements in this way, scholars apparently
avoid the need to invoke the existence of externalities, which would themselves
require an additional violation of the modern formulation of the perfect
competition model. 391 As a result, these scholars are able to accommodate
384 Indeed, it should be noted that both scholars have argued that antitrust courts should not
premise liability on mere informational market failures that may give rise to consumer harm.
See, e.g., Hovenkamp, above n 37, at 299-300.
385 See nn 319-24, above and accompanying text.
386 Hovenkamp, see above n 37, at 36-37 (product differentiation necessarily confers market
power).
387 Ibid, at 27-31 (explaining how concentration related to economies of scale can enhance
welfare); Areeda, Hovenkamp, and Solow, II, see above n 341, at 408a.
388 Hovenkamp, see above n 37, at 37-38.
389 Ibid, at 37-38 (describing such contracts as methods of reducing transaction costs, without
referring to market failure), 372-74 (same). Cf. Bork, see above n 158, at 107-10 (contending
that Williamson's trade-off model can be used to illustrate all antitrust problems). See also
Kuhn, see above n 4, at 78 (explaining that scientists will adopt modifications of the received
paradigm when necessary to protect it from attack).
390 Cf. NCAA v Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 US 85 (US Supreme Court
1984) 101-02 (explaining how agreement on price paid athletes can overcome a market failure
and thus enhance the quality of the product sold to consumers).
391 See nn 381-83, above and accompanying text (explaining how modem antitrust scholars
define perfect competition in a manner that excludes externality by fiat). The most recent
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non-standard agreements within the existing framework, thereby avoiding the
need to fundamentally alter their foundational model.3 92 In so doing, these
scholars suppress or ignore the possibility that such contracts can produce
different (and better) market outcomes by restraining the marketplace
behavior of otherwise independent firms.3 93
It should not be surprising that modern scholars have failed to incorporate
the concept of market failure into their foundational models. As noted earlier,
these scholars have embraced a curious brand of perfect competition, one that
rests upon the superfluous assumption that externalities do not exist. 394 Even
ardent devotees of TCE downplay the market failure concept, rarely
mentioning it in their work. Like modern antitrust scholars, these scholars
generally treat complete integration as the paradigm case, thus buttressing the
modern inclination to analogize transaction cost reductions to other cost
reductions that occur 'within' the firm.39 5 Indeed, as I have shown elsewhere,
leading antitrust scholars have not fully comprehended TCE's main insight,
namely, that the firm is simply a particular sort of contract, with the result that
any distinction between what occurs inside and outside the firm is entirely
illusory. 396 By approaching the problem from the 'inside-out,' then,
practitioners of TCE have missed an opportunity to identify the more
fundamental basis for modern hostility toward non-standard contracts and
thus failed to overcome modern scholars' understandably fierce resistance to
paradigm change. 397 Absent the articulation of a competing paradigm,
version of Professor Areeda's treatise does explain that vertical distribution restraints can
overcome externalities. Areeda and Hovenkamp, see above note 48, vol. 8,1 1613b. However,
this most recent version does not link the elimination of externality to any broader
understanding that non-standard contracts may impact price and output without exercising
market power. Hence, the pro forma invocation of externality does not reflect a deeper
reformulation of the authors' views on the relationship between TCE and antitrust doctrine.
392 Kuhn, see above n 4, at 97 (scientists see no reason to reexamine existing models when such
models offer adequate explanations for observed phenomena).
393 See nn 151-59, above and accompanying text (explaining how cooperating firms can
internalize externalities through voluntary contractual integration).
394 See nn 381-83, above and accompanying text.
395 See nn 137-39, above and accompanying text (explaining how devotees of TCE treat complete
integration as the paradigm case).
396 See Alan J. Meese, 'Intrabrand Restraints and the Theory of the Firm', 83 North Carolina Law
Review at 123-27. Areeda, see above n 48, vol. 7 at 1464c, p. 236 ('Intraenterprise contracts,
like the pure unilateral cooperation within the very smallest firms are natural and efficient. Such
contracts are unlike collaboration of unrelated firms which is dangerous to competition and,
therefore, forbidden unless redeemed by some pro-competitive virtue.'); Hovenkamp, see
above n 37, at 187 ('Agreements within the firm are to be treated as the conduct of a single
actor, on the presumption that such a firm is a single profit-maximizer.'); ibid ('When the firm
is unmistakably a single profit-maximizing entity and has always been so, it makes no sense to
find a Sherman Act "conspiracy" among any of its personnel, divisions, subsidiaries or other
subordinate organizations.').
397 Kuhn, see also above n 4, at 64-65 (describing resistance to paradigm change by incumbent
scientists). See also Max Planck, Scientific Autobiography and Other Papers (New York:
Philosophical Library 1949) 33-34 (trans. F. Grager) (contending that new scientific theories
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modern antitrust scholars naturally cling to that which has served them so well
for so many years.
398
It is entirely natural, then, that these scholars and the courts that listen to
them would expect transaction cost efficiencies to manifest themselves as
reduced prices and increased output as measured by courts. 3 9 9 It is equally
natural that these scholars would treat any increase in price or reduction in
output as a departure from perfect competition and a manifestation of
market power. 400 In short, modern scholars have done their best to
assimilate TCE's teachings within the partial equilibrium trade-off frame-
work initially developed to analyze the welfare effects of mergers that
produce technological efficiencies.4 0 ' Within this framework, efficiencies
necessarily manifest themselves as lower production costs and thus increased
output of the product than existed before the restraint. This merger
paradigm is ill-suited for evaluation of restraints that purportedly overcome
market failure.
40 2
While scholars 'know' that non-standard contracts can produce benefits,
they simultaneously cling to a foundational model that has as its bedrock the
'competitive price,' set in an instant by unbridled rivalry in a 'competitive'
market where resources move without restraint. When the ideal of antitrust
policy is the 'competitive price,' set without cooperation, and where scholars
assume that market power is the only source of externality, collective action
that impacts price or disadvantages rivals is naturally seen as a departure from
the perfectly competitive ideal and thus the exercise of 'market power,' the
bogey man of the model. Moreover, adherence to this foundational ideal
apparently precludes recognition that cooperation between parties can
internalize anticipated externalities, change the costs faced by the parties to
the arrangement, and thus result in higher prices or reduced output without
creating or exercising market power. In this way, otherwise independent firms
can replicate the (perfectly legal) behavior of a fully-integrated firm.
40 3
only emerge because adherents to old paradigms retire and thus cede the field to proponents of
new paradigms); Kuhn, see above n 4, at 151.
398 Kuhn, see above n 4, at 77 ('Once it has achieved the status of paradigm, a scientific theory is
declared invalid only if an alternative candidate is available to take its place'); ibid ('The
decision to reject one paradigm is always simultaneously the decision to accept another.').
399 See nn 49-52, 87-89, above and accompanying text (explaining how NCAA and the
Competitor Collaboration Guidelines rest on this assumption).
400 See nn 41-49, 67, 81-86, above and accompanying text (discussing various scholarly, judicial
and executive pronouncements that all depend upon assertion that a restraint that increases
prices or reduces output necessarily reflects an exercise of market power).
401 Cf. Oliver E. Williamson, 'Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Trade-Offs', 58
American Economic Review 18 (1968) (articulating partial equilibrium trade-off model for
analyzing mergers that simultaneously create market power and economies of scale).
402 See Alan J. Meese, 'Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason', 2003 Illinois Law
Review 77 (2003), 144-70.
403 Cf. Charles Goetz and Robert Scott, 'Principles of Relational Contracts', 67 Virginia Law
Review 1089 (1981), 1094-95 (predicting that parties will adopt relational contracts that will
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Instead, to the modern eye, such impacts on price and output 'must' be
manifestations of market power, with the result that any attempt to justify such
agreements will necessarily fail. Until courts and scholars remove the blinders
of perfect competition, they will continue to repeat many of the mistakes of
their predecessors.
V. CONCLUSION
Transaction cost economics has worked a genuine revolution in economic
theory. At the same time, practitioners of TCE have not yet identified the true
foundations of the hostility to non-standard contracts, hostility that still
survives to this day. This article has traced both the inhospitality-era hostility
and lingering modern hostility back to the foundational model of perfect
competition. Scholars, courts and enforcement officials would do well to
re-examine the 'Basic Economics of Antitrust.'
induce them to replicate the behavior of a single, unified firm over time); Robert H. Bork, 'The
Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division II', 75 Yale Law
Journal 373 (1965), 453-54; ibid, at 472 ('In economic analysis, a contract integration is as
much a firm as an ownership integration. The nature of the standards applied to them through
the Sherman Act should be the same.'); Margolis, see above n 161, at 29-42 (explaining how
deeply entrenched habits of mind can constitute barriers that prevent scientists from properly
understanding natural phenomena).

